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Statement of originality 
 
Some of the discussion of The Blair Witch Project throughout this thesis has 
formed the basis for a book, Devil’s Advocates: The Blair Witch Project (Auteur, 
2014). Some of the discussion of priming in chapter four was also used in a 
conference paper, Behind the Camera: Priming the Spectator of Found Footage 
Horror, delivered at The Society for Cognitive Studies of the Moving Image in 
2015. Sections on personal imagining also formed the basis of a conference paper, 
Personal Imagining and the Point-of-View Shot in Diegetic Camera Horror 
Films, delivered at The Society for Cognitive Studies of the Moving Image in 
2017. Finally, significant amounts of Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 will be featured in 
two chapters of an upcoming edited collection on found footage horror films with 
the working title [Rec] Terror: Essays on Found Footage Horror Films. 
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Abstract 
 
The main research question underpinning this study asks why and how the 
diegetic camera technique has become so popular to both contemporary horror 
filmmakers and audiences. In order to answer this question, this thesis adopts a 
mainly cognitive theoretical framework in order to address the mental schemata 
and processes that are elicited and triggered by these films. The concept of the 
diegetic camera is explored by analysing specific films and constructing an 
argument for the effects that this aesthetic and narrational technique can have on 
the cognition of viewers. Applying theoretical notions such as schema, priming, 
identification, recognition, alignment, and allegiance to the analysis of the 
focus films, I examine how the viewer’s mind works when watching these films. 
Another central concern of this thesis is the way in which mediated realism is 
constructed in the films in order to attempt to make audiences either (mis)read the 
footage as non-fiction, or more commonly to imagine that the footage is non-
fiction. 
 
I demonstrate that the films under scrutiny create a sense of increased immediacy 
and alignment with the characters through various techniques associated with the 
diegetic camera. The concepts of identification and character engagement are 
interrogated by using cognitive concepts such as recognition, alignment, and 
allegiance (Smith, 1995). These individual concepts break down the notion of 
identification into distinct processes, allowing for a more rigorous examination of 
the notion of character engagement. The thesis also considers how priming and 
self-consciousness eventually affect the audience’s perception and cognition of 
the films, most significantly in relation to the theory of personal imagining 
(Currie, 1995). 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Scope and significance: why do found footage films matter? 
 
The cinematic image of a young woman staring into the camera - crying, 
hyperventilating and talking directly to her audience (fig. 1.1) - has become the 
definitive image of The Blair Witch Project (Myrick and Sanchez, 1999). It is 
arguably the most famous scene, and certainly the most parodied image of found 
footage horror cinema in general. Perhaps it can be even be called one of the 
defining images of cinema in the 1990s tout court. This character, Heather 
Donahue, is played by a hitherto unknown actress called Heather Donahue, in her 
feature debut. From what we see on screen, and the manner in which her 
monologue is delivered, it can be inferred that she is not reciting scripted lines. 
She does not seem to be acting; her fear appears genuine. Heather is alone in a 
dark tent, shooting this footage herself with a handheld camera. The shot did not 
look like most other horror films that had been previously shown in cinemas; it is 
poorly framed, poorly lit, and the character knows and acknowledges that she is 
on camera.  
 
COPYRIGHTED IMAGE REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
Figure 2.1: Heather Donahue in The Blair Witch Project. 
 
There had been previous films in this style: Cannibal Holocaust (Deodato, 1980) 
contains the use of ‘found footage’ within its narrative structure and Man Bites 
Dog (Belvaux, Bonzel and Poelvoorde, 1992) is a mock-documentary that 
purports to be completely filmed by a diegetic film crew. However, neither of 
these films had the cultural impact or box office success of The Blair Witch 
Project, a film that eventually spawned numerous imitators, and arguably the 
entire found footage horror sub-genre that now consists of over a hundred films.1 
                                                          
1 According to fan-made lists on IMDb, for example, here: 
http://www.imdb.com/list/ls052694809/ Though there is some debate about whether all of these 
films could be categorised as ‘found footage’, there are over a hundred that are recognisable 
examples. There are also an increasing number of studies that have paid attention to this sub-genre 
including an entire issue of Ol3Media: e-journal of Cinema, Television and Media Studies 
http://host.uniroma3.it/riviste/Ol3Media/archivio_files/Ol3Media%2009%20Horror.pdf as well as 
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There is a straightforward economic reason why filmmakers continue to produce 
found footage films. The Blair Witch Project made over $ 248 million at the 
worldwide box office2 on a $ 60,000 production budget thus ensuring that a new 
sub-genre of horror films, labelled by critics as found footage films, was born. As 
Brigid Cherry (2009, p.34) argues, ‘since many horror films are produced at the 
low budget end of the scale, filmmakers are forced by circumstance to be 
innovative or inventive with what little resources they do have access to, often 
making a virtue of necessity’. Found footage horror films are cheap to make, with 
the highest budget to date being $ 25 million for Cloverfield (Reeves, 2008), but 
most are far cheaper. The majority of these films have budgets below one million 
dollars, and with the exception of a few, all have made a profit. With such small 
budgets, the financial outlay for investors is low, and the potential gross can be 
significant in the case of some of the popular found footage films. The most 
successful titles grossed over twenty times the amount that they cost to produce: 
The Last Broadcast (Avalos and Weiler, 1998) reportedly cost only $ 900, but 
made $ 4 million; Paranormal Activity (Peli, 2007) had production costs of          
$ 15,000 before earning $ 193 million at the global box office. 
 
 
 
 
 
Film Budget Gross Budget to Gross Ratio 
Paranormal Activity $ 15,000 $ 193,355,800 1: 12,890 
The Last Broadcast $ 900 $ 4,000,000 1: 4444 
The Blair Witch Project $ 60,000 $ 248,639,099 1: 4144 
Unfriended $ 1,000,000 $ 64,056,643 1: 64 
Paranormal Activity 2 $ 3,000,000 $ 177,512,032 1: 59 
                                                                                                                                                               
Alexandra Heller-Nicholas’ volume Found Footage Horror Films: Fear and the Appearance of 
Reality. See appendix A for a list of the found footage films produced between 1999 and 2009. 
2 All budgets and box office figures are sourced from Box Office Mojo and/or the Internet Movie 
Database in order to triangulate data and confirm reliability where possible. On some occasions, 
the figures can only be found on one of these two sites. 
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The Zombie Diaries $ 10,668 $526,552 1: 49 
Paranormal Activity 3 $ 5,000,000 $ 207,039,844 1: 41 
The Last Exorcism $ 1,800,000 $67,738,090 1: 37 
Paranormal Activity 4 $ 5,000,000 $ 142,817,992 1: 28 
Cannibal Holocaust $ 100,000 $2,000,000 1: 20 
 
Table 1: Top 10 Budget to Gross Ratios in the found footage sub-genre. 
 
Economics are not the only reason for the ubiquity and popularity of these films. 
Their cheap-looking aesthetic is in fact a virtue because it is their look that makes 
them appear similar to authentic documentaries and home videos. It is my 
argument that most of the impact of the aesthetic is due to the systematic use of 
the ‘diegetic camera’. Filmmakers working in genres other than horror have also 
begun to utilise the diegetic camera to create this distinctive aesthetic. For 
example, the release of Chronicle (Trank, 2012), End of Watch (Ayer, 2012) and 
Into the Storm (Quale, 2014), have seen budgets raise dramatically and the 
employment of found footage aesthetic and narrative strategies in superhero films, 
police dramas and disaster films respectively. Science fiction films such as Earth 
to Echo (Green, 2014) and Project Almanac (Israelite, 2015) have also recently 
adopted the approach, indicating the influence of low budget horror filmmakers 
on more mainstream practitioners. 
 
1.2 Approaching the diegetic camera 
 
The main research question underpinning this study asks why and how the 
diegetic camera technique has become so popular to both contemporary horror 
filmmakers and audiences. In order to answer this question, this thesis will adopt a 
mainly cognitive theoretical framework in order to address the mental schemata 
and processes that are elicited and triggered by these films. I will explore the 
concept of the diegetic camera and argue that this aesthetic and narrational 
technique can have an effect on the cognition of the viewer, including his or her 
moral evaluation of characters and the empathy s/he feels with the characters. 
Utilising and applying theoretical notions such as schema, priming, 
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identification, recognition, alignment and allegiance to the analysis of the focus 
films will enable me to examine how the viewer’s mind works when watching 
these films. In particular, Jean Piaget (1952) defined the notion of schemata as 
units of knowledge that people can draw upon when reacting to incoming stimuli. 
This suggests that viewers can organise information from films and use this 
information as a framework for future understanding. This is enmeshed with the 
concept of priming suggesting that the early scenes in a film are vital in creating a 
mood for the viewer based on their previous knowledge of the techniques that 
they are seeing. I will also be considering how restricted narration is set up and 
maintained in these films. This is narration that is restricted beyond most other 
films previously made, with the exception of Lady in the Lake (Montgomery, 
1947). The strict adherence to the employment of a diegetic camera creates many 
limitations on where the camera might be placed and this narration has an impact 
on the viewer’s perception of diegetic events. It will also be necessary to analyse 
what cues are present to convince the viewer that the camera is diegetic and, 
furthermore, that the shot is a point-of-view shot. Finally, another central concern 
of this thesis is the way in which mediated realism is constructed in the films in 
order to attempt to make audiences either (mis)read the footage as non-fiction, or 
more commonly to imagine that the footage is non-fiction. 
 
My hypothesis is that the films under scrutiny create a sense of increased 
immediacy and alignment with the characters through various techniques 
associated with the diegetic camera trend. It is less important that these films are 
known as ‘found footage’, and more significant that they are shot with a ‘diegetic 
camera’, hence my use of this term to describe the films henceforth. Some of the 
films contain reference to the actual ‘finding’ of the footage (e.g. The Blair Witch 
Project) and others do not (e.g. Man Bites Dog). There is always the implication 
that the footage has been found and can now be revealed to the viewer. More 
importantly, however, there is always a diegetic camera operator present at the 
events being revealed. I will be interrogating the concept of identification by 
using cognitive concepts such as recognition, alignment and allegiance (Smith, 
1995). These individual concepts break down the notion of identification into 
distinct processes, allowing for a more rigorous examination of the idea of 
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identification. Analysing these films from a cognitive perspective will allow me to 
explore the mechanisms of an audience’s responses to the characters and to 
narrative and aesthetic strategies, including how priming and self-consciousness 
eventually affect the audience’s perception and cognition of the films.  
 
In this thesis, it is my aim to analyse the aesthetic, technological, and perceptual 
elements of these films in order to first ascertain the most significant antecedents 
of diegetic camera horror films as concerns production, perception, and aesthetics. 
Based on this, I will then establish the aesthetic, technological, and psychological 
means by which the audience is primed for the viewing experience of these films. 
Subsequently, I will determine with who the viewer is encouraged to empathise 
when viewing the films and why. This will involve an analysis of how the diegetic 
camera film affects enunciation and how the diegetic camera must be theorised 
differently from the traditional notion of the camera theorised in film studies to 
date. This analysis will also allow me to consider how off-camera space is 
privileged in diegetic camera films. Furthermore, I will consider the construction 
of realism, and more precisely what type of realism is being created. I will also 
investigate how the level of self-consciousness (e.g. the characters’ awareness that 
they are being filmed) impacts the viewing experience and thought processes of 
the viewer. Finally, I will investigate the notion of allegiance in relation to the 
charismatic killer category of diegetic camera films. 
 
 
1.3 The corpus of focus films: found footage and the diegetic camera 
 
I will use the term ‘diegetic camera films’ rather than found footage films, even 
though this category of films can be defined in many different ways. Alexandra 
Heller-Nicholas (2014, p.13) offers the definition that they are simply ‘films that 
feature material that is literally found or discovered’. In films such as The Blair 
Witch Project and Cloverfield there is clear reference to the retrieval of tapes or 
memory cards that contain footage and the entire narration consists of revealing 
this supposedly discovered material. However, in others such as The Last 
Broadcast, only certain sequences in the film consist of found footage and are 
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situated within a given framing narrative as part of a larger mock-documentary 
narrational and aesthetic strategy. Therefore, Heller-Nicholas broadens the 
definition to include all ‘movies filmed with diegetic hand-held cameras, 
surveillance cameras, or both’ (2014, p.13-14). For the purpose of clarity and 
precision, it is also important to distinguish diegetic camera horror films from the 
preceding use of the term found footage. In scholarly work on film, found footage 
was traditionally a term used to describe those films that ‘employ material shot by 
someone else for another reason’ (Heller-Nicholas, 2014, p.14) such as A Movie 
(Conner, 1958) and The Clock (Marclay, 2010). The films analysed in this thesis 
can to some extent be considered fictional versions of these original found footage 
films. Originally, the term found footage referred to a moving image collage of 
non-fiction footage. The films now being labelled as found footage and, in 
particular those that are the subject of this thesis fictionalise this conceit. They are 
comprised of footage that has supposedly already been shot by someone (a 
character within the film) and has now either been edited or left as it was found, 
and finally released as a film product.  
 
Scott Meslow (2012) recognises that found footage films are ‘built on the conceit 
that the movie was filmed... by a character that exists within the film’s world - and 
whose footage was discovered sometime after the events of the film’. While this is 
an excellent definition, it does not do enough to separate and recognise the 
diversity within this group of films. Heller-Nicholas (2014, p.16) calls this body 
of films ‘a distinct horror category with its own readily identifiable features, some 
of which stem from documentary traditions and associated evolving trends in the 
field of mockumentary’. However, many of the films analysed have features that 
appear more familiar when compared to home videos and reality television. 
Therefore I will divide the focus films into three distinct, albeit overlapping, 
categories: documentary and reality TV, home videos, and charismatic killers. 
More specifically: 
 
1) The first category contains those films whose conventions most resemble 
documentaries, mockumentaries and reality television programmes. I 
will focus on The Blair Witch Project and Rec (Balaguero and Plaza, 
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2007). The Blair Witch Project is about three student filmmakers who 
enter the woods of Burkitsville in order to make a documentary on the 
legend of the Blair Witch. The film is comprised of the footage they 
supposedly shot before their disappearance. Rec is about the presenter of a 
reality television programme who is quarantined in an apartment block in 
Barcelona when a virus is unleashed. Her camera operator Pablo keeps 
filming through the night and therefore, Rec is supposedly all of Pablo’s 
footage. 
 
2) The second category includes those films whose conventions most 
resemble home videos. In this case, the focus films are: Paranormal 
Activity, Exhibit A (Rotheroe, 2007) and Cloverfield. Paranormal Activity 
is about a couple, Katie and Micah, who believe they are being haunted, 
which prompts Micah to buy a camera and film everything that is 
happening in his home. Exhibit A follows a middle class family who are 
undergoing financial and domestic problems as the daughter films the 
family. Cloverfield is about a group of friends who are in New York when 
the city is attacked by a monster. One character, Hud, films the events as 
they unfold overnight. 
 
3) The third category bridges the aesthetic, technical, and perceptual gap 
between the first and the second category; that is, between the most 
seemingly professional examples and those that look the most amateurish. 
This category - which I call charismatic killers - includes examples 
ranging from those filmed by documentary crews to outright amateurs 
using domestic camcorders. What distinguishes these films from those in 
the first and second categories is that the camera operators are less victims 
of the horror, and more complicit with the actions of the monsters they are 
documenting. The ‘monster’ may even be considered by some to be an 
appealing anti-hero, hence my use of the term ‘charismatic killers’. In this 
category, the focus films are: Man Bites Dog, The Last Horror Movie 
(Richards, 2003), and Zero Day (Coccio, 2003). Man Bites Dog is about a 
documentary crew who follow a serial killer as he goes about his business, 
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and eventually become accomplices with his actions. The Last Horror 
Movie follows a serial killer who has convinced an assistant to make a 
documentary about him. Zero Day is comprised of the footage of two 
teens who film themselves as they prepare to commit a massacre at their 
high school. 
 
Category Focus films 
Documentary/Reality TV The Blair Witch Project 
Rec 
Home movies  Paranormal Activity 
Exhibit A  
Cloverfield  
Charismatic Killers Man Bites Dog 
The Last Horror Movie  
Zero Day 
 
Table 2: Categories and focus films. 
 
 
1.4. Review of critical literature: diegetic camera horror, cognitivism and 
identification 
 
 1.4.1 Diegetic camera horror 
 
Recently, there has been an increasing amount of scholarly attention to this corpus 
of films. Referring to them, Zachary Ingle uses the term ‘diegetic camera’, which 
he defines as ‘a camera within the diegesis, acknowledged by the characters, 
which is quite different from the typical subjective camera’ (2011, p.32). The 
diegetic camera is different to the subjective camera due to the supposed origin of 
the footage. With the subjective camera, the origin is supposedly the eye of a 
character, whereas with the diegetic camera, the origin is the lens of a camera that 
is present within the diegesis. Ingle also points out that this particular technique 
could be ‘regarded as a descendant of cinéma vérité’, noting that the latter ‘has 
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also had an influence on reality television, perhaps making a case for reality 
television’s influence on the diegetic camera movement’ (2011, p.33).3 Using the 
adjective ‘diegetic’ to describe the camera in these films is accurate in that it 
indicates that the camera is a prop that is part of the fictional world, and therefore 
a profilmic element. To be more precise, the camera is being used to narrate at 
what Gérard Genette (1980, p.228) calls the intradiegetic level. This is where a 
character within the story appears to tell the narrative, rather than some unseen 
extradiegetic narrator or narrating instance. 
 
Keira McKenzie (2011) calls the trend ‘Reality Horror’ but takes a more 
contentious approach, claiming that ‘the viewer has become one of the characters, 
the imaginary real has become experiential and the viewer is directly involved in 
the narrative as it unfolds around them’ (2011, p.39). This statement requires 
some attention and further consideration in the thesis, particularly with reference 
to off-screen space and the idea that important narrative events are occurring 
behind the camera. McKenzie also argues that ‘Reality Horror enforces 
engagement and in becoming one of the hapless characters within the film, the 
viewer cannot maintain distance between the events of the story and their own 
viewing’ (2011, p.40). The spectator’s position is like that of a character 
immersed in the diegetic events, rather than being in the position of the more 
traditional invisible observer. However, when watching a diegetic camera film, I 
contend that there is still some distance. The viewer is forced to imagine some of 
the events and characters that are behind the camera and therefore the viewer still 
feels some detachment from the story and events. 
 
Don Tresca (2011) also uses the term ‘reality horror’ and argues that these films 
place ‘the audience in the “documentary mode of engagement,” creating an 
expectation of reality, and then undercutting such expectation by introducing 
elements into the film that cannot exist in reality (e.g. ghosts, giant monsters, 
demons, witches, etc.)’ (2011, p.45). Tresca (2011, p.47) also asserts that after 
viewing reality horror: 
                                                          
3 This link will be explored in greater depth later in this thesis, as will the differences between the 
diegetic camera and the traditional subjective camera. 
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the audience no longer feels safe and comfortable in the 
real world because the films imply that such terrors exist 
outside the movie experience. Even though, logically, the 
audience understands the fictional nature of the films, the 
audience mindset has been conditioned to create an 
assumption that any film presented in a documentary 
fashion is reality.  
 
Although Tresca’s claim points to a different experience for viewers of diegetic 
camera films, I would argue that he has overstated the power of these films to 
convince the audience. This is a central concern of this thesis as I consider the 
ways the spectator is primed to read and interpret the film in a different manner to 
more traditional narrative films. Diegetic camera films may not make audiences 
feel less safe in the real world as Tresca suggests, but they do encourage viewers 
to engage in a more visceral imagining that what is presented is real footage. 
 
 1.4.2 Cognitivism and the processing of point of view 
 
In order to investigate notions such as priming, identification and self-
consciousness in the diegetic camera horror film, it has been necessary to review 
several areas of existing scholarly work. Cognitive philosophy has been the most 
important area of research, and the most significant in formulating a theoretical 
perspective on the corpus of focus films. The framework of this thesis will be 
informed by Edward Branigan’s writings on the point-of-view shot, Noël Burch’s 
theory of off-screen space and David Bordwell’s theories of narration. I will be 
combining these to offer an account of how point of view is created and structured 
in these films and how its persistent use encourages specific responses from the 
viewer in terms of how s/he imagines off-screen space. My account will follow 
Bordwell’s work that emphasises the importance of schemata in the viewer’s 
processing of films and more specifically how point of view and off-screen space 
cause specific schemata to be drawn upon. I will also consider the work of Murray 
Smith and other cognitive theorists as they account for the concept of 
identification from a cognitive perspective. Broadly speaking, much of the 
literature consulted has a focus on realism and the horror genre. As the application 
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of these theories to diegetic camera films is a relatively unexplored territory, this 
thesis will be an original intervention in film theory.  
 
Bordwell’s seminal contributions stand out as a key turning point in cognitivist 
approaches to studying how viewers perceive films. As he argues: ‘when 
spectators are confronted with a film that emphasizes its stylistic features, they 
will seek cues for constructing a story’ (1985, p.36). The corpus of films analyzed 
here certainly emphasize their own stylistic features, constantly reminding the 
spectator that they are constructions that have been shot by a camera that is within 
the story world of the film. However, I believe that when these films highlight 
their own construction, they encourage the viewer to imagine that the film is a 
documentary, reality television show or home video. By foregrounding the 
construction, mediated realism is invoked in order to support their supposed non-
fiction status. Their self-consciousness makes them more immersive than 
traditional films and this is largely due to their privileging of off-screen space and 
the viewer’s imaginings and perception of this space. Of course, Bordwell is not 
addressing the same issues as this thesis, arguing that ‘unlike prose fiction, the 
fictional film seldom confines its narration to what only a single character knows’ 
(1985, p.58). However, this is almost exclusively what occurs in diegetic camera 
films with the narration always tied to the camera(s) which are predominantly 
carried by characters. With the camera so often in the hands of a character, these 
shots must often be categorised as point-of-view shots. A consideration of existing 
literature on the point-of-view shot that follows below is therefore essential. 
 
Branigan (1984, 1992, 2006) frequently focuses on the point-of-view shot and I 
will apply his work by investigating if his theories on point of view structure are 
applicable when looking at the diegetic camera film. As a rule of thumb, the POV 
shot can generally be used in an objective manner, in order to simply show what a 
character is looking at, or it can be more subjective, as is the case in diegetic 
camera films. The POV shot offers a sense of what the character is feeling or 
thinking by putting the viewer into the eyes (or camera lens) of that character. I 
will adopt Branigan’s work on POV structure in order to theorise the diegetic 
camera. Branigan identifies a number of variants on the POV structure, but 
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diegetic camera films utilise one of these variants more than others: the continuing 
POV. This has implications for the viewer’s processing of the film particularly in 
regards to imagining off-screen space. Branigan’s concept of focalization4 will 
also be key here, as diegetic camera films are clear examples where characters 
provide the spectator with information about the story world. As Branigan states, 
‘focalization (reflection) involves a character neither speaking (narrating, 
reporting, communicating) nor acting (focusing, focused by), but rather actually 
experiencing something through seeing or hearing it’ (1992, p.101). Though we 
may hear the camera-operating character speak, and we may even see their actions 
(or decipher them from the camera movement), diegetic camera films offer 
something akin to internal focalization, where ‘story world and screen are meant 
to collapse into each other, forming a perfect identity in the name of the 
character… the spectator’s task is to identify the story world with the mental 
understanding of a specific character’ (1992, p.102). The continuing point-of-view 
shot offers the viewer the perception of the character and also some impression of 
their mental state. Each of the focus films is presented as a restricted narration 
where internal focalization as described by Branigan is utilised. Some of this 
reveals what Branigan calls deep internal focalization (perception and thoughts of 
the character), but the majority is surface internal focalization, revealing the 
speech and perception of the character. Therefore, due to deep or surface internal 
focalization, the viewer gains considerable knowledge about a character. This is 
knowledge about what the character is both seeing and feeling. This increased 
familiarity with the character’s point of view should promote or assure empathy 
with the character. 
 
Branigan’s (2006) later work also deals with point of view, raising an interesting 
question: ‘whose point of view needs to be analyzed as being embodied in a 
camera: the author, implied author, tacit narrator, explicit narrator, invisible 
observer, character, ideal spectator, or actual spectator, to name a few 
                                                          
4 Focalization is a term used in narratological studies recognising that characters also provide 
spectators with relevant information. Branigan borrows the term ‘focalization’ from Genette 
(1980) who uses it to distinguish between three different types of restriction of narrative 
information: zero, internal and external. Branigan positions focalization in a hierarchy of 
narrations below the first four levels that make use of narrators. 
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possibilities?’ (2006, p.40). Branigan’s questions about the nature of the camera 
and its status as being embedded in a text only go so far, as they generally do not 
consider the diegetic camera. Branigan considers not only what a ‘camera is’, but 
more importantly, ‘what we do with the word “camera”’ (2006, p.66). He 
considers eight major conceptions of the camera (2006, p.95), from the simplest 
conception of the camera being a literal box that captures the image, through to 
expressionistic, communicative and psychoanalytic conceptions of the camera. In 
diegetic camera films, only three of these conceptions are of significance due to 
the position of the camera in the fictional world of the film: i) the camera is an 
actual profilmic prop that must be imagined by the viewer, ii) it is used for 
expressionistic purposes (i.e. to give some indication of the consciousness of the 
character that operates it), and iii) for communicative purposes (i.e. to convey 
information to the spectator and to other characters). 
 
Branigan quotes Raymond Durgnat’s (2002) ‘A Long Hard look at Psycho’ in 
saying ‘a spectator does not watch a scene through a profilmic camera nor think 
about a scene by picturing a camera that is watching the scene nor imagine a 
camera to be an invisible narrator or invisible character’ (2002, p.92). While this 
may be true of classical Hollywood films, this claim does not apply to the body of 
horror films under discussion in this thesis. In the diegetic camera horror film, we 
do watch the film through a profilmic camera and therefore I suggest that we do 
picture a camera that is watching the scene. Branigan also argues that ‘although a 
spectator may well imagine that he or she is “inside” a fiction (or “inside” a 
character), he or she is in a different place within the fiction from the view that 
appears on screen’ (2002, p.176). When a spectator remembers most films, s/he is 
likely to assemble what Branigan calls, a ‘mental matrix that permits us to freely 
visualize’ (2002, p.176). However, with diegetic camera films, I argue that our 
memory is tied to the point of view of the diegetic camera much more closely. 
This means that our memory of the film is not only of what we witnessed, but 
almost exactly how we witnessed it. The origin of the footage is the camera that is 
involved in events on screen, and therefore the experience must be more 
immersive. The cinematography is a key factor in our memory as we must 
imagine the position of our diegetic narrator who holds the camera. For example, 
14 
 
when we remember scenes from  Cloverfield, we recall details of the camera’s 
position at street level as Hud pans the camera to watch the head of the Statue of 
Liberty crash nearby. The position of the camera is memorable because when 
watching the film we are likely to imagine the character holding the camera. 
However, in our memory of the film the camera-operating character is less likely 
to be remembered: instead, the captured image - and therefore the camera’s 
placement and our alignment with it - is much more important. We are just as 
likely to recall how the scene was filmed (and our ideas about why it was filmed 
this way) as what was filmed. Our imagination of what is happening behind the 
camera in off-screen space is vital to our understanding and memory of many 
scenes. 
 
Thus far the literature considered does not include any detailed application of a 
cognitive framework to the horror genre specifically. However, Noël Carroll’s 
(1990) book on the philosophy of horror is a crucial text for the development of 
my methodology as it functions as a bridge between cognitivism and the genre-
based study of horror cinema. Carroll’s work has been criticized for its focus on 
the abnormal monster to the exclusion of other objects of horror and causes for 
fear, and much of this criticism is valid. His ‘position with respect to art-horror 
requires that the emotion be focused upon monsters where those are understood to 
be creatures not countenanced by contemporary science’ (1990, p.37). However, 
not revealing the monster is a defining feature of some of the films analysed here. 
There is no visible monster on which to focus emotion in either The Blair Witch 
Project or the majority of Paranormal Activity. Furthermore, Carroll notes ‘the 
drama of proof plays (...) an important role in horror stories, since (...) the object 
of art-horror is that which is excluded from our conceptual schemes. Thus, the 
plots make a point of proving that there are more things in heaven and earth than 
are acknowledged to exist in our standing conceptual frameworks’ (1990, p.102). 
While this is partially true of the focus films, the use of video technology is an 
attempt at providing proof of the supernatural; the video footage supposedly 
captured by the characters is often to some extent inconclusive and lacks the proof 
generally included in the resolution of the horror texts that Carroll references. 
More events of considerable narrative importance (such as the deaths of the 
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characters) are left to the imagination of the spectator due to the protagonists 
being off-screen as the film ends in examples such as The Blair Witch Project and 
Cloverfield. Diegetic camera films deliberately limit the concrete proof of 
monsters, ghosts and witches in order to further their claims of mediated realism. 
If a genuine amateur or documentary camera operator were to try and film these 
kinds of supernatural beings without knowing exactly when and where they would 
appear, the footage would likely only contain fragments of concrete evidence.  
 
This thesis will complicate Carroll’s dismissal of the concept of identification. He 
asserts that ‘what is meant by character-identification [is] emotional duplication 
[but] very often we have different and, in fact, more information about what is 
going on in a fiction than do the protagonists, and consequently, what we feel is 
very different from what the character may be thought to feel’ (1990, p.91). 
However, in these films the viewer is confined to the point of view of the 
character and there is therefore much greater alignment with the character. 
Duplication of emotions is much more frequent and common in found footage 
films than Carroll would suggest due to the viewer’s almost identical knowledge 
as the character. But identification is still a problematic idea that will need further 
exploration, particularly with reference to Murray Smith’s theory of ‘recognition, 
alignment, and allegiance’ (1995, p.73) which will be considered in chapter 7. 
 
 1.4.3 Towards a cognitive theory of identification and the diegetic 
 camera 
 
This thesis will also contest some of Gregory Currie’s assertions on identification 
and the photographic image. Currie posits that ‘identification with the camera 
would frequently require us to think of ourselves in peculiar or impossible 
locations, undertaking movements out of keeping with the natural limitations of 
our bodies, and peculiarly invisible to the characters’ (1995, p.26). In the case of 
the body of films under investigation, this is generally not the case. The camera is 
almost always in the hands of a human character and therefore moves and stays in 
possible locations. The camera is visible to the characters in the diegesis and is 
frequently acknowledged by them. Even when the camera is not in the hands of a 
16 
 
character, a viewer can easily identify and picture the camera, whether it be on a 
tripod in the corner of a room (Paranormal Activity) or dropped on the ground 
(Cloverfield). Even the editing encourages the viewer to imagine how the camera 
is being operated, as it is undemanding to envisage that cuts between shots are 
moments when the camera has simply been switched off and then switched on 
again between shots. Currie also claims ‘a significant fact about photography and 
cinematography – one that distinguishes both rather strongly from painting – is 
said to be this: just as one can see only that which exists, there can be photographs 
only of things that exist’ (1995, p.75). Though this statement reflects why the 
films discussed here are perhaps convincing to many viewers, it does not apply to 
the use of computer-generated special effects in a film like Cloverfield in which a 
giant rampaging monster is created; a monster that never really existed as a 
physical object being photographed, but is still perceptually realistic. Photographs 
and photographic moving images can be manipulated and with the advent of 
digital manipulation, this has become increasingly convincing. Other special 
effects are used in some of the films such as Paranormal Activity for example 
where it appears that an invisible entity is interacting with the visible 
environment. Filmmakers can create photo-realistic images of things that do not 
exist (like monsters or ghosts) using digital technology or they can manipulate 
images in such a way as to suggest the appearance of things that were actually 
never in front of the camera. However, special effects are generally limited in 
diegetic camera horror films, not only due to budget restraints, but also because 
they are often about more realistic human ‘monsters’ and the mediated realism of 
the way these monsters are captured by cameras in the hands of characters. 
 
The diegetic camera’s promise of increased point-of-view shots is a key factor 
affecting the viewer’s cognition when watching these films. Berys Gaut (1999) 
posits ‘the reaction shot can be a more effective vehicle for affective and empathic 
identification with a character than is the point-of-view shot. The reaction shot 
shows the human face or body, which we are expert at interpreting for signs of 
emotion’ (1999, p.210). Gaut goes on to state that ‘if we are confronted with 
visual evidence of an individual’s suffering, we have a strong tendency to 
empathise and sympathise with her’ (1999, p.210). If, in these films, the viewer is 
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witness to the point of view of the diegetic camera lens and not just the POV of a 
character, then this raises interesting questions about the use of the camera in 
films such as The Blair Witch Project where a character will turn the camera 
round to frame their own face in close-up. This moment of alignment with the 
point of view of the camera, but also recognition of the human in the frame will 
need to be explored as it is a recurring feature of the films under discussion in this 
thesis. If it is assumed (and sometimes it is made clear) that the camera has a 
viewfinder screen that can also be flipped to allow the camera operator to see 
themselves as they film their own face, then this further complicates the notion of 
identification and the use of the POV shot and close-up. In essence, and to use 
contemporary parlance, the characters take moving image ‘selfies’ and these shots 
appear very similar in style to vlogs where people look directly into the camera to 
capture a moment in their lives; a self-representation that requires no one else to 
hold the camera. The camera operator as enunciator now becomes visible, and 
therefore the viewer does not have to imagine off-screen space. We can learn 
about the character not only from their facial expressions and dialogue, but also 
how they choose to film themselves (from what angle, for how long, how often, 
etc.). These are diegetic camera POV shots, but also character POV in the sense 
that the character is still in control of the camera. Unlike more traditional POV 
shots however, these are also reaction shots where the character’s face is visible. 
Therefore Gaut’s claim that the POV shot can move us to affective identification, 
‘but it has the disadvantage of having less information to convey about what the 
character is feeling’ (1999, p.210), is not strictly true in diegetic camera films 
where a POV shot can convey a lot about a character’s feelings in a variety of 
ways. 
 
Branigan’s work on point of view is of particular importance in developing my 
cognitive framework as it will be used to theorise how narration and identification 
in the diegetic camera film works. Most significantly, I will refer to Branigan 
when theorising how audiences process these films with more imaginings of off-
screen space than they do when watching other films. However, it must be noted 
that the comprehensive literature considered for this thesis has ranged from 
critical evaluations of the focus films to broader works on genre, horror, 
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documentary, mockumentary and realism. Further critical references that I engage 
with in the genealogy section that follows have helped in assessing the relevance 
of the focus films in relation to reality TV, Mondo films, the Dogme 95 
manifesto, video games, YouTube and the Internet, leading to a thorough 
chronology of antecedents of the diegetic camera horror films. This reasoned 
chronology will provide the necessary contextualization of diegetic camera films 
within the horror genre, cinematic history, and technological developments, 
extending beyond simply tracing a possible genealogy of the genre as detailed 
below.  
 
1.5 Genealogy of the diegetic camera horror film: faked representations, first 
person point of view, real death on screen, developments in camera 
technology, and the horror genre 
 
By tracing the impact and effect of certain devices, movements, and forms, such 
as handheld and improvised cinematography, the subjective camera and first-
person viewpoints, I will establish a thematically organised range of antecedents 
that have influenced the production, technology, and aesthetics of diegetic camera 
horror films. By drawing systematic comparisons, I have found many similarities 
between the structural techniques of diegetic camera horror films and their 
antecedents. These are relevant because the viewer’s knowledge, awareness, and 
familiarity with some of these antecedents is essential in order to understand the 
priming strategies of diegetic camera horror films and their attempts at creating 
mediated realism. 
 
I will discuss these antecedents by dividing them thematically. A common theme 
across the antecedents is that they are faked representations of real documents, as 
in the case of epistolary novels or the War of the Worlds (Welles, 1938) radio 
broadcast. Other influences on the diegetic camera horror film consistently utilise 
first-person POV as a central narrative and aesthetic choice. A further theme that I 
have identified in these antecedents is the inclusion of actuality footage of real 
death. I will also consider technological antecedents such as developments in 
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camera technology, precursors in the cinematic horror genre and finally those 
media forms that diegetic camera films specifically mimic. 
 
 1.5.1 Faked representations 
 
Firstly, there are those antecedents that take the form of faked representations of 
real documents such as letters, news reports, or photographs. These examples 
include epistolary novels, ghost photographs and some scenes in mondo films. 
Martin Harris (2001) points to the influence of epistolary novels on The Blair 
Witch Project with particular reference to Samuel Richardson’s Pamela; or, 
Virtue Rewarded (1740). The reader of such novels only experiences the story 
from one point of view, that of the main character who ‘writes’ the letter or diary 
entry. This prefigures the restricted narration employed in diegetic camera horror 
films. Heller-Nicholas (2014, p.30) argues that epistolary ‘texts rely on creating a 
sense of authenticity by replicating the familiar documentation of everyday life, 
and thus creating a sense of realism unavailable to the omniscient third-person 
narrator that has traditionally dominated literary fiction’. This implies an attempt 
to hide the presence of an omniscient author (or, in our case, a camera operator) 
by emphasising that the origin of the footage appears to be the diegetic camera. 
 
This attempt to create a fake narrator is similar to the historical attempts to offer a 
faked representation of reality by creating media products that appear to tell the 
‘truth’. Sarah Higley and Jeffrey Andrew Weinstock (2004, pp.13-14) point to the 
‘ghost photographs so popular at the turn of the twentieth century’ that suggest to 
an observer that something extraordinary has occurred and been captured by a 
keen camera operator. The idea that photography is reliable evidence of what is 
represented was being questioned at this early stage in the history of the medium. 
Viewers of these photographs were divided over their faith in photography to 
capture the ‘real’ and their belief that supernatural beings do not exist. 
Contemporary horror audiences experience a similar conflict between the force of 
the film’s claims to realism and the fantastical events that they represent.  
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Barry Keith Grant (2013, p.155) also draws an interesting comparison between 
ghost photographs, or what he calls ‘evidential survival pictures’ and ‘the realistic 
gore effects of the Grand Guignol’. Between 1897 and 1962, Le Théâtre du 
Grand-Guignol offered spectators the opportunity to witness gruesome and brutal 
violence, torture, and simulated murder on stage. All faked for audiences, the 
producers of such fare strived for convincing effects, aided by the naturalism and 
limitations of working in the theatre. With inventive use of lighting and sound, the 
Grand Guignol productions aimed for verisimilitude. Grant argues that just like 
the ghost photographs, the makers of Grand Guignol entertainment used ‘the 
technological means available at the time to present horror in the most realistic 
manner possible’ (2013, p.155). Similarly, the use of digital technology in 
diegetic camera films is an updated way to make horror appear more perceptually 
realistic to a contemporary audience.  
 
Many diegetic camera horror films pretend ‘to capture evidence of a paranormal 
event. Like the radio production of H. G. Wells’s The War of the Worlds, it 
depicts a fantastic situation as though it were fact’ (Higley and Weinstock, 2004, 
p.14). The footage in The Blair Witch Project appears to capture inconclusive 
evidence that a witch attacked three student filmmakers, while Paranormal 
Activity offers footage that seems to reveal a woman possessed by a demon that 
kills her partner. These films do not present themselves as fictions, but attempt to 
resemble actuality footage, demonstrating a clear link between the diegetic camera 
horror trend and these earliest examples of the faked reality of violence, fear, and 
the grotesque. Similarly, reports about the impact of Orson Welles’s radio 
production suggest that his faked news report was so convincing that listeners did 
fear that Earth was being attacked by aliens. For example, Stefan Lovgen (2005) 
states that ‘scores of adults reportedly required medical treatment for shock and 
hysteria. The hoax worked, historians say, because the broadcast authentically 
simulated how radio worked in an emergency’. This ‘authentic simulation’ is key 
to understanding how diegetic camera films work as well. While the War of the 
Worlds broadcast was structured as a series of news bulletins with actors playing 
the reporters and broadcasters witnessing the unbelievable events unfold, diegetic 
camera films similarly simulate eye witness accounts of extreme situations. Some 
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characters are reporters (fig.1.2) or television crews on the scene (Rec) and some 
are ordinary people with cameras that capture the chaos around them 
(Cloverfield). If the mimesis of mediated reality is convincing, the diegetic 
camera technique is successful and is more likely to have the desired impact on 
audiences that want a convincing film.  
 
COPYRIGHTED IMAGE REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
Figure 1.2: Ángela Vidal presents While You’re Asleep in Rec. 
  
For example, Cannibal Holocaust is a fiction film that mimicked mondo films 
successfully, leading some viewers to think that they were watching real footage 
of death. Mondo films combine elements of documentary, mockumentary, and 
exploitation movies and, as a result, are sometimes referred to as 
‘shockumentaries’. As described by Mikita Brottman (2004, p.167), they ‘consist 
of compiled camera footage of murders, suicides, accidents, assassinations, and 
other real-life disasters’. Hallam and Marshment (2000, p.231) pinpoint Mondo 
Cane (Cavara, Jacopetti and Prosperi, 1962) as ‘the founding film of the (mondo) 
genre, a compilation of customs and rituals from around the world, mostly drawn 
from actuality footage but with some staged sequences’. The existence of mondo 
films led some viewers to believe that at least some parts of the footage in the film 
were real. Neil Jackson (2002, p.35) identifies the similarities between Cannibal 
Holocaust and mondo films; ‘these films mixed documentary and staged footage, 
presented as travelogues which purported to demonstrate the lifestyle conditions 
and peculiarities of cultures in underdeveloped nations’. The mixing of staged and 
documentary footage can lead to viewer confusion over what is fiction and non-
fiction; a confusion that diegetic camera films wish to achieve through their 
mimicking of non-fiction media forms and their use of a diegetic camera operator. 
 
 1.5.2 First-person point of view 
 
As previously established, diegetic camera films consist largely of the camera 
operator’s point of view on events and many antecedents have experimented with 
subjective camera work and ongoing point-of-view shots. These include early 
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footage of war reporting from the Second World War, the player’s perspective  in 
first-person shooter videogames, some user-generated content on the Internet and 
an often cited film noir called Lady in the Lake. 
 
Diegetic camera films also imitate the genuine subjective camerawork of war 
reporters, and others who film in dangerous situations. The outbreak of the First 
World War in 1914, sets a precedent for subjective camerawork that can be seen 
in some cases of war reporting. Though it is difficult to find surviving examples 
of such footage, H. Mario Raimondo-Souto (2006, p.52) refers to a case where:  
 
after the battle of Verdun one of these cameras [The 
Aeroscope] was found on a cameraman’s lap, A 
Frenchman named Dupre, who had died in action: 
apparently he was killed while he was filming, but the 
camera went on running by itself (...) recording the scene 
in which the courageous camera operator gave his life and 
where an enemy patrol is seen approaching.  
 
This kind of sequence may not actually depict a real death but suggests it through 
the overturning of the camera. It is a clear influence on numerous diegetic horror 
films from Cannibal Holocaust through to Cloverfield which feature characters 
killed while still filming shown through the convention of the overturned camera. 
 
Some first-person shooter (FPS) video games also suggest the killing of the 
protagonist through a viewpoint that falls to the floor (for example, see Goldeneye 
007 on the Nintendo 64 console). Therefore, another influence on diegetic camera 
horror films is the increasing use of a subjective viewpoint in videogames, 
particularly in the ‘first-person shooter’ format. The key conventions borrowed by 
the diegetic camera film from FPS games include multiple character viewpoints, 
the visceral and hectic nature of the first person perspective, immersion in the 
environment, identification with the characters and the use of different views such 
as night vision. There are many similarities and differences between these films 
and this type of game, making this a rich area for further exploration and what I 
offer here is an introductory overview. 
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J. P. Telotte (2004, p.47) briefly alluded to this similarity between watching a 
diegetic camera horror film and playing a FPS videogame when discussing The 
Blair Witch Project, about which he said: 
 
The “pleasure” – along with the frustration – of agency 
dissolves into transformation, as we do indeed “become,” 
by turns, Josh, Heather, and Mike, sharing their points of 
view within the same scene, as one character’s vantage 
through the colour video camera shifts to that of another, 
filming in 16mm black and white, almost as if we were 
“team-playing” a video game. 
 
This idea of becoming the characters, or at least any character that holds the 
camera, is central to the pleasures of both first-person videogames and horror 
films. Immersion and alignment are increased, with the viewer becoming, or 
‘transforming’, into the character that operates the camera. However, without 
agency or the ability to control or make choices for the character, diegetic camera 
films are significantly less immersive than first-person video games. We are 
viewers rather than players, experiencing violence from behind the camera’s lens 
rather than the avatar’s eyes. In FPS videogames, the viewpoint is from the eye of 
the protagonist at all times, but in diegetic camera films, the viewpoint is from the 
lens of the camera which may be set up on a tripod, or turned around to film the 
character, so it is not always a straight-forward character point-of-view shot. 
 
On the other hand, American film noir Lady in the Lake is a notable antecedent of 
diegetic camera films as, with only a few exceptions, the entire film is a point-of-
view shot; not from a diegetic camera, but from the protagonist’s eyes. In The 
New York Times review of the film, it is stated ‘YOU [sic] do get into the story 
and see things pretty much the way the protagonist, Phillip Marlowe, does, but 
YOU don't have to suffer the bruises he does. Of course, YOU don’t get a chance 
to put your arms around Audrey Totter either. After all, the movie makers, for all 
their ingenuity, can go just so far in the quest for realism’ (Pryor, 1947). This 
anticipates the appeal and critical reaction to films such as The Blair Witch 
Project and Cloverfield. Screenwriter John Swetnam says of the diegetic camera 
trend that it ‘just makes sense for horror because it puts you in the shoes of the 
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story. You get to experience those scares in a more visceral and direct way’ 
(Frappier, 2012). Swetnam could more accurately refer to the shoes of the camera-
operating characters, or even more precisely, the lens of the diegetic camera. 
While the protagonist of Lady in the Lake is not carrying his own diegetic camera 
and the audience is not witnessing the supposed footage filmed by him, the 
position of the spectator is constantly aligned with the position of the character. 
Though the diegetic camera in the more contemporary examples does not always 
have to be aligned directly with the eye of the character, the technique of seeing 
the entire events of the film from a single character’s perspective was a step 
towards diegetic camera horror. Ingle (2011) also recognises the link, arguing that 
there is a ‘relationship between these films and earlier subjective camera 
experiments in such films as The Last Laugh, Lady in the Lake, and Dark Passage’ 
[sic]. The Last Laugh (Murnau, 1924) ‘is often described as the first film to make 
great use of a moving point of view’ (Ebert, 2000) and Dark Passage (Daves, 
1947) is another film noir that extensively used the POV shot. Therefore, the 
diegetic camera film was influenced by previous uses of the POV shot in cinema, 
but developed the technique by making the POV solely that of a camera, rather 
than a character’s eye. 
 
 
 
 1.5.3 Real death on screen 
 
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Highway Safety Foundation produced a 
series of short films with the intention of revealing to audiences the damage and 
death that can result from careless driving. These documentary films, including 
Signal 30 (Wayman, 1959) and Wheels of Tragedy (Wayman, 1963) ‘combined 
pantomime-like re-enactments of small town Americana with grisly footage of 
actual car accidents and their mangled, bloody victims’ (Heller-Nicholas, 2014, 
p.42). In her volume on ‘found footage’ horror films, Heller-Nicholas explores 
these films at some length, arguing that the ‘authenticity of their real-life carnage 
provides their primary lure for its cult horror audience today’ (2014, p.42). Like 
diegetic camera films, the highway safety films often feature poor production 
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values on purpose in order to mark them as authentic. The perceptual realism of 
diegetic camera films depends on the aesthetic cues that make them appear similar 
to mediated versions of reality. As they do not use real footage of murder and 
death (except briefly in Cannibal Holocaust) Heller-Nicholas perhaps overstates 
the influence of Highway Safety Films on the diegetic camera subgenre. 
 
With their images of real death, snuff films are similar to Highway Safety Films, 
though their purposes significantly differ. Snuff films depict the actual rape, 
torture or murder of a person. The act itself is shown without any faked footage 
and the film is then released for an audience to view it. There was debate over 
whether such films actually existed, but in recent years it has been confirmed that 
snuff video footage has appeared on the Internet and is also known to be being 
bought and sold by international paedophile rings (Davies, 2000). There is limited 
scholarly interest in snuff films but certain scholars such as Brottman (2004) and 
David Kerekes and David Slater (1993) have written about the existence of snuff 
material. Julia Hallam and Margaret Marshment (2000, p.230) argue that these 
films have become ‘a byword for the ultimate blurring of violent fiction and 
actuality’. Horror fans that draw a moral line line at witnessing real death and 
dismemberment, might be drawn to promises of authenticity proffered by diegetic 
camera horror films that are constructed to appear like a genuine snuff film might. 
 
Paul Barker (1996. p.355) considers reality television programmes like I Witness 
Video which shows videos of real deaths and disasters. This programme appeals 
to voyeuristic desires of the audience to witness the suffering of real people. The 
occasional failure of the protagonists of diegetic camera horror films to even 
capture proof of what they are searching for (e.g. the Blair Witch) is exacerbated 
by their failure to keep out of harm’s way. Their ultimate failure is in keeping 
themselves alive and separate from the violence they film. Like viewers of I 
Witness Video that enjoy the thrill of seeing real people in danger, viewers of 
diegetic camera horror films gain pleasure from imagining that the characters are 
in real danger. The aesthetics of the footage screened in I Witness Video bears a 
strong resemblance to the footage captured with the diegetic camera. In both cases 
the viewer gains pleasure in witnessing hardship and distress, sympathising or 
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empathising more with the people in the footage due to the manner in which it has 
been filmed. Programmes like this are similar to mondo films, except that some of 
the footage in mondo films is far more graphic and extreme and also some of it is 
staged. This means that when watching diegetic camera films, the viewer may be 
responding to the films with feelings of doubt over the veracity of the contents of 
the footage, but also perhaps with a knowledge of what real footage of terrible 
events looks like. 
 
 1.5.4 Developments in technology and the impact on aesthetics: 
 cameras, surveillance, and the dominance of mediated reality 
 
Developing camera technologies have had a considerable impact on the evolution 
of the diegetic camera in modern horror. While diegetic camera films often appear 
to use handheld consumer digital video cameras, other significant developments 
in camera technology influence the production and cinematographic techniques of 
these films. CCTV, webcams, and personal micro-surveillance cameras have all 
been used to varying degrees in the films analysed. Though many of these 
technologies have been referred to previously in this chapter due to their use in 
forms of media from cinema vérité to reality TV, the impact of developing 
technologies on the formation of the diegetic camera subgenre of horror itself has 
been significant. Biressi and Nunn (2005, p.16) establish that ‘since the 1960s the 
relative portability of hand-held cameras, changes in sound recording, the 
availability of home movie equipment, video and CCTV, the possibility of live 
web-streaming and DV cameras all appeared to liberate filmmakers, allowing 
them to represent reality all the more convincingly’. This freedom allows 
filmmakers to put small, easy-to-use cameras in the hands of their characters. 
These characters are then free to run and hide from the horrors they experience at 
the same time as they film themselves and those around them. 
 
Joel Black (2002, p.5) considers ‘memorable newsreel footage of World War II 
military campaigns and early nuclear-weapons tests, filmed and taped records of 
the Vietnam and Gulf Wars, and unedited amateur footage such as Abraham 
Zapruder’s home movie of John F. Kennedy’s assassination or George Holliday’s 
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videotape of Los Angeles police officers beating Rodney King’. Significant 
events of the last century are remembered very much through their recordings and 
this footage is often captured by amateurs who just happened to be in the 
wrong/right place at the right time. The videotape of Rodney King’s beating for 
example is grainy and clearly recorded on a domestic camera by an amateur. Yet 
it featured on the worldwide news and led to riots and was used as evidence in the 
trials of the police officers involved. Because of the small size of the camera and 
the zoom function, an atrocious event was caught on tape without the camera 
operator having to make his presence known to the subjects of his video. This 
discreet filming occurs in many diegetic camera horror films and is only possible 
with modern camera technology. The Tapes (Alliston and Bates, 2011), for 
example, features a scene where the protagonists secretly film the meeting of a 
cult in a barn. The audience sees through the video camera as the character 
cautiously films what looks like potentially incriminating activity. 
 
Black (2002, p.5) also makes note of the ‘growing reliance on satellite 
surveillance and security camera footage’ that means ‘the presence of a human 
operator behind the camera has become increasingly superfluous’. This can be 
seen in the final scene of Zero Day (that uses CCTV) as well as the use of 
surveillance cameras in Paranormal Entity 2 (Fankhauser, 2010). Though many 
examples do, not all diegetic camera films end when the camera-operating 
characters die or their cameras are destroyed, as the filmmakers can switch to an 
imitation of the footage produced from other sources such as CCTV. This 
positions the handheld camera footage as being just one form of possible audio-
visual evidence of an event and alludes to the possibility of there being other 
footage that could have been captured of the same or similar events. It may also 
remind the viewer of the authorial presence that is responsible for editing together 
these disparate sources of footage, an enunciator that is very rarely mentioned in 
these films.  
 
Documentary, reality television, video sharing websites and feature films have all 
adapted due to changes in available recording equipment. Diegetic camera horror 
films often use a variety of these media forms to create their narratives and 
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enhance their claims to realism. The increase in the presence of CCTV cameras 
has led to more use of CCTV footage on television and therefore horror 
filmmakers in turn recreate the look of security footage in their films. Similarly, 
as webcams, video blogs, and phonecams become ubiquitous and their footage is 
used more in news programmes and reality TV, diegetic camera filmmakers can 
increasingly depend on footage that is designed to resemble these sources to 
create more perceptually realistic aesthetics. Craig Hight (2008, p.209) argues that 
this integration of surveillance systems into society and the ‘acceptance of 
surveillance footage within television programming’ is leading to ‘a collapse of 
distinctions between public and private space and an increased realm for 
personalized forms of confession and expression’. The impact of this can again be 
seen in diegetic camera horror films. Audiences are more willing to except this so-
called ‘found footage’ because it is increasingly believable that if a video was to 
emerge showing the death of some young people at the hands of something 
terrible, the footage would be bought, edited, and released either on the Internet or 
as part of a documentary or true-life television show. Deborah Jermyn (2004, 
p.83) notes that ‘CCTV and video footage are able to transport the viewer into the 
‘scene of the crime’ (...) it carries a sense of immediacy and privileged access’. So 
when viewers of diegetic camera horror films witness the terrible events portrayed 
on screen, supposedly from the perspective of an eyewitness holding a camera or 
from the omniscient eye of a security camera, they perceive the events as more 
realistic because it looks like mediated footage of actuality. 
 
 1.5.5 The horror genre: history, aesthetics, and technology 
 
The diegetic camera horror film is a relatively new sub-genre of horror and 
therefore must be considered in the context of the wider horror genre as a whole 
and its cinematic history. Mark Jancovich (2002) has usefully outlined a brief 
history of the horror film from the early influence of the fantastical films of 
Georges Méliès through German Expressionism, Universal’s classic monster 
films of the 1930s, the monsters associated with modern scientific America in the 
1950s and low budget efforts from American International Pictures and Hammer 
Studios in Britain. Of more interest to this thesis is the shift to contemporary 
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horror films that is generally considered to have occurred around the time of 
Alfred Hitchcock’s Psycho (1960). The horror in many of the films that emerged 
in the 1960s and 1970s was situated in America itself and, furthermore, seemed to 
have been spawned from American society itself and, more specifically, the 
nuclear family. Robin Wood (1984) used a Marxist and psychoanalytic 
framework to argue that repression is the central concept of the horror genre. We 
see the ‘return of the repressed’ (1984, p.173) in the 1960s and 1970s as the 
horror genre deals with what has been repressed in American culture and 
civilisation more generally. 
 
Wood (1984, p.192) argued that some of these horror films were radical in nature, 
but that this radical potential was then undermined by the slasher film cycle that 
emerged following John Carpenter’s Halloween (1978). However, the reactionary 
nature of slasher films has been debated with Carol Clover offering an alternative 
reading that emphasises the progressive presence of the ‘Final Girl’ (1992, p.35). 
Clover’s analysis is particularly significant as it follows a notable focus on the 
usage of the POV shot in horror films (and elsewhere). Clover traces the POV 
shot from Hitchcock’s work (in particular Rear Window and Vertigo) through to 
the subjective shots from the killer’s point of view in slasher films. Clover’s 
argument is that the point of view shifts towards the end of slasher films from the 
killer to the final victim. This is when viewers are encouraged to identify with the 
female victim-hero (1992, p.4) as she tackles the monster alone. Referring to 
Christian Metz’s theory of primary and secondary identification and Laura 
Mulvey’s theory of the cinematic gaze, Clover suggests that the pleasures of 
horror films extend beyond what others had previously theorised. Clover argues 
that young males, who are the main audience of horror films, are capable of 
identifying with female victims, rather than simply with male killers. She argues 
that the sadistic, voyeuristic pleasures of horror have been overstated (1992, p.19) 
and that ‘horror is far more victim-identified than the standard view would have 
it’ (1992, p.8). This is relevant to the emergence of the diegetic camera film as the 
viewer is aligned with the victim’s POV for the majority of the film. In the case of 
The Blair Witch Project, the final girl is the camera operator, and it is her POV 
that we see events from. 
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Much of the critical theory on horror films has revolved around the issue of 
gender and taken a feminist and psychoanalytic framework to argue for or against 
the progressive nature of the genre. Barbara Creed (1993) focussed on the female 
monster specifically, pointing out that this is a common feature of the horror film 
despite many theorists’ previous concern with male monsters. Creed sees the use 
of female monsters in Freudian terms, arguing that the representation of such 
monsters is down to a patriarchal concern over sexual difference (1993, p.2). To 
illustrate her argument, Creed’s analysis chooses those films where femininity is 
clearly monstrous from witches to aliens to castrating women seeking revenge. 
With their focus on the slasher film and feminine monsters, Clover and Creed’s 
volumes are important to the history of the horror genre, but the pleasure of horror 
has still not been fully accounted for and certainly not the particular pleasures of 
diegetic camera horror films. In strictly gendered terms, the diegetic camera 
operators are often male and in the charismatic killer category specifically, the 
monsters are all male. 
 
Returning to the history of horror outlined by Jancovich (2002), he argues that 
The Blair Witch Project represented a reason for horror fans to celebrate after the 
genre had started to be dominated by self-referential imitations of Scream 
(Craven, 1996) starring the casts from popular teen-themed television shows. At 
the time of writing, Jancovich noted that ‘The Blair Witch Project increasingly 
looks like a one-off gimmick’ (2002, p.7), but the cycle was revitalised around 
2007 with the release of Paranormal Activity and Cloverfield. While this history 
of the horror film is necessarily very limited, it does demonstrate how the genre 
has developed and more importantly how it has been theorised in the past. This 
summary also allows me to suggest my intervention, which is to take a specific 
sub-genre of the horror film and apply a cognitive approach to understand how it 
affects viewer emotions. In chapter 3 I will elaborate further on why I reject the 
psychoanalytic readings of horror in favour of a cognitive approach. 
 
 1.5.6 Mimicked forms: documentary, reality television, and home 
 video 
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David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson (1993, p.180) state that ‘the distinction 
between “documentary” and “fiction” films often rests on the difference between 
the staged and the unstaged. In a fiction film, the filmmaker controls the mise-en-
scène completely, but the documentary film purports to present unstaged events’. 
This is not true of all modes and types of documentaries (Nichols, 2001), with the 
performative (those that highlight the filmmaker’s involvement) and reflexive 
(those that draw attention to the conventions of documentary filmmaking) modes 
having clearly staged scenes within them. Nevertheless, this structuring of the 
mise-en-scène can be seen in diegetic camera horror. Similarly, Hallam and 
Marshment (2000, p.227) argue that ‘in fiction films, as in documentary films, the 
closer certain aspects of a film’s depictive elements correspond to actuality 
recording practices, the greater their capacity to appear to mediate actuality 
directly rather than perform a representative or symbolic function’. Therefore, 
when these diegetic camera horror films use interviews, shaky footage, direct 
address, and other techniques commonly found in documentaries, they are 
attempting to make claims that their footage should be read in the documentary 
tradition. 
 
Later developments in documentary practice have also influenced the diegetic 
camera horror film. Cinéma vérité is the form of documentary that combines 
many of the naturalistic techniques of what Bill Nichols describes as (2001) the 
‘observational mode’ with more intrusive and stylised techniques. The camera is 
often used to provoke subjects and the interaction of filmmaker and subject is 
seen as a method of increasing the perceived realism of the situation. The 
observational documentary filmmakers’ route to realism attempts to make 
subjects feel as though they were not being filmed and also tried to make 
audiences feel that they were witnessing real life, edited very little and presented 
as it was filmed. The filmmakers of cinéma vérité instead recognised that subjects 
will likely always be aware of the camera’s presence and, therefore the 
documentary would be more authentic if it drew attention to this. The camera and 
documentary makers’ presence should be noticeable to the viewer as it creates a 
different kind of realism where viewers are more aware that what they are 
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watching is a construction. Audience awareness of construction makes the films 
more transparent and therefore arguably more real. 
 
Reality television is also a key influence on diegetic camera films. There are 
numerous television precedents for these films, which use reality TV tropes to 
increase their mediated realism. This influence can be broadly divided by 
considering the formal and aesthetic strategies of the reality television format as a 
whole and, more specifically, sub-genres such as crime appeal programmes and 
docudramas. Reality TV cues certain emotional responses and these emotional 
strategies coincide with those felt by the viewer of diegetic camera horror films. 
Our experience of reality TV helps to orient our cognition and emotional 
responses to diegetic camera horror films. We must understand how we 
conceptualise reality TV, in order to understand how diegetic camera horror films 
try to make us feel. 
 
Critical literature about reality TV helps to suggest why audiences have responded 
so strongly to the aesthetics and formal strategies of these films. James Keller 
(2004, p.57) asserts that ‘the same unsteady images that reveal the presence of the 
camera also suggest “reality TV,” a genre that lacks the polish of cinematic 
realism but signifies the authenticity of the events depicted’. Authenticity is a key 
factor that both reality TV and diegetic camera film audiences desire. John Leland 
et al. are quoted in Newsweek arguing ‘to a Gen-X and -Y audience raised on 
handheld TV programs like Cops and MTV’s The Real World (…) grainy equals 
real, immediate. Wholly created by the production process, the jerk of a video 
camera or the crackle of a scratchy vinyl record has come to stand in for the truer 
reality behind the process’ (Higley and Weinstock, 2004, p.21). Signifiers of 
mediated realism are important in maintaining a sense of authenticity, and to a 
contemporary audience an awareness of the process of mediation and the ability to 
read this self-reflexively is increasingly an important part of creating the ‘reality’ 
effect.  
 
Signifiers of mediated realism are consistently evident in home videos; a specific 
form of media that has emerged due to relatively recent developments in camera 
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technology. Though the technology used by amateurs in their homes today has 
developed a great deal since the time of Roger Odin’s writing, much of it still 
applies. Odin (1979, p.345) defines a home video as ‘a film made by a member of 
a family, with regard to objects or events linked in one way or another to the 
history of this family, and for the privileged viewing by members of this family’. 
This type of video has inspired many diegetic camera horror films including 
Exhibit A and Home Movie (Denham, 2008) among others. These two examples, 
as well as many other of their type, mimic many of the textual characteristics 
Odin (1979, cited in Buckland, 2000, pp.102-103) identified ‘that prompt the 
spectator to read a film as a home movie (…) absence of closure (…) 
discontinuous linear temporality (…) spatial indeterminacy (…) dispersed 
narrative (…) jumps (…) blurred images, jolting camera movements, hesitant pan 
shots (…) address to the camera’. There is not a narrative or script and the cast 
may acknowledge the camera frequently. The camera may switch hands between 
family members and the audience is likely to be limited to those family members 
who were present at the filming of the video. 
 
This section has identified and thematically arranged a range of influences feeding 
into the development of the diegetic camera horror film. From first-person 
literature of the eighteenth century to the Internet, I have mapped how these 
antecedents have influenced diegetic camera horror films. Some experience of 
consuming examples of any and/or all of these antecedents is also essential 
priming for the spectator of diegetic camera horror films. The existence of many 
of these precursors shapes the viewer’s understanding of the techniques used to 
invoke mediated realism in diegetic camera films. An awareness of the 
conventions of reality television, documentary, or home videos will aid the 
viewer’s imagining that the films are non-fiction. Similarly, if the viewer is aware 
of the existence of snuff films, and footage of real death in other media forms, it 
enables them to imagine that these films are what real tragedies look like when 
caught on camera. 
 
 
1.6 Structure of the thesis and chapter outlines 
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The thesis is divided into two parts. Following this introduction, the first two 
chapters will develop the thesis’ theoretical context. The second part of this thesis 
will be divided into three analytical chapters, utilising the focus films as case 
studies. 
 
In Chapter 2, I will establish my theoretical framework by expanding on the 
review of the extant critical literature mentioned in the introduction. Key to 
developing this theoretical framework will be a detailed conceptualisation of the 
diegetic camera. Drawing on Branigan’s theories of point-of-view, I will argue 
that the diegetic camera creates POV shots that are different from the traditional 
POV shot featured in films that do not employ a diegetic camera; I will also 
emphasise the importance of priming in the process of ensuring that audiences 
recognise the shots as taken from the point-of-view of a diegetic camera.  
 
I will then consider issues of narration and enunciation by following Branigan and 
Bordwell’s work on levels of narration and self-consciousness. Here I will argue 
that in diegetic camera films, narrator and character are frequently collapsed into 
one and that the author, narrator and character are all aware that there will be a 
viewer. I will also argue that diegetic camera films are distinctive as the narration 
is confined to a single character or occasionally multiple characters; the key point 
being that the audience’s knowledge is limited to that of the camera-operating 
character, or the restricted viewpoint of the fixed diegetic camera as with 
surveillance cameras. These films posit a fake enunciator within the diegesis, 
whose role it is to mask the presence of the real enunciator (the films’ production 
teams). 
 
In chapter 2, I will also introduce the concepts of metatextuality, performance, and 
dialogue as central concerns of this thesis. The diegetic camera has an impact on 
the tone of the films, creating a critical commentary on other media forms such as 
documentary, reality television, and home videos. Performance and dialogue are 
also affected by the use of a diegetic camera, as I will argue that cinematography 
is a part of the performance of a diegetic camera operator. These films privilege 
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off-screen space significantly by having dialogue with off-screen characters and 
the performance of a key character - i.e. the diegetic camera operator - occur 
largely off-screen. Noel Burch’s work on off-screen space will be significant here 
due to his focus on theorising the implications of what occurs behind the camera. 
 
I conclude chapter 2 by interrogating Gregory Currie’s theory of personal 
imagining. Currie (1995, p.166) argues that: 
 
when I imagine merely that such and such happens, 
without imagining that I see (or have other kinds of 
epistemic contacts with) what happens, we have a case of 
impersonal imagining. When imagining involves the idea 
that I am seeing the imagined events, we have a species of 
personal imagining... more specifically, it is a case of 
imagining seeing. 
 
Currie rejects personal imagining and what he calls the ‘imagined observer 
hypothesis’, and by extension the ‘view that the imagining appropriate to film is 
imagining seeing’ (1995, p.167). However, Currie does concede that in the case of 
a few exceptional shots (such as the POV shot), imagining seeing (personal 
imagining) is appropriate. This is why I insist upon a theory of personal imagining 
in this thesis given that the diegetic camera clearly constitutes a stronger form of 
personal imagining.   
 
In chapter 3, I argue that psychoanalytic theories of horror as detailed by Robin 
Wood, Barbara Creed and others that attempt to explain the popularity and 
endurance of the horror genre are inadequate because they do not consider the 
cognitive activity of the spectator while watching horror. These theories lack 
emphasis on the processing required to understand and interpret these films. 
While psychoanalytic film theorists argue that interpretation of films involves the 
unconscious mind, I propose to use cognitive film theory as an analytical tool to 
account for the pleasures of diegetic camera horror films. I particularly stress the 
active, conscious processing that the viewer’s mind conducts and more 
specifically point to the importance of cognitive processes such as priming, 
engagement, empathy and allegiance. The diegetic camera generally enforces 
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prolonged and intense alignment with a character and this has repercussions for all 
four of the previously mentioned concepts. This chapter will then lead on to a 
close analysis of the focus films in part 2 where priming, allegiance and other 
concepts are used as the basis for an in depth analysis of specific case studies. 
 
Part 2 will be divided into three chapters. Chapter 4 will analyse how the viewer is 
primed while watching diegetic camera horror films. Chapter 5 will focus on the 
home video examples and analyse how interaction between diegetic camera 
operators and the subjects on screen affects the emotions of the viewer. Chapter 6 
will consider the charismatic killer examples and analyse how allegiance is 
problematic despite the promises of the diegetic camera. 
 
The concluding chapter will build on, and question, existing literature to suggest 
new ways of defining found footage films and their influence on mainstream 
media productions. I will evaluate how other scholars have categorised these films 
and then evaluate my own system of grouping them. I will attempt to find some 
more defined and narrow classifications for the focus films, particularly with 
regards to their distinctive cinematographic techniques and how these imitate 
other media forms. In chapters 4 to 7, I will draw conclusions around the key 
notions of priming, self-consciousness, and allegiance in diegetic camera horror 
films. My conclusions revolve around the activity of the viewer, particularly in 
terms of the imagining of the film as a non-fiction document, and the imagining of 
off-screen space in order to recognise the camera operator as a character. I argue 
that this imagining can heighten empathy with camera-operating characters, 
particularly when these characters are involved in interactions with profilmic 
subjects. With regards to allegiance, I conclude that the diegetic camera is 
unlikely to affect the viewer’s moral evaluation of characters, except in the case of 
camera operators that become profilmic subjects and engage in amoral behaviour. 
Finally, I will highlight my contributions and interventions to the ongoing critical 
and theoretical debate on the focus films and in the field of cognitive film theory 
at large. 
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PART 1: Theoretical context 
 
Chapter 2: Narration and the diegetic camera 
 
In this chapter, I suggest a theoretical framework that contextualises and develops 
my core arguments regarding the diegetic camera horror film; that the diegetic 
camera prompts specific imaginings from the viewer, and that it can affect the 
viewer’s empathy with characters, if not his or her feelings of allegiance. Firstly, I 
wish to theorise the diegetic camera as a distinct entity, one that is different from 
traditional formulations of the camera in film studies. Then I will move on to 
issues of narration and enunciation which become central to analysing the focus 
films in subsequent chapters. 
 
 
2.1 The diegetic camera and point of view 
 
Due to the relative scarcity of scholarly work on the diegetic camera5, it is 
necessary and also illuminating to consider how the non-diegetic camera has been 
theorised. In order to highlight the similarities and differences between the 
diegetic and non-diegetic cameras as narrating devices, I will employ theories of 
the non-diegetic camera in order to theorise the diegetic camera. This initially 
raises a number of questions because the non-diegetic camera is traditionally not 
seen by the characters and therefore not acknowledged by them. It is not a prop 
that is used by the characters and the cinematography associated with its use is 
generally supposed to go relatively unnoticed by the spectator, particularly in 
Classical Hollywood cinema. I am mainly interested in Branigan’s conceptions of 
the non-diegetic camera, but they need to be extended in order to address films 
that utilise the diegetic camera as a narrating device. I will consider the important 
distinctions between the two ways of using the camera as a narrating device. 
While both a non-diegetic or a diegetic camera (or even a mixture of both) can be 
used to create any film, each way of using the camera as a narrating device 
engages a different kind of schema in the viewer’s mind. In the focus films, the 
                                                          
5 Some of this work has been discussed in the previous chapter. 
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diegetic camera is typically employed to mimic other types of media forms such 
as documentaries, reality television programmes, and home videos. I therefore 
argue that this is an attempt to encourage the viewer to imagine that the artefact 
that s/he is watching is not a fiction film, or that what is being watched is what 
non-fiction media products look like. The attempt here is to encourage the viewer 
to respond more strongly to the footage; whether that be to empathise, sympathise 
or feel angrier at the characters. Documentaries, reality television, and home 
videos are generally believed to convey a more realistic narration. The purpose of 
the diegetic camera is to create a kind of mediated realism, in which the spectator 
recognises the codes of other media forms and therefore considers the diegetic 
camera film to be like an authentic non-fiction media product. 
 
To increase this realist aesthetic, the diegetic camera can usually be understood to 
be in the hands of a character in the diegesis. Therefore, most shots in diegetic 
camera films can be considered POV shots, but they are often distinctly different 
from the traditional POV structure because it is usually simplified from a two or 
three-shot sequence to a single shot in diegetic camera films. Furthermore, the 
traditional POV shot is supposed to represent the vision of a character, whereas 
the POV shot in diegetic camera films represents the vision of the camera, not 
always the character. Branigan pays great attention to the point-of-view shot; 
however, he discusses those shots where ‘the camera assumes the spatial position 
of a character in order to show us what the character sees; the camera lens, so to 
speak, becomes the eye of the character… with the result that our sensory 
perception is restricted to that of the character’ (1984, p.6). In diegetic camera 
films, what the spectator sees is what the camera captures and this is not always 
exactly what the camera-operating character sees. Our sensory perception is 
limited to the lens of the camera, not the character’s eye, because a diegetic 
camera lens does not need to ‘become the eye of the character’. In fact, the 
diegetic camera does not replace the eye of the character, as it is a prop in the film 
and is held either at the eye level of the character or elsewhere in many cases. This 
is significant because although the viewer feels privileged in terms of the 
prolonged alignment with a character, s/he will also feel limited by the POV 
perspective if the camera is for example pointing to the ground as the camera 
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operator is running. We have to imagine that the camera-operating character can 
see where s/he is going, but because of the camerawork, our vision is more 
frustratingly limited. 
Branigan (1984, p.7) also acknowledges that: 
 
something more – beyond the merely formal – is required 
for a film to be “genuinely” subjective. The difficulty of 
equating optical (perceptual) POV with the experience of 
being that character (feeling the character’s feelings) 
leads critics toward attitude, identification, or language as 
additional conditions on subjectivity, or as an entirely new 
attempt to define subjectivity. 
 
The formal traits of diegetic camera films are consistently noticeable to the 
viewer, but I argue that there are more than just formal qualities to consider in the 
creation of so-called identification with imperilled characters, such as a 
consideration of the behaviour and actions of the characters.6  
 
With the exception of their opening titles, diegetic camera films do not contain 
other levels of what Branigan calls ‘impersonal’ or ‘neutral’ narration (1984, 
p.57). Branigan distinguishes character narration as just one of the narrational 
levels and includes the point-of-view shot as a way of achieving narration that 
appears to originate with the character. This level of narration is more likely to 
align the audience with a character than other levels of narration such as non-
diegetic narrators or historical authors. Only the opening titles and closing credits 
have no clear origin and therefore appear omniscient; like the additions of a non-
diegetic narrator. Other than these opening shots, the films only contain narration 
delivered by the character holding a camera, or by a camera that has been set up 
by a diegetic entity (whether a character in the narrative or not), for example the 
final shot of Paranormal Activity in which the camera has been positioned on a 
tripod by one of the main characters. Furthermore, POV in diegetic camera films 
does not always contain what Branigan theorises as the six elements of the POV 
structure in classical films. Elements 1 and 2 comprise the Point/Glance shot in 
which a character is seen looking (usually off-screen). Here the point at which the 
                                                          
6 Identification will be discussed in chapter 6. 
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character is positioned is established, as well as the point where the character 
glances. Element 3 is a transition to a new shot. Elements 4 and 5 comprise the 
following Point/Object shot, in which the object being glanced at in the preceding 
shot is revealed from the point of view of the character’s position as established in 
the preceding shot. Element 6 is the presence of the character. Diegetic camera 
films often lack a point/glance shot and therefore no transition to the point/object 
shot. Diegetic camera films almost exclusively consist of elements four and five 
of Branigan’s POV structure: the point/object shot. Element six of the POV 
structure is character, but in the case of diegetic camera films, ‘the sentient 
observer in whose viewpoint we may participate’ (1984, p.58) is the camera. The 
camera delivers the glance, not always the character. In fact, the character and 
camera may be glancing at different objects in the diegesis and the spectator has 
to decipher this without direct visual cues; without the point/glance shot. This 
causes the viewer to spontaneously imagine what is occurring in off-screen space. 
 
What we have in diegetic camera films instead of Branigan’s six elements of the 
POV structure is a three or four element structure, depending on the camera’s 
position and movement: 
 
Shot A: Point/Object 
 1. From Point: the camera is located at a point in space undefined until 
 this shot begins. 
 2. Object: the camera films the object 
Shot B: Point B/Object B 
 Elements 1 and 2 are repeated. The camera films from a new point in 
 space and films a new object. 
Shots A and B: 
 3. Camera: the space and time of elements one and two are justified by the 
 presence of a diegetic camera. 
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 4. Character (optional): the movement, or lack of movement, and the 
 object of the camera’s attention will often be justified by the presence of a 
 character operating the diegetic camera. 
Therefore, if we consider Branigan’s six elements of classical representation - 
namely origin, vision, time, frame, object, and mind - the lack of the point/glance 
shot in the diegetic camera film has significant implications. Without the 
point/glance shot, it is harder for audiences to discern the origin of the POV shot 
through which both character and spectator are seeing. This means that the viewer 
must be primed carefully to accept and understand that (almost) everything shown 
is from the POV of a diegetic camera. Branigan alludes to the importance of ‘one 
of the most pervasive of film narrating/reading conventions: sound perspective’ 
(1984, p.63) and the voice of a camera operator can often be vital in discerning the 
origin of the representation in diegetic camera films.  
Unlike an ordinary POV shot, the vision of the character behind the camera is not 
a contingent factor in diegetic camera films. It is the vision of the camera as a 
diegetic entity that is of primary concern. Sometimes this will be the same or 
almost the same as a character’s vision and, at other times, such as when the 
camera has been set up on a tripod, it can be completely different and separate 
from any character’s vision.  
A similar principle is at work with the element of time. Branigan argues that in a 
POV shot, the time of narration is equal to the time of the narrative, except in a 
flashback structure. Here, ‘there is a discontinuity in the narration… in the 
classical film this effect of the narration is often justified by character memory’ 
(1984, p.64). However, in the diegetic camera film, the flashback is justified by 
the memory of the camera. There can be discontinuity in the narration when the 
camera is stopped and footage is watched by characters. This is where the 
memory of the camera and what it has recorded previously, can be revealed for 
brief moments of the narration. The old footage remains ‘underneath’ the new 
footage and emerges for the viewer’s sight and attention only in gaps created 
during the recording of the new footage. Examples of the camera’s memory being 
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revealed as flashbacks occur in both Exhibit A (figs. 2.1 and 2.2) and Cloverfield 
(figs. 2.3 and 2.4). 
 
COPYRIGHTED IMAGES REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
Figure 2.1: Present time in Exhibit A as Gary King walks the camera towards the family 
television to show a group of friends what he has recorded.  
 
Figure 2.2: Cut to the camera’s memory of the past when the camera was left recording on 
the beach on a family day out (Exhibit A).  
                          
Figure 2.3: Present time in Cloverfield as Hud decides to show a group of people what he has 
just recorded on his camera on a New York City street. He points the camera toward the 
ground before, pressing the stop button to stop recording and look back at the previously 
recorded footage. 
 
Figure 2.4: Cut to camera’s memory of the past when Rob films Beth on a day out to Coney 
Island (Cloverfield). 
 
 
 
What is perhaps most significant is the framing element here. Branigan states that 
‘framing sets a boundary; if there were no boundaries, then the system would be 
totally open and everything would be related to everything else’ (1984, p.65) and 
points to Noël Burch (1973) for his emphasis on ‘off-screen space’. Burch divides 
off-screen space into six segments, four of which are ‘determined by the four 
borders of the frame’ (1973, p.17), the fifth is the segment ‘behind the camera’ 
and the sixth is the ‘space existing behind the set or some object in it... the outer 
limit of this segment of space is just beyond the horizon’ (1973, p.17). While 
Burch acknowledges that static shots are much easier to analyse using this theory, 
than shots with camera movement, diegetic camera films are not only (like 
Burch’s example of Robert Bresson’s L’Argent) in a ‘constant state of flux’ 
(1973, p.30), but they consistently emphasise the importance of the fifth segment: 
the space behind the camera. 
Off-screen space is often articulated in diegetic camera films, and to a lesser 
extent in the horror genre more widely, as being of equal importance to the 
spectator as the on-screen space. Burch identifies three ways off-screen space can 
be defined: entries and exits from the frame, having a character look off-screen, 
and framing a character so that parts of the character’s body remain out of frame. 
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While all three of these methods are important in the diegetic camera film, it is the 
second and third that warrant further investigation. On-screen characters often 
look off-screen in diegetic camera films, not to the left or right of the frame, but 
beyond the camera to look at the camera-operating character. Similarly, the 
camera operator will occasionally reach out from behind the camera with his or 
her free hand, therefore framing a part of his or her body on screen. In many 
instances, the camera operator will also be audible as s/he speaks from off-screen 
space. Burch states that ‘off-screen sound... always brings off-screen space into 
play’ (1973, p.26) and highlights that it is even possible to discern distance and 
direction of some off-screen sounds. When considering the camera operator’s 
voice, it is clear that behind the camera space is given great prominence in 
diegetic camera films, and must consistently be imagined by the viewer, until it 
becomes what Burch calls ‘concrete’ (1973, p.21) by sometimes being revealed 
later (for example, when the camera-operating characters turn the camera around 
to film themselves).  
 
This example of a camera-operating character eventually turning the camera 
around to reveal him or herself is an example of what Branigan calls a 
‘retrospective’ (1984, p.111) POV structure. This is where the point/object shot 
comes before the point/glance shot. In this type of structure, the viewer may only 
become aware that they are seeing from a character’s POV when the point/glance 
shot appears. However, in many diegetic camera films, this point/glance shot may 
never occur and therefore there must be other methods of recognising the 
point/object shot as being a POV shot in case it does not become a part of the 
retrospective POV structure. 
 
Branigan also identifies ‘simple variants of the POV structure including structures 
which may be termed closed, delayed, open, continuing, cheated, multiple, 
embedded, or reciprocal structures’ (1984, p.112). Branigan uses the word 
structure to emphasise the importance of the shots that surround the POV shot 
itself. His analysis demonstrates that these surrounding shots (e.g. the point/glance 
shot) allow the spectator to recognise the single POV shot as being from a 
character’s point of view. The POV shots in diegetic camera films do not always 
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fit easily into these categories and it is useful to consider the effects of this on the 
spectator. Though the POV shots in diegetic camera films are rarely, if ever, part 
of a closed structure, Branigan’s point that ‘time is momentarily suspended in the 
closed POV... we do not expect events to be happening to the characters while we 
are looking at an object’ (1984, p.112) is particularly pertinent. Because diegetic 
camera films contain little more than point/object shots (and are therefore not 
closed), this suspension of time is frequently destabilised through sound and 
cinematography. There are often events happening to the characters while we are 
trapped into seeing only from their POV, which causes a greater tension between 
on-screen and off-screen space. For example in Cloverfield, Hud is knocked over 
by an explosion and falls down some stairs. All of this occurs while we are seeing 
events from his point of view. We see the explosion far above him (fig. 2.5), then 
the visuals become very difficult to discern (figs. 2.6 and 2.7) until Hud’s camera 
hits the ground next to one of his feet (fig. 2.8). Most films would forego 
displaying the entire sequence through a POV shot and instead opt to use an 
omniscient camera that would show Hud’s fall down the stairs. 
 
   
  COPYRIGHTED IMAGES REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
 
Figure 2.5: POV of  explosion far above Hud (Cloverfield). 
Figure 2.6: Difficult to discern POV visuals (Cloverfield). 
Figure 2.7: Difficult to discern POV visuals (Cloverfield). 
Figure 2.8: Hud’s camera hits the ground next to one of his feet (Cloverfield). 
    
Similarly, Branigan’s identification of a delayed POV structure where ‘the 
point/object shot is withheld for a number of shots... or a number of scenes’ 
(1984, p.113) in order to create suspense as to what the character is glancing at 
does not apply in diegetic camera films. However, the inverse delayed POV shot 
where ‘the point/glance shot is withheld’ (1984, p.113) is occasionally in evidence 
instead. These would be diegetic camera films where the camera operator 
eventually turns the camera around to film their own face, either with a camera 
movement or a cut.  
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Most commonly, diegetic camera films use examples of Branigan’s ‘continuing 
POV’ (p.114) structure. This is where ‘one character looks at several objects or 
one object a number of times. The objects are typically rendered by cutting from 
object to object or by camera movement - the subjective traveling shot’ (1984, 
p.114/115). Diegetic camera films consist mostly of the continuing POV structure 
as the camera operator points his or her camera at object after object, both by 
using handheld travelling shots and by supposedly stopping and starting the 
recording of the camera, thereby creating the cuts between shots. This limits our 
view of the character and therefore our ability to read facial cues and recognise 
characters and means that the viewer must work harder to imagine who is behind 
the camera and what is happening to them. On the other hand, as we constantly 
see what the operator chooses to record, it can often be less demanding for the 
spectator to imagine what the operator is thinking about or feeling; or at least what 
his or her attention is focussed upon. 
Of course, it is not the character that creates the cuts by turning the recording 
device off and on. It is the job of the editor and director of the film to position 
these cuts. The characters in diegetic camera films, though they may be holding 
cameras and appear to make decisions about where to point the cameras, are not 
the real ‘authors’ or cinematographers of the films. This is the central fictional 
deceit. Even in The Blair Witch Project, where the actors were given a great deal 
of freedom to improvise the cinematography and dialogue, the directors outside 
the fiction are still the final arbiters of meaning. 
To summarize, the diegetic camera is thus a narrational tool employed to create a 
specific kind of realism; a mediated realism that attempts to mimic the 
recognisable codes of other media forms such as documentary and home videos. 
The central conceit is that a character is holding the camera and therefore almost 
all of what the audience sees can be conceived as point of view. These POV shots 
are significantly different to what Branigan has identified as the common POV 
structures, but nonetheless draw upon these structures’ traditions. The POV shots 
in diegetic camera films can be categorised as examples of the continuing POV 
structure and they often crucially lack the point/glance shot. This means that off-
screen space and the way the viewer imagines this space must be considered. 
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Sound and cinematography become key indicators of what is occurring off-screen 
because, unlike in other films, there is no suspension of time during point/object 
shots and anything could happen to the camera operator while they are filming. 
The mediated realism of the diegetic camera film therefore relies on mimicking 
non-fiction media products, and also making the diegesis more immediate by 
having the camera operator within it and affected by it. The viewer must therefore 
be more active in his or her imaginings of who is narrating this story by holding 
the camera and what is occurring to the operator when they are off-screen.  
2.2 Issues of narration and enunciation 
Branigan (1984, p.1) argues that with any text, ‘there must of necessity be some 
conception of a subject who presents the text (author), tells the story (narrator), 
lives in the fictional world (character), and who listens, watches, and desires that 
the story be told (viewer)’. In diegetic camera horror films, there is a subject who 
presents the text - the filmmakers and scriptwriter and production and post-
production crews. There is always a diegetic narrator who tells the story, with the 
exception of the opening titles: the camera operator (mostly off-camera, but 
within the diegesis), or the presenter on-screen who narrates the story. Therefore, 
at most times, narrator and character are conflated into one. Most importantly, the 
author, the narrator, and the character are all aware that there will be a viewer.7 
Branigan’s theory of levels of narration and point of view is a useful foundation to 
theorise the diegetic camera. In this thesis I extend it in order to properly consider 
the strategies and techniques involved in diegetic camera films. Branigan states 
that ‘point of view becomes a function of the position of the hypothetical observer 
who stands in for the viewer of a painting or movie, that is, we are invited to 
imagine ourselves within a certain perceptual array’ (1984, p.6). The observer in 
diegetic camera films is never hypothetical. There are two levels: the cinema or 
home viewer and the presumed future diegetic viewer. We either see the camera 
or imagine its presence and we then imagine that we are seeing from its point of 
view or from the point of view of the implied observer. 
                                                          
7 The character’s awareness of this is important and will be discussed further later 
in this thesis. 
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Bordwell also questions to what extent the narration displays a recognition that it 
is addressing an audience, calling this ‘the degree of self-consciousness’ (1985, 
p.58). This notion is vital in the analysis of the body of films under scrutiny here 
in order to consider how empathy is encouraged between viewer and characters. 
Narration in these films is often extremely self-conscious with the characters 
frequently directly addressing an imaginary future audience of their home 
video/documentary. Bordwell’s ideas can be applied to this shift in horror when 
he states that ‘in watching films, we are seldom aware of being told something by 
an entity resembling a human being’ (1985, p.62). This is untrue of these films 
where the viewer is frequently made aware that a character is holding the camera, 
choosing to show us things, talking from behind the camera and telling the 
imagined future viewer his or her thoughts. I argue that these films posit a fake 
enunciator within the diegesis, whose role it is to mask the presence of the real 
enunciator, the filmmaker. In Branigan’s elements of classical representation 
(1984, p.57), the origin is the diegetic camera, rather than an omniscient invisible 
camera, and the vision is what the operator of this camera chooses to reveal. With 
this perception, the viewer is encouraged to forget the existence of the real 
enunciator and the viewer therefore finds it easier to imagine that the film is a real 
home video or documentary. There is a greater sense of mediated realism because 
the enunciator appears to be in the diegesis and this should make the film feel 
scarier, more immersive, and lead to greater sympathy for the camera operator. 
 
The following pages introduce the notions of self consciousness, tone and 
metatextuality, performance, dialogue, and personal imagining that I use to 
develop my argument that diegetic camera films highlight the presence of a fake 
enunciator in order to encourage the viewer to imagine that the film is solely 
narrated by a character in the diegesis. The purpose of this is to make the 
characters more engaging and sympathetic. The effect of imagining that the 
camera-operating character is the enunciator is that the viewer will empathise 
more with the fear that the character feels. The above notions help to further 
elucidate how the diegetic camera enforces imagination of off-screen space and 
the implications of this on the viewer’s processing of the films. 
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 2.2.1 Self Consciousness 
 
Building on Bordwell’s degrees of self-consciousness, I will now explore the 
ways that diegetic camera films and the characters within them recognize that they 
are addressing an audience. This involves identifying the audience and how they 
are addressed. Many diegetic camera horror films show evidence that the 
characters address different audiences: sometimes imagined, other times more 
specific. Self-consciousness is fundamental in encouraging specific cognitive 
activity and in promoting certain emotional and intellectual responses from the 
spectator. Characters that address the audience are acknowledging that off-screen 
space exists and, furthermore, these characters seem to be communicating from 
within the diegesis to a viewer who s/he believes is also a part of the story world, 
but who is, in fact, non-diegetic. 
 
The vast majority of traditional films are not self-consciously constructed, as their 
characters have no awareness that they are being filmed or are being watched by 
an audience. Conversely, the characters in diegetic camera films are almost 
always aware of the presence of the camera and also that they are going to appear 
in a piece of footage viewed by others. They may address the camera operator, the 
camera itself, or the audience they envisage one day watching the footage; or they 
may choose to ignore the camera altogether. Either way, they are aware of being 
in a film (if not a fictional one) and this makes the characters inherently self-
conscious. The spectator is similarly aware that the characters know that they are 
being watched and recorded. Unlike other films that maintain a certain amount of 
distance between the character and the audience, diegetic camera films involve 
and engage the viewer more by having characters communicate with audience 
members. Kendall Walton (1990) emphasises the part that “make-believe” plays 
when spectators interact with a representational work of art: diegetic camera films 
specifically urge the spectator to make-believe that what s/he is watching is not a 
traditional film. Walton describes films that ‘limit our involvement in fictional 
worlds’ as being like ‘a spectator sport’ where ‘our stance is more akin to that of 
an onlooker than a participant in games of make-believe’ (1990, p.274). Diegetic 
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camera films attempt to increase the viewer’s involvement in the fictional world 
through self-conscious techniques, thus encouraging the audience to engage as 
participants rather than spectators. 
 
Bordwell defines the degree of self-consciousness in a film by asking ‘to what 
extent does the narration display a recognition that it is addressing an audience?’ 
(1985, p.58). There is a range of different degrees of self-consciousness within the 
diegetic camera horror sub-genre but all of these films are marked by a greater 
degree of self-consciousness than traditional fiction films. In all of the examples 
analysed, the majority of the characters who appear on screen are aware of the 
camera’s presence. In every example, the footage ‘deliberately breaks the rules of 
cinema by having its characters gaze directly into the camera and verbally address 
it’ (Rose, 2009, p.51). 
 
In most fictional films, the camera is not a part of the diegesis and it is neither 
acknowledged nor addressed except in very rare instances of postmodern 
playfulness where the fourth wall is broken. Ed S. Tan and others have called the 
camera an ‘invisible witness’. In his work on emotion and the structure of film, 
Tan argues that the camera is neither addressed nor ignored because to ‘the 
characters of the fictional world the witness simply does not exist’ (1996, p.76). 
Therefore, when the characters are undergoing painful or miserable 
circumstances, the audience is protected in a sense from what the character is 
going through. This is partly because the character is unable to address the 
spectator (through the camera) and beg for his or her help. Tan calls this ‘a happy 
circumstance’ (1996, p.76) for the spectator. However, in diegetic camera horror 
films, part of the appeal relies on the characters being able to directly address the 
diegetic camera and therefore the audience in order to intensify feelings of 
sympathy. Our investment in the profilmic events can be heightened if the 
characters ask for the viewer’s help, or at least for the viewer to remember the 
characters once they are deceased. This leads to an increased level of engagement 
and a heightened sense of empathy with the characters, as I will argue in chapter 
3. 
 
50 
 
While in most traditional films the characters do provide information about the 
story and diegesis, they do so by interacting with one another: observing, acting, 
and speaking. Branigan notes that a character in a traditional film is different from 
a narrator because the character ‘is not strictly telling or presenting anything to us 
for the reason that spectators, or readers, are not characters in that world’(1992, 
p.100). However, in diegetic camera films the audience is acknowledged as 
existing as part of the diegesis. The viewer may not be present or visible to the 
characters, but the camera and therefore the means of communication with the 
viewer is there. Therefore, the characters do in fact know that they can tell the 
viewer anything they want, and that it is likely that one day in the future, the 
footage will be watched by a spectator. 
  
The audience of diegetic camera films becomes aware that the character is 
communicating with him or her. Whether the viewer sitting at home and watching 
the film on DVD is the desired audience that the character hopes for is a different 
matter but the point is that the character reaches out and tries to leave a message 
for someone who has found the footage. Though there is still very little sense of a 
traditional extra-diegetic narrator, the sense of being narrated to by a character is 
consistently accentuated through various techniques. This has the effect of 
heightening the engagement and empathy of the spectator, altering his or her 
emotional reaction to the films. Similarly, Walton argues that ‘it is not commonly 
fictional, in our games with representational works, that characters notice or 
respond to us, or that we exchange glances with them or hold conversations with 
them’ (1990, p.229). Diegetic camera horror films do not give the viewer an 
actual opportunity to interact with the characters but the characters do make it 
clear that they are aware of being watched: by the camera and a future viewer.  
 
Diegetic camera films appropriate some of the conventions of documentary, 
reality television and television news in self-conscious ways. Warren Buckland 
(2000, pp.98-9) notes that the addressee of these formats is ‘modalized as real’ 
compared to those in fiction films, who are ‘modalized as imaginary’. Diegetic 
camera films also modalize their addressees as real, and this can have a range of 
effects. As Janet Staiger puts it, ‘direct address by television narrators to the 
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viewers increase distanciation instead of promoting identification’ (1992, p.62). 
Diegetic camera films often contain an element of direct address, be it from an 
ordinary amateur camera operator or by a more professional documentary maker, 
news reporter or reality television presenter. While the more formal mode of 
address used by some reporters and narrators will distance the viewer, the diegetic 
camera film often breaks down the cool, calm, and objective facade of these 
presenters and eventually uses their on-camera presence and direct address to 
increase the possibility of the viewer’s sympathy for the character. This highlights 
the importance of performance, particularly of the presenter characters. 
The idea that direct address can involve the viewer in diegetic events has been 
considered by cognitive theorists. When characters speak directly to the audience, 
Currie argues that the spectator can ‘come to play a dual role’, becoming ‘both 
spectators of, and actors (or sometimes merely props) in, the production’ (1990, 
p.96). The members of the audience do not become props or actors in the diegesis 
but they may increasingly identify with the participants in the action, make-
believing and imagining how the camera operator taking part in the events would 
be feeling. Walton (1990, p.232) notes that in the theatre it is impossible for a 
narrator to make eye contact with every spectator individually at one moment; in 
film it is possible for the character to share a semblance of eye contact with every 
viewer simply by looking into the camera. Walton finds it disconcerting, ‘if 
pleasantly so’ to be recognized by a character on the screen and argues that when 
the character ‘sees’ the spectator, it marks ‘an important shift in one’s relation to 
the fiction’. He compares the act of directly addressing the audience with being 
recognized in real life, arguing that it ‘marks a significant change in one’s social 
situation (…) one feels included in a manner one wasn’t previously’ (1990, 
p.233). When Heather Donahue talks directly to me as a viewer from the diegesis, 
I feel like a privileged witness to her most personal testimony. Even if the footage 
is not shot from the most ideal position to capture the best and clearest visuals of 
an event, the fact that a character has a viewer in mind for the footage s/he creates, 
produces an important sense of privilege and intimacy. This points to the 
immersive experience of watching a diegetic camera horror film for a viewer. 
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However, there are limits to what direct address can achieve and while Currie 
(1990, p.96) suggests that a spectator becomes an actor in the fiction, Walton 
takes a more restrained approach to the interaction between film and spectator. 
Walton contends that ‘the interaction remains severely limited’ (1990, p.235) with 
characters rarely carrying on long conversations with the spectator. Similarly, the 
viewer is not able to communicate back to the character and while they may find 
themselves more engaged in the world of the film, they have not become a part of 
the film. Walton suggests that ‘asides do not introduce the appreciator into a 
fictional world he did not previously or would not otherwise belong to. But they 
do give him a slightly fuller presence in the world of his game’ (1990, p.237). A 
viewer will be immersed in many fiction films but by being directly addressed, it 
is as though the character is actively attempting to keep the viewer engaged in 
what is happening in the diegesis. This will lead to a different cognitive response 
to the films and the trials of the characters within them. By looking directly into 
the lens of the diegetic camera, it is almost as though the character can see into the 
off-screen space that is not behind the camera, but is in front of the screen that the 
viewer watches and that this space (which the character appears to know exists) is 
in the same diegesis as the character. This means that the viewer can feel as 
though the character is actually talking to him or her and is therefore more 
invested in the events occurring on-screen. 
 
A constant tension is present in these films between the filmmakers’ attempts to 
make them appear as authentic pieces of ‘found footage’ and the frequent 
reminders, and spectator’s own knowledge, that s/he is watching a constructed 
film. On the one hand, the self-conscious techniques that remind the viewer of the 
presence of the camera (such as shaky camera movement) act as a marker of 
realness; on the other hand, they are also a sign of the film’s construction and 
point to the film being a representation rather than reality. In a traditional 
cinematic experience this could clearly be conceived as a negative effect: 
however, in diegetic camera films, these moments where the camera’s presence is 
noticeable to the audience are not interruptions; on the contrary, they are a way to 
convince the spectator that what they are watching is not traditional cinema. 
Walton argues that some films discourage participation ‘by prominently declaring 
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or displaying their fictionality, betraying their own pretense [sic]’ (1990, pp.275). 
Diegetic camera films do not display their fictionality; however, they do display 
their construction. The filmmakers have many techniques to convince the viewer 
of the veracity of the events depicted and some of these include emphasizing how 
the footage has been created by a camera operator who is present in the diegesis. 
Diegetic camera films are clearly artificial representations (filmed footage) but 
their artifice (e.g. shaky camera, poor lighting, etc.) is designed by the filmmakers 
to specifically enhance their authenticity and their mediated realism.  
 
Self-consciousness is crucial to creating authentic-looking ‘found footage’. When 
the spectator is attentive to the construction of the film and alert to the fact that the 
character is aware of the camera’s presence, it can make the diegetic events 
appear more like mediated reality. Geoff King suggests that techniques such as ‘a 
limited view and problems of access signify authenticity, something not set up for 
the cameras,’ but also acknowledges that ‘such qualities also tend to draw our 
attention to the process of mediation’ (2005, p.54). Being made aware of the 
process of mediation is central to the believability of such films as the characters 
within the diegesis are the people who appear to be mediating for the viewer. The 
more amateur the characters appear in their camerawork, the more it convinces the 
viewer of the apparent authenticity of the footage. 
 
Similarly, when a character acknowledges the presence of the camera, it does not 
detract from the mediated realism of the film. Instead, Bill Nichols argues that 
‘such moments authenticate the presence of characters (…) and filmmakers on the 
same plane of historical coexistence’ (1991, p.184). An audience familiar with 
documentaries, home videos and amateur videos on the Internet is attuned to 
accept the events presented in diegetic camera horror films as believable. When a 
subject addresses the camera, it corresponds with the behaviour seen in many 
documentaries and home videos, and making the ‘found footage’ feel like a 
genuine document from the contemporary world where so much of what we see is 
mediated by amateurs capturing everyday life. If, as Gary D. Rhodes notes, it is a 
‘generally-established cinematic convention (...) that characters in fiction films 
did not gaze directly into the camera lens and thus at the audience’ (2002, p.49), 
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then when a character in a diegetic camera horror film does gaze into the camera, 
it prompts the spectator to consider the film’s attempts at realism in relation to 
non-fiction texts. 
 
Directly addressing the camera is also increasingly familiar from contemporary 
media products, both amateur and professional. News reports, television 
presenters and more recently vloggers address the camera frequently, if not 
constantly. The growing number of amateurs attempting to use cameras and the 
media to speak to a mass audience is what Anita Biressi and Heather Nunn 
describe as ‘a desire for the mark of authenticity, for the social legitimisation of 
one’s existence’ (2005, p.101). By addressing the camera, recording their thoughts 
and then distributing the videos to an audience, the person appears to require some 
validation. Their videos become proof of their existence to many people beyond 
those that know them. This trend corresponds with diegetic camera horror films 
and the characters that often desperately want the camera, and therefore some 
imagined future audience, to know that they were alive, they did exist, and they 
did try to survive in the face of the threat presented. 
 
 2.2.2 Tone and metatextuality 
Diegetic camera horror films show not only a high degree of self consciousness in 
that their characters often address the camera and audience: they are also self-
reflexive because they are marked by their own artificiality. Branigan argues that 
‘a camera movement that is motivated by the narrative is relatively “invisible” as 
an element of style with the result that plot and story are foregrounded for a 
spectator (2006, p.26). However, in diegetic camera films, it is almost constantly 
noticeable to the viewer that they are watching an artefact; a film captured on a 
camera. Where classical films will not foreground their style, the camerawork in 
diegetic camera films is frequently at the forefront of the spectator’s mind. 
Zachary Ingle argues that ‘the diegetic camera takes self-reflexivity to a new level 
that resembles metafiction, as viewers are consistently aware that the characters 
are conscious of making a film’ (2011, pp.34-5). Metafiction texts such as Last 
Action Hero (McTiernan, 1993) where a movie character enters the ‘real world’, 
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or Funny Games (Haneke, 1997) where a character can ‘rewind’ the film that he is 
in, draw attention to themselves as constructions, encouraging the reader/viewer 
to question the relationship between fiction and reality and their own role as 
spectators. The filmmakers of diegetic camera films aim to convince the viewer of 
the veracity of the footage by borrowing techniques from artefacts such as 
documentaries and home videos and therefore there is reference to a range of 
other media products that are still artefacts but have a closer relationship with the 
‘real’, and a more immediate relationship to horror. 
 
Numerous stylistic techniques found in these films make the audience focus on 
the presence of the camera. Don Tresca contends that such techniques make ‘the 
audience hyperaware of the camera’s presence in a way that is atypical for either 
fictional or documentary film’ (2011, p.46). These techniques may not be found in 
the majority of professional media products but they are becoming increasingly 
familiar to modern audiences of user-generated content on the Internet, mobile 
phone recordings played on news programmes and other formats where amateur 
videos can be viewed. In order to ascertain the level of self-consciousness in the 
films, careful consideration of the use of the diegetic camera will be required to 
determine how camera movement can impact the audience. The metatextual tone 
of the films creates a tension between the fact that the footage was recorded in the 
past, but the camera operator’s reactions feel immediate and present and also 
between the artifice and the realism of the mediation. I contend that the sensitive 
viewer does not constantly sense this tension and is instead mostly engaged with 
the immediacy and familiarity of the mediation; creating a metatextual experience 
only insofar as the films are designed to remind the spectator of other non-fiction 
media artefacts. 
 
 2.2.3 Performance 
The self-conscious, metatextual nature of these films extends to a tendency for 
characters to display themselves for the camera in some diegetic camera films. 
There is a sense at times that some characters ‘perform’ for the camera, much as 
people often do in home videos or other instances where they become aware of 
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being filmed. Some characters’ desire to be observed is seen by Biressi and Nunn 
as extending ‘beyond the masochistic desire to submit to another’s gaze or the 
exhibitionist’s desire to display’ (2005, p.102). The characters ‘caught’ on camera 
in these films often acknowledge the cameras and their reactions to being filmed 
range from not wanting to be filmed to putting on a ‘performance’ for the camera. 
The camera can become a confidant, a means to record a last will and testament, 
or a way to communicate with whomever the subject believes will eventually 
watch the footage. 
 
Furthermore, in some cases the camera can become a central part of the 
characters’ motivations. The camera can be the reason that the characters behave 
in particular ways (for example, posing) and the audience recognise the behaviour 
of a person who is reacting to the gaze of a camera. Biressi and Nunn insist that 
the camera ‘can even be a provocateur and stimulant to action. Signs of 
performance provide evidence of this awareness of the camera’ (2005, p.128). In 
fact, the characters often display signs of knowing they are on camera and 
performing in ways that emphasize this. The viewer is therefore privy to this 
performance and can learn more about the characters from their response to being 
on camera. Having the camera drives characters to action as they are often 
determined to capture something by recording it. This leads them to behave in 
certain ways such as staying in situations that are becoming increasingly unsafe. 
In this way, the use of the diegetic camera becomes an integral part of the 
performance of the character and the horror effects of the genre. In this kind of 
situation, the diegetic camera device also justifies the narrative. 
 
Despite this emphasis on the performative, the diegetic camera rarely allows for 
close-ups. Close-ups have long been a technique used to convey character 
emotions to the audience, giving the viewer a chance to see the performance of the 
actor or subject up close. Torben Grodal considers that ‘classical film-theory laid 
great emphasis on the role of close-ups of facial expressions as a central means of 
cinema and its communication of emotions’ (1997, p.90).  
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Close-ups are indeed a vital tool used in showing emotions but Murray Smith 
(1995) is right to point out that the performance of the actors is as important as the 
shot type used. Both are intrinsic parts of making an audience acutely aware of 
how the characters on screen are feeling and even what they are thinking. Most of 
the diegetic camera horror films analysed contain close-ups, but they are seldom 
(if ever) focussed on the camera operator. These close-ups reveal the 
performances that convey the emotions of certain characters; however, with one 
character always behind the camera, this character may be more difficult to 
identify with as their face and the actor’s performance is rarely, if ever seen. Some 
of the films get around this by having the camera-operating characters turn the 
camera on themselves at pivotal moments in the story. Smith argues that 
‘performance rather than POV is the central device of “identification”’ (1995, 
p.158). I argue that performance can be captured from off-camera if the viewer 
pays attention to both the cinematography and the voice of the off-camera 
operator. In addition, Gaut offers that ‘while the first-person-point-of-view shot 
(…) is obviously important in securing our perceptual identification with a 
character (…) it is less central to producing affective identification with characters 
than the reaction shot’ (Shaw, 2008, p.57). However, despite the obvious lack of 
reaction shots in diegetic camera films, I argue that there can still be increased 
affective identification with camera-operating characters due to the amount that 
we can learn about them through the cinematography. Nevertheless, when 
camera-operating characters do turn the camera around to film themselves, this is 
clearly comparable to a reaction shot. Thus, the diegetic camera operator is not 
excluded from appearing on-screen in some of the films. With the cinematography 
being an indicator of performance, as well as the possibility of reaction shots, the 
camera operator becomes a likely character that the viewer will empathise with. 
 
Even though there are an abundance of point-of-view shots in the diegetic camera 
horror sub-genre, some feature several close-ups, thus giving the audience an 
unobstructed look at the performances of the actors. These close-ups are usually 
of characters other than the camera operator, but can also occasionally be of the 
operator. Jane Roscoe argues that ‘the position constructed for the viewer through 
the characters’ use of the video camera is clearly voyeuristic’ and that ‘we are 
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given privileged access to (...) personal moments that otherwise would be denied 
us. We are encouraged to gaze at the characters’ faces as the camcorder captures 
their every emotion’ (2000, p.5-6). The camcorder is useful for getting very close 
to characters’ faces and its size and portability make it easier to take the camera 
into what Roscoe calls the most ‘personal and intimate spaces’ (2000, p.5). Like 
the confession cams and diary cams used in reality television shows like Big 
Brother, the camcorder can become confidante and provide a seemingly intimate 
means of communicating with a wider audience. In diegetic camera films, the 
camera can become the site of confession and diary and as Amy West argues 
about reality television programmes, these sequences can ‘heighten the desired 
affect of immediacy and authenticity’ (2005, p.89). Communication with the 
diegetic camera and imagined future audience intensifies engagement and 
empathy with the characters, whether it be communication from the camera 
operators or their profilmic subjects. 
 
 2.2.4 Sound and dialogue 
Sound can be a particularly effective tool for eliciting and enhancing audience 
identification with characters. Music is rarely used in these films unless it is 
diegetic. Music is a significant tool in passing on information to the spectator 
about the emotions and even thoughts of characters. Instead of having an 
extradiegetic soundtrack added in post production, the dialogue and sound effects 
are elevated in importance in the diegetic camera film. The sounds made by the 
camera operator are particularly useful to the viewer when ascertaining how the 
character is feeling: for instance King (2005, p.53) points to the ‘startled reactions 
of people close to the camera’. Despite the lack of close-ups and visible 
performance of the camera operators, they are still present and clearly audible. 
Often the voice of the camera operators relay their hopes, fears, and desires, 
revealing much about their emotions and state of mind. It even allows the 
audience to gain insight into the characters’ innermost thoughts, and what they 
would like to say to others including the future audience, but refrain from doing 
so. 
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Sound is also essential in making the audience aware of what is occurring in off-
screen space. While the viewer is limited to seeing only what is captured by the 
camera, the character sees more because they have access to off-screen space. 
Bordwell contends that ‘sound has a particularly strong potential for cueing us 
about offscreen space’ (1985, p.120) and I argue that this can be heightened in 
diegetic camera films. Often the darkness and erratic camerawork make the shot 
unreliable or incomprehensible. However, sound becomes revelatory. Sound can 
terrify characters and the audience alike, thus creating corresponding emotions. It 
can also mystify both the audience and character. It therefore plays an integral 
part in creating character engagement in diegetic camera films, for example when 
the characters in The Blair Witch Project can only hear distant noises in the night 
outside their tent. Both characters and spectator are equally unsure of what they 
are hearing. 
 
 2.2.5 Personal imagining 
Currie differentiates between impersonal and personal imaginings, rejecting 
psychoanalytic ideas about spectator belief that suggest that the viewer believes 
that s/he is a spectator of a genuine event. Instead, Currie argues that watching 
fiction films causes the viewer to have imaginings about what they see. He also 
objects to ‘the idea that cinematic fictional works encourage us to imagine 
ourselves to be observers of the fictional events, placed within the world of the 
fiction’ (1995, p.166). In terms of defining impersonal and personal imaginings, 
Currie argues that ‘when I imagine merely that such and such happens, without 
imagining that I see (or have other kinds of epistemic contacts with) what 
happens, we have a case of impersonal imagining. When imagining involves the 
idea that I am seeing the imagined events, we have a species of personal 
imagining... more specifically, it is a case of imagining seeing’ (1995, p.166). 
Currie rejects personal imagining and what he calls the ‘imagined observer 
hypothesis’, and by extension the ‘view that the imagining appropriate to film is 
imagining seeing’ (1995, p.167). Currie also concedes that in the case of 
exceptional shots (such as the POV shot), imagining seeing (personal imagining) 
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is appropriate. This is why I strongly advocate a theory of personal imagining as 
foundational to the diegetic camera horror film.  
When Currie asks, ‘do I really identify my visual system, in imagination, with the 
camera, and imagine myself to be placed where the camera is?’ (1995, p.171) he 
is not specifically considering the diegetic camera film. However, in these films, I 
argue the viewer does frequently imagine the camera and its operator. The 
spectator may not always imagine what it would be like if s/he was the actual 
character holding the camera, but the spectator is encouraged to imagine the 
position of the character who is filming. Currie suggests that the imagined 
observer hypothesis is comparable to imagining oneself in an ‘invisible, massless 
time machine capable of discontinuous movement’ (1995, p.172) that gives the 
viewer ‘magical access’ to the world of the film. However, in diegetic camera 
films, there need not be a massless time machine, as we have the diegetic camera 
itself to imagine. This is the means by which the viewer can travel through time 
and space, anchoring the point of view. The diegetic camera forces us to imagine 
a camera operator, or some other device that holds the camera in its position. Thus 
our visual system is constantly identified with the diegetic camera, and usually its 
operator. The imagined observer in the diegetic camera film is the diegetic camera 
and its operator. Therefore, the viewer does actually imagine this central prop and 
character because they both exist in the story world. 
Similarly, Currie argues that fictions preclude the presence of a witness in the 
world of the fiction and beyond. He states that ‘naturalistic fictions do not leave 
open as to whether someone is watching the scene from another world: such an 
idea would be wildly at variance with their conventions’ (1995, p.174). Again, 
this is where diegetic camera films represent a divergence, as their conventions do 
not rule out the presence of witnesses. They are filmed by an internal witness: the 
camera operator within the diegesis. The characters do not realise that they are in 
a fiction, but they are aware of being filmed and witnessed and they are therefore 
aware that in the future, there may be an internal diegetic witness. This means that 
they may perform for the camera (and future witness), or monitor their behaviour 
due to the possibility of other characters seeing the footage. 
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Identification takes a degree of imagination from the spectator. The viewer must 
either imagine being the character (Currie, 1995, p.175) or at least imagine what 
the beliefs and desires of the character might be (Neill, 1996, p. 183). Films, and 
more specifically diegetic camera horror films, are adept at aiding the reader’s 
imagination and putting the spectator ‘into’ the film with the characters. In no way 
is the spectator actually sharing the same diegetic space as the characters (even 
though their perception may be aligned). Rather, the viewer imagines, as Gaut 
(1999, p.203) argues, being in the situation experienced by the character; what it 
would feel like and what the character would be wanting. Gaut (1999, p.206) 
notes that ‘the fact that we are imagining seeing from her perspective does not 
require us to imagine wanting what she wants, or imagine feeling what she feels’. 
However, seeing the diegetic world from the point of view of the character can 
help achieve what Neill (1996, p.185) calls an ‘internal understanding of another’ 
character. Perceptual alignment is just one part of identification but it can aid the 
spectator’s imagining of what the character is experiencing. 
 
Another reason for increased audience identification with the characters in 
diegetic camera horror films is what the spectator sees as common ground 
between his or her self and the character. The desire to film, the desire to witness 
horror, and the urge to flee when put in harm’s way are all aspects that many 
viewers will understand, and tap into Smith’s notions of recognition, alignment, 
and allegiance. Despite not being able to see the camera operators for much of the 
films, there is clear recognition of a character behind the camera. The spectator 
may have to imagine details about the character, but due to the alignment with the 
character, this imagining should be undemanding. If the viewer understands the 
compulsion to film, even in extreme circumstances, then allegiance may in some 
cases be stronger. The compulsion to film must be a realistic and believable 
motivation of the character, and therefore the realism of the films requires some 
discussion. 
 
2.3 Realism 
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Diegetic camera films are attempting to create a very specific type of realism; one 
that is based on the viewer’s perception of other media forms such as 
documentary and home video. Debates surrounding the notion of realism are 
important to my conception of mediated realism and I offer here an overview of 
some of the key theories of realism that inform my own use of the term. 
For Andre Bazin, the ontological realism of the cinematic image stems from its 
basis in photography. Bazin argues that ‘the objective nature of photography 
confers on it a quality of credibility absent from all other picture-making’ (1945, 
p.198). The moving image becomes more real than still photography as moving 
images are even more lifelike than a still photograph. Bazin suggests that ‘we are 
forced to accept as real the existence of the object reproduced, actually re-
presented, set before us, that is to say, in time and space. Photography enjoys a 
certain advantage in virtue of this transference of reality from the thing to its 
reproduction’ (1945, p.198). Diegetic camera films rely on this Bazinian 
conception of ontological realism. If cinema’s claim to realism is based on its 
photographic imagery, then the diegetic camera film heighten their claims to 
realism through explicit reference to the filmmaking apparatus. If we can trust 
cameras to capture what actually existed, then the diegetic camera becomes the 
enunciator of what the spectator witnesses. The diegetic camera film also shows 
that the photographic image is far from objective as the camera is wielded by a 
character in the diegesis. 
Thus diegetic camera films rely on another type of realism: subjective realism. 
Similar to Branigan’s conception of ‘deep internal focalization’ (1992, p.87), this 
is where cinema ‘deals with the reality of the imagination as well, but treats this as 
if it were as objective as the world before us’ (Bordwell, 1985, p.206). We do not 
see into the imaginations of the camera-operating characters in diegetic camera 
films, but we do frequently see from their point of view, or more precisely from 
the diegetic camera’s point of view. We see a memory card or tape’s ‘memories’ 
of what has been previously recorded and we are given a sense of the experience 
of the camera and the character holding it. The diegetic camera offers both its own 
flashbacks to previously recorded material and through the cinematography, it 
offers the viewer the opportunity to imagine the experience of the character 
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holding it. The diegetic camera forces us to imagine the operator in off-screen 
space (behind the camera) and to imagine their experience as they film in 
challenging circumstances. This means that a schema of  subjective realism is in 
play when watching these films. In this framework, the spectator is encouraged to 
imagine that the real enunciator is the camera operator and that the footage offers 
a realistically subjective experience. 
Both Stephen Prince (1996) and Joel Black (2002) highlight the deceptiveness of 
modern cinematic images and how even the most fantastical of images can still be 
perceived as realistic. For Prince (1996, p.92):  
a perceptually realistic image is one which structurally 
corresponds to the viewer’s audiovisual experience of 
three-dimensional space. Perceptually realistic images 
correspond to this experience because filmmakers build 
them to do so. Such images display a nested hierarchy of 
cues which organize the display of light, color, texture, 
movement, and sound in ways that correspond with the 
viewer’s own understanding of these phenomenon in daily 
life.  
Perceptual realism suggests that even an image with no indexical link to what was 
placed in front of a camera; no physical referent, can be considered realistic by a 
viewer. This is both relevant in films such as Cloverfield where computer 
generated images are utilised, but also in the performance of camera-operating 
characters to make their cinematography seem realistic. The viewer must 
recognise the cinematography and other visual cues belonging to genuine 
documentaries and home videos that s/he has seen in his or her own life in order 
to find diegetic camera films “realistic”. As in computer-generated images, 
diegetic camera films have their own ‘nested hierarchy of cues’ to convince the 
spectator that s/he is watching non-fiction footage. The viewer must be primed to 
respond to these cues, as will be shown in chapter 4.  
Similarly, Black argues that ‘today’s sophisticated effects are increasingly used to 
produce a heightened illusion of reality itself (crashes, disasters, wars, space 
travel, etc.) - of truth as visible spectacle, of reality as anything that is filmable’ 
(2002, p.8), what he calls the reality effect. Diegetic camera films use effects, but 
not the kind of sophisticated effects that Black describes. His argument that ‘ever 
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more talent and resources are devoted to making artifice seem natural’ suggests 
that it is computer generated imagery, prosthetics, and make up effects that help to 
make films more explicit and graphic, but not necessarily more realistic. Diegetic 
camera films are a direct response to this. If showing more in the way of graphic 
details can sometimes fail to make films more realistic, then a diegetic camera 
device can hide details, but make this hiding a part of a believable aesthetic. 
Diegetic camera films reveal less because narration is restricted and off-camera 
space is often privileged as a site for important narrative events to occur. The 
reality effect in diegetic camera films is something different to Black’s 
formulation. It is not pro-filmic effects that give diegetic camera films their 
realism, but their cinematography and centring of the diegetic camera in the midst 
of a diegesis where off-camera space is consistently emphasised. 
The handheld camera and off-screen voice of the operator contribute to the 
solidity and centrality of off-screen space. These aspects continually remind the 
viewer that there are important elements of the diegesis that are not on screen. 
They exist, even if they are not shown. This is what Richard Allen calls the 
‘optimum preconditions for the experience of projective illusion’ (1995, p.108). 
Projective illusion is central to the viewer’s experience of cinema for Allen; the 
idea that while we know we are watching a film, ‘we nevertheless experience that 
film as a fully realized world’ (1995, p.4). Spectators actively enter into this 
experience because ‘the cinematic image provides an impression of reality’ 
(Allen, 1995, p.2). In diegetic camera films, the documentary or home video 
aesthetics make it easier to imagine that you are perceiving events from within the 
diegesis, because that is where the diegetic camera is positioned. The camera 
exists in the diegesis and therefore the world on-screen is more fully realised and 
convincing. Therefore, the viewer is more likely to experience the film as what 
Allen calls a ‘projective illusion’. But it is not so much an impression of reality 
that is important in these films. Instead, it is the impression of mediated reality 
that is more important. 
 
In diegetic camera films, like in other films, we should imagine that the fiction we 
are watching is non-fiction, in order to engage with the films as the filmmakers 
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intended. To make this process easier for the viewer, the visual and auditory cues 
are designed to make the films appear like non-fiction moving image texts such as 
documentaries and home videos. Diegetic camera films are no less fictional than 
others, but the illusion created is that of non-fiction and therefore imagining them 
this way can be easier. The films offer a subjective experience of both the camera 
and the camera-operating character, and at the same time promote imaginings 
about the space behind the camera where the character is most often positioned. 
This makes the diegesis feel more real to the viewer as there is much that needs to 
be imagined which occurs off-screen. This creates the vivid impression that the 
events on screen are only what the camera operator was able to capture; just a 
small framed part of a wider world, while there is clearly more action that would 
be of interest to the viewer, often occurring all around the camera operator. 
 
The mediated realism of diegetic camera films allow us easier imagining of off-
screen space and therefore of a world beyond the frame of what is shown on-
screen. They align us with camera-operating characters, positioning us as 
witnesses to horrific events. The cognitive activity of the viewer (imagining, 
empathising, hypothesising etc.) is therefore affected by the diegetic camera and 
its sense of mediated realism. 
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Chapter 3: Developing a cognitive approach to diegetic camera horror films 
 
Cognitive theory in film and media studies began in the 1980s with scholars such 
as David Bordwell and Noël Carroll initially challenging the psychoanalytic 
theory that had dominated film studies since the 1970s. In order to justify my use 
of cognitive film theory to elucidate the pleasures and purposes of diegetic camera 
horror, I will first clarify why I reject psychoanalytic theories that have been 
predominant in discussions over concepts such as identification and of the horror 
genre more generally. I will argue that psychoanalytic film theory relies too 
heavily on cinema’s relation to theories of the unconscious; instead, I explore the 
cognitive processes of the viewer when s/he is watching diegetic camera horror 
films. I emphasise how the use of the diegetic camera orients our emotions and 
cognitions when watching these films. Understanding how we cognize the 
diegetic camera will help to gain an appreciation of how we feel about the 
characters that operate it, and furthermore how this can lead us towards certain 
emotions. My argument is that the diegetic camera is a key stimulus that provokes 
our emotional responses to these films, and that these emotions are far more 
complex than simply labelling them as pleasure and desire. 
 
3.1 Limits of psychoanalytic theories for diegetic camera horror films 
 
Psychoanalytic film theorists from Christian Metz (1982, p.4) 8 to Laura Mulvey 
(1989, p.14) 9 as well as countless others are preoccupied with cinema’s relation 
to the unconscious. However, in this study of diegetic camera horror films, I am 
primarily focussed on cinema’s complex relationship with the world, realism, and 
other non-fiction media forms such as documentary and home videos. I wish to 
look beyond Metz and Mulvey’s assertions that a Freudian/Lacanian approach is 
required to explain the pleasures and desires of film viewing. Although I will be 
referring to the process of identification that Metz sees as the most important 
pleasure of film viewing, I argue that this is more intricate than psychoanalytic 
theory suggested and requires a more active engagement with the text that 
                                                          
8 Metz argues that cinema can be used to explore the unconscious dream state. 
9 Mulvey argues that the structure of film form reflects the unconscious of patriarchal society. 
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involves significant cognitive processes. I agree that identification is a crucial 
concept, but in following notable cognitive scholars such as Murray Smith, I will 
be breaking down the process of identification into numerous parts in order to 
explain the complex array of emotions that a viewer feels when watching a 
diegetic camera film. My concern is with the specifics of emotional experience 
and how these are tied to the utilisation of a diegetic camera in the horror film 
genre. According to Carl Plantinga and Greg M. Smith, ‘the best of recent 
psychoanalytic theory is attempting to elaborate and enumerate pleasures instead 
of “pleasure,” desires instead of “desire”’ (1999, p.12). For this thesis, however, 
the concepts of pleasure and desire are still too limited as there are more complex 
emotions to consider when a diegetic camera is utilised such as empathy and 
sympathy, fear, dread and anticipation. I will be relying on the work of cognitive 
scholars because their central attention is on emotions and more specifically how 
these emotions are tied to cognitive activity. This approach stresses the activity of 
the viewer’s mind when watching the films and moves away from subconscious 
drives.  
 
I argue that the viewer of diegetic camera horror films has control over his or her 
cognition, actively making connections between media forms during the priming 
stage of the film and choosing who or what to identify with through a process of 
recognising characters and making moral evaluations about their actions. I will 
also argue that the viewer brings his or her own previous individual experiences, 
memories, schemata, and expectations to the film, meaning that s/he will interpret 
meaning, narrative, and aesthetics individually.  
 
Furthermore, Metz’s notions of primary and secondary identification lack the 
precision of cognitive theorists and their fuller explorations of what identification 
entails. The diegetic camera also opens up many new avenues of investigation as 
its employment contradicts much of Metz’s conception of the camera in cinema. 
For example, the diegetic camera does not provide the spectator with an illusion 
of power over the screen images, nor does it offer the spectator the feeling of 
avoiding being seen by those on screen. The diegetic camera is a fundamental 
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component in the creation of identification, but this concept needs interrogating 
and clarifying beyond what psychoanalytic theory has offered in the past. 
 
3.2 Cognitivism and how we think about the diegetic camera 
 
Cognitive theory is about studying the process of cognition or thinking. 
Encompassing a range of factors including attention, learning, memory, 
reasoning, problem-solving, and perception. Cognitive theory explores the 
conscious mind and this makes it a suitable framework for analysing the diegetic 
camera horror film. I will contend that the films encourage the viewer to actively 
process the information contained within the films in specific ways, such as by 
imagining off-screen space and empathising with off-screen camera-operating 
characters. This is significant because it immerses the viewer and increases their 
investment in on-screen events. My question is: how do viewers respond to 
diegetic camera films and why do they respond as they do? I believe that 
cognitivism is central to answering this question because the use of the diegetic 
camera fundamentally affects the attention, learning and perception of the film 
viewer. With their priming techniques, self-conscious strategies and the moral 
orientation of characters, diegetic camera films encourage viewers to be more 
engaged with the films. 
 
In the following sections, I will explain how priming, engagement, empathy, 
attention, alignment and allegiance are key factors in the cognition of the viewer 
while watching diegetic camera horror films. I argue that priming (the subject of 
chapter 4) is the initial process that must occur in order for the viewer to be able 
to recognise the off-screen camera operator as a character and begin imagining of 
off-screen space. The diegetic camera then affects the level of engagement of the 
viewer, the empathy generated for the characters, the way the viewer pays 
attention to the film and how s/he becomes aligned with, and morally evaluates 
the characters. 
 
 
 
69 
 
 3.2.1 Priming for point of view 
 
Peter Wuss’s theory of priming argues that ‘since the opening of a film has the 
function of programming the information processing of the whole reception 
process, the first sequences serve as a kind of priming. They formulate the 
aesthetic rules for the following course of experience’ (Wuss, 2009, p.34). This is 
especially true of the films in this horror trend as they have to prime their 
audiences with relatively new, but easily identifiable, aesthetic rules for a different 
viewing experience. Wuss continues by stating that ‘the formation of a successful 
opening sequence (...) must (...) prepare the spectator for a specific way or style of 
film perception that leads to the aesthetic code of the artwork here called its 
“priming pattern”’ (2009, p.49). The priming patterns of many diegetic camera 
horror films are strikingly similar. This will be developed with a detailed analysis 
of the opening scenes of The Blair Witch Project and Rec in chapter 4.  
 
Branigan’s work on the POV shot will inform my discussion of the stylistic 
techniques used in the early scenes of the film as priming. This is of particular 
importance because diegetic camera films do not often conform to Branigan’s 
theory of the most common POV structures. Without what Branigan calls the 
‘point/glance’ shot to prepare audiences for the ‘point/object’ shot, the use of 
POV must be signalled in other ways. Therefore, these films must contain cues to 
ensure that the spectator understands the footage as a continual POV shot. Also, it 
must be understood by the viewer that the POV is not strictly that of any one 
character, but that of the diegetic camera. 
 
POV shots help to limit what the viewer sees and therefore aid in creating feelings 
of anxiety. With reference to Greg M. Smith, I will also consider how the early 
scenes establish an emotional orientation for the viewer and help to create what 
Matt Hills (2005, p.25) refers to as a mood of anticipation. The opening text of the 
films is often a key element in establishing an anticipatory mood that will then 
orient the viewer’s emotions for the remainder of the film. The viewer is primed 
for two major responses: to anticipate a disaster befalling the characters and to 
recall other media artefacts that they have seen in the past that have a closer 
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relation to reality than fiction film - for example documentaries and home videos. 
Diegetic camera films and particularly their opening pieces of text also activate 
what Jaak Panksepp (1998) calls seeking emotions. Torben Grodal (2010, p.65) 
argues that these emotions are often activated when watching what he calls 
‘classical detector fictions’ - films that set up a mystery for the viewer to attempt 
to solve. Many of the diegetic camera horror films, specifically those that follow 
the victims of violence (as opposed to those who commit acts of violence) 
encourage the viewer to hypothesise and to search for clues as to what exactly is 
going to happen further along in the narrative. The viewer should ideally seek 
answers to the mystery that is teased in the opening text and s/he will hope that a 
character with a camera can provide some evidence as to what exactly happens to 
the characters. What we also see in diegetic camera films is the seeking system 
appearing to be activated in the camera-operating characters as they search for 
evidence. This I argue creates an alignment of systems - a shared seeking - 
between character and viewer, especially exaggerated because of the continuing 
POV shots. 
 
However, these POV shots also restrict the narration creating a strong alignment, 
but limiting what the viewer sees. In Ed Tan’s volume on emotion and the 
structure of narrative film, he suggests that ‘as a privileged witness, viewers are 
allowed to see precisely what they need to see, at precisely the moment they need 
to see it’ (1996, p.55). This may be true of the formal strategy of classical 
Hollywood with the tradition of seamless continuity editing and traditional 
cinematography but the horror films discussed here do not position the spectator 
in a privileged way. While we may feel privileged in the sense of having access to 
a character’s vision and perhaps even their emotions, the narration is also highly 
restricted because the viewer of the film is confined to the (often less than ideal) 
POV of a character and their camera. The viewer is primed to experience the film 
from a less privileged position than the traditional invisible observer camera. 
Similarly, Tan’s assertion that ‘the invisible witness is not addressed, indeed, not 
even ignored: for the characters of the fictional world the witness simply does not 
exist’ (1996, p.76) does not apply to diegetic camera horror films, where the 
camera operator and camera is frequently acknowledged. The viewer must be 
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primed to accept this shift in their spectatorial position compared to when s/he 
watches a classical film. I argue that this can create a stronger form of the fear that 
Julian Hanich (2014) labels dread. Hanich argues that dread is created when we 
anticipate a shock or threat in a scene and that dread is therefore a meta-emotion, 
where the viewer actually fears another emotion, for example the shock or terror 
of something jumping out of the darkness at the end of a suspenseful scene. This 
is exacerbated by the diegetic camera as we see constantly from vulnerable 
character’s POV and the threat may launch itself not only at the character, but the 
camera itself (and by extension, the viewer). Hanich argues that ‘something we 
can see is manageable, whereas unseen horror cannot be controlled’ (2014, p.31). 
With the lack of privilege associated with the diegetic camera, many terrors 
remain half-glimpsed and therefore do not allow viewer’s dread to dissipate. 
 
 
 3.2.2 Heightened engagement in diegetic camera films 
 
Feeling, and being primed to feel, an increased level of dread will heighten the 
viewer’s engagement, as will the activation of the seeking system. I argue that 
viewers feel a sense of heightened engagement with diegetic camera horror films. 
This is largely due to the diegetic camera horror film’s use of off-screen space and 
correspondingly the prolonged use of the POV shot. The crew in fictional films 
are conventionally completely invisible to the audience. Their presence on screen 
would shatter the spectator’s engagement with the fiction as a believable and 
engaging narrative. Even documentaries largely keep their crews off-screen as 
audiences are more concerned with the stories being presented than the people 
behind-the-scenes who have created them, with notable exceptions such as 
documentaries by Michael Moore and Louis Theroux. 
 
However, the operators in diegetic camera horror films turn the camera on 
themselves or film themselves in mirrors, emphasising their pronounced 
involvement with the subjects they film. Not only are these cameras engaged with 
the profilmic event, but they are also often communicating with, and explicitly 
attempting to engage with their audience. The camera-operating characters are 
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aware that someone is watching and the viewer can imagine that the character is 
communicating with him or her from within the fiction. This communication and 
engagement can lead to greater empathy with the diegetic camera operator. It is 
tempting to assume that this equates to a greater sense of identification with the 
characters, but it is vital to dissect the idea of identification before making this 
claim. 
 
Identification has already been broken down into different processes by Murray 
Smith who defines specific concepts within it. Concepts that make up his 
‘structure of sympathy’ involve three different ways that the spectator can 
‘apprehend the fictional world’: these in turn involve different levels of 
engagement with the central character. The viewer may ‘imagine the events of the 
narrative from the (physical and mental) perspective of the character’ or they 
might imagine themselves ‘in the exact situation of the character’ (1995, p.80). 
Diegetic camera horror films prove adept at helping the spectator share the 
perspective of the character but the question of whether this leads them to imagine 
themselves more easily in the situation of that character is debatable. I argue that 
diegetic camera films do allow the viewer to easily imagine themselves in the 
situation, but that this is not necessary as the viewer is more likely to imagine the 
off-screen camera-operating character in the situation. Smith also argues that the 
spectator simulates the emotions of the character that they are observing by 
hypothesising about what the character is experiencing (1995, p.97). Furthermore, 
he suggests that hypothesising, imagining and simulating, is not always required. 
When the viewer reads the facial and bodily cues of a character, they may mimic 
those cues and, therefore, feel corresponding emotions. This ‘affective mimicry’ 
(1995, p.99) may be harder with very limited or even non-existent facial cues of 
the camera-operating character, but their bodily cues will often be registered by 
the cinematography. For example, if a camera operator is running in fear, the 
camerawork will reflect this. Similarly, if a camera operator is startled by a noise, 
their camerawork will register this shock and may also register their seeking of 
what made the noise. Smith also identifies ‘autonomic reactions (...) such as the 
startle response’ that are involuntary and can also add to the emotional processes 
of the audience (1995, p.102). Though the character and spectator can often be 
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aligned when they are startled by a shock, Smith notes that this is not a case of the 
spectator ‘responding “through” the response of the character’ (1995, p.102). In 
other words, we do not jump because the character jumps; we jump because 
whatever it is that made the character, also makes us jump. However, diegetic 
camera horror films provide an example that suggests a counter argument: when 
the character who holds the camera is startled, it is the operator’s response itself 
that can startle the spectator. For example, if a character screams from behind the 
camera or suddenly drops his or her camera on the floor, this can encourage the 
viewer to respond through, or to, the character’s response.  
 
Character emotions are an important factor in making the spectator respond in an 
emotional way. The emotions of the camera-operating characters can often be 
expressed through their use of the camera, rather than in the regular use of close-
ups. Branigan suggests that the viewer ‘is expending energy in reacting to 
something that is familiar’ (2006, p.175). The energy that Branigan suggests the 
spectator is applying is the energy of imagining and drawing links with our own 
experience of the real world and making links between the characters and the 
people we know in real life. Moreover, in diegetic camera films, we are expending 
energy recalling other media such as documentary and home videos. We must 
recognise these forms in order to understand what is being mimicked in diegetic 
camera films. We activate what Bordwell calls mental schemata (1985, p.31) 
derived from those previous experiences of watching other media forms and these 
schemata allow us to assess the new experience and recognize the similar pattern. 
Walton claims that ‘we seem to be in psychological contact with characters, 
sometimes even intimate with them (...) Often we are privy to characters’ most 
private thoughts and feelings. And we respond to what we know, apparently, in 
many of the ways in which we respond to what we know about the real world’ 
(1990, pp.191-192). Similarly, Tan argues that ‘when we watch a film, our 
general interest in the fortunes of our own loved ones and friends takes the form 
of sympathy with the fate of a particular character or characters’ (1996, p.48). 
Clearly the viewer often cares deeply for the fictional characters, despite knowing 
them to be works of fiction. I would suggest that this is not due to interest in our 
loved ones as Tan suggests. Horror filmmakers that utilise the diegetic camera 
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attempt to make this psychological link between the character and viewer as close 
as possible by persuading the audience that what they are watching is not an 
ordinary film but the video testimony of a real person. Audiences are not 
generally fooled, but they may find it less difficult to project their imaginings on 
to the fiction. Because the characters communicate with the audience, our 
psychological contact with them is closer and therefore we are more likely to 
share certain character’s emotions. However, this does not mean that our 
sympathy for the characters is in any way linked to a more general interest in the 
fortunes of actual people that we know and care about. The viewer imagines that 
the characters are real. We do not think of our loved ones because we are 
imagining that the characters have their own loved ones and own reasons for 
feeling fear or sadness.  
 
Horror filmmakers often aim to create corresponding emotions between characters 
and the audience to increase the visceral impact of their films. According to 
Carroll, in horror ‘the emotive responses of the audience, ideally, run parallel to 
the emotions of characters’ (1990, p.17). It is a fundamental point of diegetic 
camera horror films that the viewer shares a significant amount of the perception 
of events with a character. Identification, then, can be a case of almost literally 
putting oneself in the shoes of the character, as in we see from where the character 
sees. Gaut argues that when the spectator does this, he or she may then come to 
care for that character (1999, p.202). Furthermore, Gaut maintains that ‘the viewer 
imagines herself to be the character with whom she identifies’ (1999, pp.202-3). 
By imagining oneself in the place of the character under the same stresses and in 
the face of the same horrors, the spectator may share or simulate the emotions of 
that character. This task is made easier by the constant alignment with the 
character’s POV and imagining the off-screen space behind the camera. 
 
The extent to which the viewer is invited into the mind and emotions of the 
character is another important factor when considering how these films engage the 
viewer. Subjectivity is key to encouraging identification with a character, as the 
more the spectator is aware of the character’s thoughts and feelings, the more 
likely s/he is to understand and potentially simulate those emotions. This suggests 
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that the camera-operating character is the most likely source of identification if we 
assume that by holding the camera, the spectator is getting their subjective 
viewpoint on events. Cherry argues that ‘subjectivity can account for the way in 
which the emotional and physiological responses of the spectator are oriented 
around a specific character’  (2009, p.129). If the viewer is ‘inside’ the character’s 
head, as opposed to simply seeing events as if from ‘in their shoes’, then they are 
more likely to respond with the same emotions as the character. Being inside the 
character’s head involves a greater subjectivity, than merely seeing from the same 
position as the character. This again demonstrates the importance of off-screen 
space. Hearing the character and being encouraged to imagine their movement 
through the cinematography creates a direct link to the reactions and emotions of 
the character. The viewer is forced to imagine what occurs not only behind the 
camera, but to some extent what is occurring in their mind. 
 
Identification is unlikely to be the same for all viewers. Some viewers will resist 
any attempts at making a connection between themselves and the characters in the 
film. Many viewers would be less likely to accept the invitation to imagine that a 
diegetic camera horror film is a non-fiction document featuring real people. On 
the other hand, horror fans that particularly enjoy being terrified will welcome the 
techniques displayed and the chance to imagine that they are watching a non-
fiction piece of media. Currie draws a line between sensitive and refined readers, 
arguing that ‘the sensitive reader is one who knows what emotion is expressed in 
the work and is therefore able to respond congruently to it; the refined reader is 
one who responds congruently only to works that have a certain kind of merit’ 
(1990, p.214). Currie also suggests that ‘our responses to fiction are appropriate, 
then, when they are (...) congruent with the emotion we make believe is possessed 
by the fictional author’ (1990, pp.214-215). In diegetic camera horror films, the 
fictional author is the camera operator and his or her emotions and fears are often 
registered in the camera work and the audio, making it easier for the spectator to 
respond congruently, particularly if they are what Currie deems to be sensitive 
readers. For example, when Hud is screaming in fear and his camera shakes as he 
is caught between soldiers advancing towards a monster on the streets of 
Manhattan, it could be easy for viewers to feel a similar sense of the terror and 
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confusion that Hud feels and performs. On the other hand, a refined viewer may 
be resistant to the techniques of the diegetic camera film, choosing not to imagine 
Hud, or to find his constant screaming from off-screen intrusive on the unfolding 
of on-screen events. 
 
There will also be times of greater and lesser emotional connection between 
character and viewer throughout the course of the film. Often in films, climactic 
moments produce the most emotional responses in spectators and diegetic camera 
films are no different. When the characters face difficulties and have to make 
decisions, emotional engagement and cognitive involvement become heightened 
in the spectator. Wuss argues that ‘the affective arousal of the audience always 
rises when decisions and problem-solving seem to be approaching (...) and the 
viewer becomes both cognitively and emotionally involved in what is happening’ 
(2009, p.109). I argue that this affective arousal can be heightened when a 
camera-operating character is involved in this decision-making process and 
particularly if there is conflict between the camera operator and a character on 
screen. For example in Cloverfield, Rob makes the decision to find Beth who is 
trapped in a building far away from his current location. The camera operator Hud 
is not in love with Beth, like Rob is, so has different feelings about risking his life 
to find her. Hud films Rob’s face in close up as Rob receives a voicemail message 
from Beth saying that she is trapped. Hud remains silent as this message is played. 
In the following shot, Rob is ahead of Hud moving fast down a street (fig. 3.1), 
while Hud is trying to convince Rob that finding Beth is too risky. In this 
sequence, we are not only emotionally involved with Rob, who is clearly 
determined to save a woman he loves, but we are also cognising about where Hud 
is, how he must be feeling and whether or not he should be following his friend 
into danger. The cinematography in both figures 3.1 and 3.2 reveals something of 
Hud’s emotions, but only if the viewer is willing to imagine Hud behind the 
camera. Figure 3.2 offers an excellent example of a conflict for the viewer: Rob is 
troubled by what he hears on the phone and caught in close up, while Hud films 
silently to give his friend the impression of privacy. We can easily imagine that 
Hud is concerned both for his friend’s emotional state, but also for what Rob 
might decide to do after listening to this message. 
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COPYRIGHTED IMAGES REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION   
Figure 3.1: Rob is ahead of Hud moving fast down a street (Cloverfield).      
Figure 3.2: Rob is troubled by what he hears on the phone and caught in close up 
(Cloverfield). 
 
Despite arguments about the congruence between character and spectator 
emotions, there is often a disparity between the audience and the characters’ 
emotions. Carroll argues against many of the commonly held assumptions about 
identification, though his arguments do not always apply to the characters in 
diegetic camera horror films. Firstly, he argues (1990, p.17) that there is a 
disparity between the belief in fictional monsters held by the characters and the 
lack of that belief in the viewer. This is not always the case because often the 
characters in films such as The Blair Witch Project remain sceptical about the 
existence of the ‘monster’ just as the viewer does despite growing evidence of its 
presence. The scepticism is therefore shared by both some of the characters and 
the viewers. Because the characters resist drawing supernatural conclusions, the 
films engage the seeking systems of the cynical viewer as s/he attempts to 
hypothesise other reasons for what is happening to the characters. Carroll 
identifies some convergence between the emotions of the characters and the 
emotions of the viewer but not total duplication. Characters provide examples of 
how to respond to monsters - with fear, disgust, or panic (Carroll, 1990, p.22). 
Carroll’s theory rarely considers the object-less fear of films like The Blair Witch 
Project where the monster is unseen by either the protagonists or the viewer. 
However, the Blair Witch is still an object of terror, even if she is never 
witnessed. 
 
I aim to extend Carroll’s reading beyond the typical horror genre to include 
diegetic camera films. Carroll argues that character-identification ‘cannot be 
based on postulating an audience illusion of being identical with the protagonist’ 
(1990, p.90). One of his key arguments is based on the fact that the viewer is often 
given more information than the protagonist, particularly in the typical 
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methodology of filmmakers creating suspense (1990, p.91). For instance, the 
audience knows that the monster is approaching but the character does not. 
Therefore we experience different emotions to the character. However, in diegetic 
camera horror films this is rarely the case. By limiting the viewer to the perceptual 
experience of the character with the camera, there is an epistemological alignment 
between character and spectator. Even when the viewer does have ‘parallel 
emotive appraisals’ (1990, p.92) Carroll argues that this ‘does not entail 
identification’. Instead he argues that ‘what we do is not identify with characters 
but, rather, we assimilate their situation’ (1990, p.95). We do not duplicate the 
character’s mental state but come to an understanding of it. With the prolonged 
alignment of diegetic camera films, however, I argue that there is a more 
pronounced attempt to make the viewer duplicate the feelings of the character that 
holds the camera, particularly empathising with a character’s feeling of dread. 
 
 
 3.2.3 Encouraging empathy through information acquisition 
 
Neill (1996, p.183) highlights the importance of empathy in the process of 
identifying with a fictional character. Empathy is the intellectual identification 
with or vivid experience of another person or character’s feelings. I have already 
suggested that the utilisation of the diegetic camera technique in films can create 
stronger feelings of empathy between viewer and characters and that this is due to 
the viewer and the character having similar cognitive processes; including 
formulating hypotheses about what is happening. Empathy suggests something 
beyond feeling the same emotions as someone else; it also implies a distinct 
cognitive process that allows someone to actively engage with how another 
person is feeling. Neill goes on to suggest that identification and empathy depend 
on a viewer’s ability to imagine what the character’s beliefs and desires might be. 
Without detailed knowledge about the character, it will be harder for the spectator 
to imagine things from his or her point of view. Neill’s argument also considers 
the similarities between the person in the audience and the character on screen. He 
suggests that the greater the extent to which the character resembles the viewer, 
the more will the viewer be able to imagine events from the character’s point of 
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view. While I do not strongly advocate that this similarity between viewer and 
character is strictly necessary, Neill’s work is useful for highlighting the amount 
of knowledge the viewer has about characters and how easily the viewer can 
imagine what the character is feeling. This ties in with Smith’s idea of 
‘recognition’ as the viewer must be able to recognise the construction of a 
character, and imagine and understand some of the emotions of that character in 
order to feel empathy. 
 
Grodal (1997, p.93) describes identification as the sharing of a given character’s 
emotions that leads the viewer to simulating such emotions. Grodal suggests that 
the end result of cognitive identification will not always be empathy, but that 
feeling empathy for a character is likely to be a consequence of prolonged 
identification. For example, the longer we spend identifying with the characters 
by being positioned in alignment with their point of view, the more likely we will 
empathise with them by the end of the film. This is also important to the study of 
diegetic camera horror films for obvious reasons. If we accept that a continuing 
point-of-view shot throughout the majority of a film could lead to increased 
identification and therefore empathy, then Grodal’s account is useful. 
 
Often the character and the spectator share similar interests: for instance, the 
character wants to survive, and the viewer hopes that the character will. The 
spectator of diegetic camera horror films is forced into perceptual alignment with 
a camera-operating character for much of the duration. Therefore, though the 
viewer knows it is a fiction, he or she still sees the threat (or senses the presence 
of the threat) in similar ways. Carroll believes the audience’s emotions are 
altruistic (for the character) whereas the character emotions are egoistic (for 
themselves). Grodal (1997, p.85) counters that there is compatibility between their 
interests. The spectator that is forced into perceptual alignment with the character 
does not only fear for the character, s/he fears for his or her self if they were in 
that situation (though s/he is aware that s/he is not). The viewer is expending 
effort in imagining that s/he is the character behind the camera or in imagining the 
mental state of the person that carries the diegetic camera. I posit that the effort 
spent imagining what a character is feeling is reduced due to the aesthetic and 
80 
 
aural strategy of the films. Over the duration of the film, if the techniques have 
been effective then Grodal argues that ‘empathy will very often be the 
consequence of a prolonged cognitive identification’ (1997, p.93). The prolonged 
use of point-of-view camera allows the viewer to face the same situations as the 
characters (albeit from the safety of a seat outside the diegesis) and this makes the 
experience more immersive.  
 
However, it is not simply the case that audiences identify and empathise with 
characters in terms of fulfilling goals such as staying alive. Between spectator and 
character there is empathy beyond this convergence of desires. Grodal (1997, 
p.94) points to the empathy that occurs as a result of human bonding. Characters 
and their interactions are equally as important in aiding the spectator to identify 
and empathise with particular characters. This is important because in some 
diegetic camera horror films, the camera operator does not interact frequently (if 
at all) with his or her subjects, whereas in other examples there is frequent 
interaction. In chapter 5, I will analyse the interactions between camera operators 
and their subjects to ascertain how empathy is produced and how the diegetic 
camera aids this process. 
 
Even the most vicious of charismatic killers converses with the camera operators 
that film them. Whether it is a killer or a victim behind the camera, the narrators 
are often unreliable. For example, Heather in The Blair Witch Project is more 
concerned with filming than getting out of the woods quickly and likewise Micah 
in Paranormal Activity seems more concerned with capturing evidence of the 
supernatural than keeping his partner safe. The characters often descend into 
increasingly erratic, paranoid and unstable mental states. Horror films in general, 
and diegetic camera films even more so, often end in the protagonist’s death. The 
handheld camera and first-person point of view do not offer any safety or respite 
from a decline in mental stability, which is not shared by the viewer. Though 
some spectators may become increasingly jumpy, nervous, even bordering on 
hysterical at certain points during the films, they do not go through the same 
cognitive and emotional process as the characters within the fiction. Horror 
viewers will likely have bodily responses such as muscle tension, speeding up of 
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eye movements and rises in adrenalin, but Grodal argues that horror fictions often 
use ‘problems of cognitive consistency and of paranoia, as both major elements in 
the creation of emotion and as means of involving the viewer in a claustrophobic, 
non-distanced experience’ (1997, p.245). The camera-operating characters often 
cannot believe their eyes, but by capturing proof on camera, they seek to 
rationalise the irrational, or at least record it. When confronted with something 
they cannot fully understand, they wish to communicate an imagined witness. 
This reflects the activation of the seeking system, so although the character and 
viewer may not have similar problems of cognitive consistency, they will at least 
share a desire to have the camera seek out and capture something that they can 
then try to understand. Both viewer and character may not believe in monsters or 
witches, but both are more likely to believe in these things if they witness 
examples on film. The viewer knows that s/he is watching a fiction, but becomes 
increasingly engaged as the characters strive to make the viewer believe the truth 
of what is being captured with the cameras. For example, the spectator of 
Cloverfield may not scream and run like Hud, but both viewer and Hud are left 
with a sense of awe and confusion when faced with the monster. 
 
Those theorists who have specifically looked at diegetic camera horror films in 
relation to identification have used words like ‘trapped’ (McKenzie, 2011, p.37) 
to describe the experience of the spectator of found footage films. McKenzie 
compares the films to being on a ‘horrific ride’, and argues that the ‘blinkered 
limitations of the camera/viewer’s eye are the only visuals and the viewer 
passively experiences the untenable situations in which the characters are acted on 
by external forces’ (McKenzie, 2011, p.37). The idea that the spectator passively 
experiences these films may be true in terms of physicality but because of the 
continuing POV shots, I argue that the viewer is actively imagining his or her 
position in the narrative. 
 
While we are ‘trapped’ in the continuing POV shots, as on a ride, the viewer 
shares this experience with the characters. When analysing most fiction films, 
Carroll argues that ‘the audience (...) frequently has access to many more scenes 
and incidents, as well as their implications, than are available to individual 
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characters’ (1990, p.100). However, this is not the case with diegetic camera 
horror films. More frequently, due to the confinement of positioning to the 
character’s camera’s gaze, the spectator and character share almost identical 
knowledge. Tresca (2011, p.46) argues that in diegetic camera horror films, ‘the 
camera (and, thereby, the audience) only knows as much of the reality as the 
person behind the camera; therefore, if the person behind the camera cannot 
perceive the “reality” of the situation, it will remain forever beyond the grasp of 
the film to capture it’. The viewer is rarely separated from the point of view of the 
character and therefore does not get to see elements that are hidden from the 
character. 
 
I will argue that if the spectator accumulates information in a consistently similar 
way as the character, then empathy will be stronger. The viewer and the character 
have similar cognitive processes; formulating hypotheses about what is 
happening. Currie points out that ‘the illusion peculiar to film is that the viewer is 
present at the events of the story’ (1995, p.23) but also that ‘people watching 
movies do not behave like people who believe in the reality of the fictions they 
are watching’ (Currie, 1995, p.25). In this sense, diegetic camera horror films and 
other more traditional films are no different. The focus films do not have the 
‘capacity to make the viewer think that he or she is actually watching real events’ 
(Currie, 1995, p.22-3) but they do often offer increased intimacy and immediacy 
through their specific stylistic presentation and aesthetic and narrative strategies. 
The believability of the characters and situations and the way they are presented to 
the spectator are key to increased identification, but this identification is an active 
process. 
 
 
 
 3.2.4 Attention and cognitive participation: activating the seeking 
 system 
 
I argue that diegetic camera horror films encourage active cognitive participation 
from the viewer even more so than other films. The spectator does more than 
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identify with the characters, hypothesise about how the film will end and 
empathise with the victims of the monster. They are encouraged to become 
participants in the film, searching the frame for monsters withheld from view and 
attempting to spot the subject that the camera-operating character is trying 
desperately to film. Grant (2013, p.165) argues that these films ‘encourage or 
construct a spectatorial position that requires an intensely active engagement with 
the image’. He believes that they arouse ‘the epistephilic drive of the spectator’ 
(2013, p.168), thus forcing the viewer to look carefully and search the frame 
shrewdly for evidence of what is menacing the protagonists. The films then shock 
the viewer by rewarding their careful gaze with an attack on the camera itself ‘and 
by extension, the spectator’ (2013, p.168). While the character attempts to see 
(and therefore gain knowledge) by using the camera, the spectator is similarly 
searching. The spectator is limited to scanning the frame presented, rather than 
being in control of the camera. Most importantly, the seeking system is activated 
by both character and viewer and the aesthetics of the footage encourage this 
seeking to become intensified. This seeking is also exaggerated as the viewer feels 
like a privileged witness to the footage. S/he does not imagine that s/he is the 
finder of the footage because the footage has already had opening titles added and 
there is often evidence that editing has taken place, but the viewer does also feel 
that the footage is evidence that needs careful consideration to reveal its truths. 
 
This means that the viewer is constantly working to maintain his or her careful 
observation. Characters with cameras can zoom in to highlight important details, 
whereas at other times (particularly when the camera is put on a fixed rig) the 
viewer is left to search the frame. Branigan (2006, p.62) argues that ‘attention is at 
work making what is “blurry” or “ambiguous” at a specific point in the space 
clearer and more vivid while making the rest of the space temporarily less distinct 
or not visible’. The spectator of diegetic camera horror films often does not have a 
physically present protagonist in front of the camera and therefore his or her 
attention is not taken up by this individual. Instead, s/he is more active in 
searching the frame for what is catching the attention of the protagonist who holds 
the camera. This also encourages the viewer to imagine what is occurring off-
screen and particularly behind the camera more. 
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The amateur camerawork also stimulates cognitive activity. The impulsive and 
often frantic movement of a diegetic camera operator makes it difficult for the 
viewer to maintain attention on an object. Focus can be lost and disorientation 
may occur. When this happens, the viewer’s mind must work harder on making 
sense of the on-screen action. Wuss notes that in Dogme films10 where the 
camerawork is allegedly improvised to some degree, there is a similar ‘orienting 
reaction’ (2009, p.206). The camerawork, he argues, ‘seems quite uncertain and 
rarely allows reliable prognoses about the coming plot development’ (2009, 
p.206-7). This leads to increased anxiety in the viewer, an effect in congruence 
with the feelings of the protagonist who holds the camera in diegetic camera 
horror films. Dogme films share similarities with many diegetic camera films in 
their shooting style, emphasis on improvised performances, lack of artificial 
lighting, and use of location shooting. Wuss adds that ‘the agitation consequently 
produced in the viewer... [is] produced by the camera’s attempts to find an 
orientation, provoking renewed orienting reactions in the viewer’ (2009, p.207). If 
the cinematography appears improvised and uncertain and the camera operator’s 
agitation can be perceived through the cinematography, then the spectator will not 
only be more agitated, but will have to work harder to maintain a degree of 
orientation. This in turn makes their forensic searches of the frame more difficult 
and, perhaps, more urgent. I argue that this search for orientation involves 
imagining off-screen space, and an increased anxiety over what is occurring 
outside the frame of the continuing point-of-view shot. 
 
 
 3.2.5 Alignment and allegiance with camera operators and 
 charismatic killers 
 
In this thesis, I will be heavily drawing on Murray Smith’s notions of alignment 
and allegiance. Instead of using the term identification, Smith uses these terms to 
provide an alternative for ‘the psychoanalytic explanations that are put forward 
                                                          
10 Wuss refers specifically to Breaking the Waves (von Trier, 1996). Breaking the Waves is not 
strictly a Dogme film as it does not follow all of the rules laid out in the manifesto. 
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almost automatically for both the making and viewing of perverse material’ 
(1999, p.218). Smith breaks the notion of identification down into three different 
concepts: ‘recognition, alignment, and allegiance’ (1995, p.73). He dubs these 
constituent parts of the ‘structure of sympathy’. Sympathy is similar to empathy in 
that it is the sharing of feelings between people, but it often is used to describe a 
feeling of sorrow or distress for another person. Firstly, Smith asserts that we 
must recognise and perceive the construction of a character. The next stage in the 
structure is alignment. This is the process of placing the spectator in a position 
whereby, using a variety of techniques, he or she has access to certain actions, 
knowledge, and feelings of the characters. Finally, through allegiance spectators 
will make moral evaluations about the characters and choose whether they will 
identify with them or not. 
 
Smith differentiates between alignment and allegiance, arguing that ‘the contrast... 
is one between the narrative information that a text provides us with and the way a 
text directs our evaluation of this information’ (1999, p.220). This distinction can 
determine how increased alignment with certain characters affects the viewer’s 
responses, particularly in the case of the charismatic killer characters, which I will 
explore in depth in chapter 6. I will not suggest that empathy or sympathy can be 
automatically produced by increased alignment, but that the viewer may have 
more complex feelings of attraction and repulsion when s/he is forced in 
alignment with a character. As Smith notes, ‘sympathetic allegiance is not 
automatically produced by alignment with a character’ (1999, p.220), and the 
charismatic killer examples challenge the viewer’s feelings of antipathy to 
atypically monstrous characters. Something more than morals are at stake here, 
and ideas of allegiance are entangled and challenged in some of the diegetic 
camera films. 
Smith’s argument is that ‘fictions designed to elicit perverse allegiance... are 
actually exceptional and unusual, and that the major popular traditions that appear 
to elicit them (like horror) often reveal underlying structures that are more 
complex but also more conventionally moral than... psychoanalytic arguments 
have suggested’ (1999, p.222). In the diegetic camera films, perverse allegiance is 
rarely present. The monstrous characters are not sympathetic and their actions are 
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more likely to provoke disgust than allegiance. They cannot even be considered 
antiheroes; they are not vigilantes and none have any sympathetic moral code.  
The desire to watch them stems from curiosity, of which Smith (1999, p.234) 
notes that:  
 
we appear to have a limitless natural curiosity in and 
fascination with the bizarre and the horrific. Such 
fascination and curiosity have an essentially amoral 
character and can take two forms: the first premised on the 
human kinship between ourselves (spectators, readers) and 
the object of our attention; the second on the complete 
absence of such kinship. 
 
The psychopaths represented in the charismatic killer examples are the subject of 
the spectator’s amoral fascination, rather than perverse allegiance. The techniques 
used in diegetic camera films reward this amoral fascination in a number of ways, 
but they do not generally encourage allegiance as will be discussed in chapter 6.  
 
Smith considers the casting of Anthony Hopkins in The Silence of the Lambs 
(Demme, 1991) as a way of heightening the spectator’s awareness of ‘the fictional 
status of the character’ which allows  ‘our imaginative play with morally 
undesirable acts to an even greater extent’ (1999, p.227). However, diegetic 
camera films often lack stars, encouraging a greater sense of mediated realism and 
making the process of evaluating the character’s monstrous actions potentially 
more straightforward. The spectator is not confronted with a fantasy world filled 
with stars, but something different; something more like non-fiction media forms. 
Actors in the majority of these films seem to have been cast on their ordinary 
appearances, adding to the mediated realism as the cast look as though they would 
more likely feature in a home video than a feature film. 
 
For the remainder of this thesis, I build my analysis on these existing frameworks, 
paying particular attention to Murray Smith’s concept of allegiance in order to 
discuss how identification is created with morally dubious characters in diegetic 
camera horror films (particularly the charismatic killers and the camera operators 
of documentaries and home videos). I will also use the concept of affective 
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identification to further deconstruct how empathy is created in these films, 
especially with characters that hold cameras and are therefore off-screen for large 
amounts of diegetic time. 
 
Taking priming, engagement, empathy, attention, alignment and allegiance as my 
theoretical tentpoles, I analyse how diegetic camera films provoke different 
cognitive activity to many other more traditional films, such as imagining of the 
camera and its operator, recognising and empathising with an off-screen character 
and activating the seeking system in order to empathise with the camera operator. 
I will be using the theories of Murray Smith, Peter Wuss, Torben Grodal and 
Gregory Currie to demonstrate, challenge, and build on the ideas of allegiance, 
personal imagining, affective identification and priming when watching diegetic 
camera films. The diegetic camera is the key variable here, and its usage in horror 
films will be shown to have an effect on the imaginings, empathy, and 
engagement of the viewer. I argue that the viewer imagines off-screen space 
frequently in order to recognise and empathise with the camera operator. I argue 
that the camera operator and profilmic subjects’ interactions with each other and 
the viewer create increased engagement. Finally, I will argue that allegiance is not 
affected by the use of the diegetic camera. 
 
3.3 Methodology for the analysis 
 
In the second part of this thesis, I will analyse a small sample of diegetic camera 
horror films in order to apply the theoretical framework developed in part one of 
the thesis. I begin this by investigating the priming pattern, looking at 
approximately the first ten minutes of the focus films. Here I will examine how 
the opening text encourages viewer hypotheses and how the employment of the 
diegetic camera in the early scenes prepares the spectator to perceive the films in a 
manner which is repeated and adapted in all diegetic camera horror films. This 
will involve shot-by-shot analysis of key scenes, looking particularly at the 
cinematography, dialogue and reference to off-screen space. In chapter 4 I will 
also explore how codes of various other media forms are mimicked in order to 
give diegetic camera horror films a convincing non-fiction aesthetic and 
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narrational style - i.e. their mediated realism. I will focus particularly on The Blair 
Witch Project and Rec and how these films mimic the forms of documentary and 
reality television. In order to analyse how mediated realism is created, I will 
identify the cues nested within the films designed to convince the viewer of the 
supposed authenticity of the product. In my consideration of priming, I also 
analyse the use of the point-of-view shot and, more specifically, how it functions 
in relation to Branigan’s POV structure. This will require analysis of how point-
of-view shots are constructed and emphasised within diegetic camera films. 
Following Burch’s work on off-screen space, I will then analyse how what is 
behind the camera is created and privileged as part of the priming process for the 
viewer. Finally, in terms of priming and point of view, I will address mood and 
emotions that are encouraged in the early scenes of the films. The outcome of this 
chapter is that I argue that diegetic camera films use a variety of techniques to 
encourage the viewer to imagine both off-screen space and that the footage on 
screen could be real. The effect of this is to heighten emotions of fear and dread 
that are central to the horror genre. 
 
When analysing the viewer’s response to diegetic camera horror films, I will be 
continually complicating Currie’s theory of personal imagining. I will be 
developing this theory to demonstrate that the viewer is encouraged to imagine a 
camera operator that remains largely off-screen. The continuing use of POV shots 
forces the spectator to imagine seeing from within the diegesis, counter to 
Currie’s argument for impersonal imagining. I will reveal how the viewer is 
forced into active imaginings, both about where the camera is positioned within 
the diegesis and about what is occurring off-screen. My intervention here is in 
reconsidering Currie’s claims that we do not imagine seeing the film from the 
point-of-view of the camera. When watching the focus films, imagining seeing or 
personal imagining is exactly what we do. The analysis will also examine the 
cinematography in diegetic camera horror films and its effects on the spectator’s 
emotions and mood. The cinematography heightens anticipation and agitation, 
and inputs frequent cues to encourage the viewer to imagine the film is non-
fiction. 
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I will also analyse the engagement and empathy created between camera operator 
and viewer, most notably when the diegetic camera is used as a tool for 
communication with the imagined future audience. From behind the camera or in 
front of the camera, many of the camera operators in diegetic camera films will 
reach out beyond the diegesis to the finder of the footage. This means that we 
must identify cues that aid recognition of the camera-operating character, 
including the cinematography that becomes a part of the performance of the 
character. My analysis of alignment and allegiance in the diegetic camera horror 
film will involve further examination of the POV shots used, but also how sound 
and off-screen space help to increase this alignment between viewer and character 
to aid in creating a mood of dread. I will focus on the alignment between 
responses of the spectator and camera operator, both in the cinematography and in 
the cognitive response of viewer and character at crucial moments of decision-
making in the films. The analysis will examine how information is accumulated 
by spectator and camera-operating character and the effects of this 
epistemological alignment on empathy. The viewer becomes an imagined (by the 
character) part of the diegesis that the characters are in as the witness or finder of 
the footage. Unlike in traditional films where the fourth wall remains largely 
unbroken, diegetic camera films deliberately have their characters imagine their 
audience. This prompts the viewer to feel a heightened level of engagement with 
the film and leads to him or her being more attentive to what the character says. I 
will also examine the interactions between camera operators and their profilmic 
subjects to ascertain how empathy can be produced, and how the diegetic camera 
aids this process. Finally, I will argue that allegiance is affected if the camera 
operator engages in amoral behaviour, as the shift from observer to participant is 
shocking and unexpected and therefore the viewer’s moral evaluation of these 
characters is increasingly negative. 
In chapter 6 I analyse how the killers on screen are constructed as amorally 
fascinating characters that are both ‘inhuman’ in their lack of remorse and 
undeniably human in their complex relationships with other supporting characters. 
This leads to an examination of the interactions of these killers with the viewers of 
the films and how this might affect allegiance. I also analyse the broader aesthetic 
approach defined by the killers being camera operators, particularly in Zero Day, 
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and how this affects our allegiance with the characters. I will then consider how 
empathy, affective identification and sympathetic allegiance are limited in these 
films, both with killers and their victims, before analysing how diegetic camera 
films complicate what Plantinga labels ‘scenes of empathy’ (1999, p.239). I argue 
that allegiance is not always a result of recognition and alignment, and that 
diegetic camera horror films are more concerned with engaging viewer’s curiosity 
than their empathy with monstrous characters. I will show how diegetic camera 
films, particularly those with charismatic killer characters reward the amoral 
fascination of the viewer using a range of techniques offering the viewer an 
experience unlike most other horror films. I will also argue that feelings of disgust 
and sadness can be heightened when the diegetic camera is used in these films to 
create mediated realism. 
 
The analytical chapters of part 2 of the thesis will investigate the cognitive 
processes of the viewer when watching specific diegetic camera horror films. The 
use of the diegetic camera is revealed as a central tool to orient our emotions when 
watching these films. With detailed reference to these filmic examples, I will 
reveal how the diegetic camera causes the viewer to feel specific emotions about 
the characters that operate it. The analysis will leave no question that the diegetic 
camera is a key piece of stimuli that provokes our emotional responses of fear, 
dread and anticipation to these films, and that these emotions are specific and 
significant. 
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PART 2: Analysis and Case Studies 
 
Chapter 4: Priming the spectator 
 
This chapter details how spectators are ‘primed’ for the experience of watching 
diegetic camera horror films. To this end, I offer close readings of the techniques 
employed in the opening sequences arguing that these are essential in encouraging 
the viewer to respond with specific cognitive activities. By looking at these 
techniques (e.g. point of view shots and direct address), I will establish how the 
formal, aesthetic, and narrative strategies encourage the viewer to respond to the 
film in specific ways such as imagining that the film is a non-fiction text, 
imagining who is behind the camera and what s/he is doing (as s/he is filming), 
and how the viewer is encouraged to perceive the diegetic camera as the 
enunciator. I will build on the ideas of Peter Wuss (2009, p.34), particularly on his 
argument that the first sequences of a film prime the viewer for the rest of the 
experience of watching the film (or at least until there is a reframing of 
expectations in which case a repriming may need to instigated). As I will illustrate 
in this chapter, the focus films share many similarities in their priming patterns, 
aiming to convince the spectator quickly that what s/he is watching is non-fiction 
footage captured by a camera in the hand of, or set up by, a character within the 
diegesis. This priming encourages the viewer to react with stronger feelings of 
fear and dread and empathy for camera-operating characters. 
 
In order to limit repetition, the films under discussion have been grouped into the 
three categories set up in the introduction and analysis is focused on 
representative examples. To recap, the groupings revolve around the mimicked 
media form central to the films’ aesthetic. These are:  
 
1. Documentary and reality TV crews, such as The Blair Witch Project and 
Rec;  
2. Home videos recorded by amateur camera-operating characters, such as 
Exhibit A and Cloverfield; 
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3. Charismatic killers with a camera crew in tow, such as Man Bites Dog, 
The Last Horror Movie and Zero Day. 
I will investigate how an impression of authenticity is created and what techniques 
are used to achieve this. This will include: 
 
• an analysis of how the audience are primed to accept the shots they see as 
being point-of-view shots; and  
• an analysis of how technical limitations are systematically used in these 
films as cues that enhance the sense of mediated realism.  
 
I then look at how the camera’s presence is emphasised and what the viewer 
learns about the diegetic camera operators. This aids recognition and alignment 
and in turn primes the viewer to empathise with the camera operators. Finally, I 
will investigate how a mood of anticipation is created in the opening scenes and 
what hypotheses are encouraged in the minds of the spectator, such as hypotheses 
regarding the deaths of the characters. This involves considering whether the 
viewer is being persuaded to feel fear due to what is being presented on screen. 
However, instead of a feeling of object-directed fear, the viewer is often being 
encouraged to imagine that the film is non-fiction due to the cues being presented 
in the opening scenes. 
 
 
4.1 Defining priming 
 
In his work on cognition and priming, Wuss (2009, pp.48-49) refers back to the 
work of Meir Sternberg (1978) who ‘borrows a term from cognitive psychology, 
the “primacy effect”, to describe how initial information establishes “a frame of 
reference to which subsequent information [is] subordinated as far as possible”’. 
The underlying idea of the primacy effect is that people have a cognitive bias 
towards recalling information presented towards the beginning, rather than 
towards the end of a sequence. In terms of film consumption, this suggests that the 
viewer will be able to recall earlier scenes more clearly than those that are later in 
the film. Priming occurs when stimuli such as dialogue, actions, or stylistic 
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elements including cinematography, music or editing coax the viewer into 
hypothesising about the remainder of the text. The receiver responds to the stimuli 
in ways that the filmmakers wish by anticipating and extrapolating not only where 
the narrative is leading, but also how the film should be read. The individual 
stimuli build up to an overall priming pattern that helps to further create 
expectations and establish a mood that the viewer will be able to sense. The 
priming pattern needs to be consistent and coherent so as to establish a way of 
reading and anticipating the remainder of the film. This will then need to be 
frequently updated and adapted (or reframed) as the film progresses and new 
stimuli are introduced. 
 
Thus, the opening sequence is of critical importance in a genre in which the goal 
is frightening viewers. Diegetic camera films have very particular aims and ways 
of setting up priming patterns. Their opening scenes are structured and presented 
specifically to get viewers to imagine that the films are documentaries or home 
videos, or to allow the viewer to make cognitive assumptions about how the 
footage has been filmed, who was filming it and for what purpose. In the focus 
films, authenticity is promoted through a range of techniques such as jump cuts, 
direct address and seemingly improvised camerawork employed in the opening 
scenes: the camera’s presence in the diegesis is highlighted and the audience is 
invited to imagine that what they are watching is footage captured by a character. 
Therefore, the viewer is primed to imagine this camera-operating character, being 
attentive to the cinematography and audible dialogue from off-screen throughout 
the film. 
 
Priming the viewer of diegetic camera horror often begins with a consideration of 
the marketing that has pre-primed the spectator before s/he even begins watching 
the actual film. Both Cannibal Holocaust and The Blair Witch Project used 
innovative marketing techniques that attempted to establish the films as real 
documents of deaths and disappearances. The actors remained out of the press to 
convince early viewers that they might indeed be deceased: The Blair Witch 
Project had ‘missing’ posters put up at the Sundance Film Festival and a website 
and accompanying mock-documentary to further deceive the audience by adding 
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to the mythology. The IMDb web page also listed the actors from The Blair Witch 
Project as ‘deceased’ for some time. 
 
4.2 Viewer hypothesising 
 
Priming is essential in encouraging viewers to create advance hypotheses of 
further developments in narratives and, particularly, their resolutions. From the 
opening sequences, the viewer can create cognitive evaluations about the direction 
and outcomes of the stories. Diegetic camera films are no different from other 
films in this respect, but have precise ways of setting up specific hypotheses of 
how the film will end. Their introductory text often leaves little doubt in the mind 
of the viewer as to the fate awaiting the characters: for example by mentioning a 
‘murder scene’ (Exhibit A, fig. 4.1) or ‘bodies found’ (Paranormal Entity 2, fig. 
4.2) or the ‘disappearance’ of filmmakers (The Blair Witch Project). Therefore, 
the viewer can formulate a smaller range of hypotheses with regards to how the 
film will end, and more theories about the specifics of what will become of the 
characters leading to their eventual deaths. However, knowing a fundamental part 
of how the story will end often does not limit the spectators’ enjoyment of the 
films in question. This is a function of genre cinema - horror in particular. Some 
research even insists that knowing the ending allows for enhanced enjoyment 
(Cohen, 2011). Knowledge of the fates of the characters can in fact add to the 
mood throughout the film and therefore increase the pleasure for horror fans that 
wish to be kept in an anticipatory and fearful state. 
 
 
IMAGES REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
 
Figure 4.1: First diegetic information presented in film is text informing audience that the 
diegetic camera in Exhibit A was found at a ‘murder scene’. 
Figure 4.2: Text informing audience that the footage in Paranormal Entity 2 was found 
‘alongside the remains of the six victims’. 
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The Blair Witch Project disposes with opening credits and only shows the studio 
logos before announcing: 
 
IMAGE REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
Figure 4.3: The Blair Witch Project opening text. 
 
This immediately alerts the viewer to an extra-diegetic enunciator that appears to 
have added this title at the start of the footage to offer some context before the 
film begins. This also suggests an editor, which primes the viewer to expect edited 
footage rather than raw footage. This may only occur to the attentive and media-
literate viewer when it becomes clear that the footage from two cameras is being 
intercut, rather than the footage from one camera being shown. However, while 
the opening title cards prime the viewer to expect an extra-diegetic narrator and 
some editing to have occurred, the rest of the film encourages the viewer to forget 
about this extra-diegetic narrator. Instead, the opening scenes immerse the viewer 
in the point of view of the camera operators, thus priming the viewer to read the 
film as the enunciation of its diegetic camera operators only. 
 
In The Blair Witch Project, Exhibit A and Paranormal Entity 2, the use of words 
such as ‘murder scene’, ‘disappeared in the woods’ and ‘remains of the six 
victims’ are also examples of the iconography and narrative conventions of the 
horror genre. Wuss (2009, p.86) notes that genres ‘provide for certain types of 
probability with regard to coming events and their narrative stereotypes set up 
corresponding patterns, for example with regard to the final resolution of the plot’. 
Diegetic camera films are a sub-genre of horror, as these films have their own 
conventions that lend their endings a degree of predictability, most literally with 
these types of priming intertitles. 
 
The words chosen for the opening titles prime the viewer for a specific ending by 
instilling a sense of dread as s/he is likely given the knowledge that the characters 
will die. Their knowledge of the genre and their further knowledge of the more 
specific fates of the characters causes audiences to feel the meta-emotion of dread 
as they anticipate and fear the emotions of shock and disgust that they will feel 
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later in the film. This could have an empowering effect, as the viewer feels able to 
hypothesise the fate of the characters confidently. However, the effect is more 
likely to be that viewers will be primed to feel a fearful anticipation that, with the 
appropriate emotion cues throughout, will endure until the end of the film.  
 
Some of the films allude to the secretive nature of the footage and the fact that 
what the audience is about to witness has been suppressed. For example, 
Cloverfield displays a ‘DO NOT DUPLICATE’ watermark stamped over its 
opening frames (fig. 4.4). The audience will likely feel a desire to see something 
horrific that is also forbidden. This activates the seeking system, leading to 
hypothesising and an anticipatory mood. 
 
   
IMAGES REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
 
Figure 4.4: Deliberately faint ‘Do not duplicate’ watermark in Cloverfield. 
Figure 4.5: The origin of the footage is a ‘digital SD card’ in Cloverfield. 
               
Cloverfield opens with vertical colour bars on screen, a time code at the bottom 
and a high-pitched sound. This gives the audience the impression of the start of a 
tape being watched, the colour bars familiar to users of some domestic cameras 
from over a decade ago. The words on screen anchor the film as diegetic camera 
about to be played. Some of the titles include ‘digital SD card’ and ‘camera 
retrieved at incident site’ (fig. 4.5). The screen also features a faint watermark 
stamp that reads ‘Property of the U.S. Government. Do not duplicate’ alluding to 
its secret and controversial status. The audience is primed to expect the footage 
that follows is recorded on a diegetic camera and they can hypothesize that this 
camera was found by someone who then surrendered it to the government. It 
therefore likely contains something whose secrecy is of interest to the 
government. The title also reveals that the camera contains ‘sightings of case 
designate “Cloverfield”’ which immediately prompts hypotheses about what this 
‘Cloverfield’ is and what it might look like. This is particularly true in this film as 
Cloverfield’s marketing campaign withheld any image of what the monster looked 
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like. A third title card states that the camera was retrieved in Central Park 
allowing the viewer to predict that the film may end in New York’s Central Park 
and that whoever was holding the camera either died or had the camera taken 
from them. 
 
IMAGE REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
Figure 4.6: Opening text of Paranormal Activity 
 
Paranormal Activity takes a different tactic by acknowledging that a distributor is 
releasing the film as entertainment but also attempting to convince the audience 
that what they are about to see involved real people. By thanking the families and 
the San Diego Police Department (fig. 4.6), the director of Paranormal Activity 
Oren Peli (and Paramount Pictures) insinuate that the footage has been released 
from police evidence and that the families of the two characters have given 
permission for Paramount to release the film. This also primes the viewer to 
expect Micah and Katie’s deaths or disappearances. It is a tactic only slightly 
altered for the sequel, where the character names are replaced with ‘the deceased’ 
to narrow the hypotheses that audiences can create. The specific inclusion of the 
named police departments gives further weight to the alleged facts. The viewer 
not only hypothesises about the end of the films, but is engaged in seeking clues 
from the beginning of the film as to what is going to happen to the characters. 
 
4.3 Representing mediated reality with the diegetic camera 
 
One of the most essential purposes of priming in diegetic camera films is to 
construct the impression of authenticity and to have the viewer cognize in a 
manner concurrent with viewing a non-fiction piece of media. The audience is 
aware of watching a film but in this particular type, the task of the creative team is 
to make it easier for the viewer to imagine that s/he is watching some non-fiction 
footage.  
 
The opening words that appear on screen impart specific information informing 
the film’s claim to realism. In films like The Blair Witch Project and Cloverfield, 
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there are no credits listing the director, the stars, or any of the crew. There is no 
clear evidence within the opening seconds of the films that marks them as works 
of fiction. This lack of credits also gives the impression that the material is 
authentic and that it has not been ‘created’ by anyone to be a piece of fiction that 
pretends not to be. 
 
COPYRIGHTED IMAGE REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
Figure 4.7: Pixelating production company logo (Rec). 
 
Some films have credit sequences whereas others do not. The production 
company logo of the film Rec is shown but it briefly pixelates (fig. 4.7), along 
with the sound of static interference. When the first picture from the film appears 
on screen, it emerges as though an old television has been switched on, complete 
with accompanying audio and briefly distorted image. This connotes a disruption 
to the production of the film and primes the audience for technical disturbances. 
Man Bites Dog has a company logo and a single title announcing the filmmakers’ 
names, followed by the title of the film on screen, but there is no introductory 
message claiming authenticity. These title cards are therefore an element 
introduced by The Blair Witch Project that has been employed systematically in 
later films to prime the audience for the mediated realism approach, encourage 
viewer hypothesising, and promote an anticipatory mood. 
 
There are certain common techniques used in the opening scenes of the films to 
trigger specific responses and cognitive processes. The camera may be glimpsed 
or shown fully in a mirror, such as in the first shot of Exhibit A or the early scenes 
of The Last Horror Movie (fig. 4.8). This stimulus causes the viewer to become 
hyper-aware of the camera’s presence11. While the majority of classical 
Hollywood films do not wish to draw attention to their artifice, editing and 
cinematography, diegetic camera films do draw attention to the fact of their 
mediation. They invite the viewer particularly through these early sequences to 
dwell on the fact that there is a camera being used and that the characters can see 
it and interact with it. 
                                                          
11 Similar techniques will be analyzed later in this chapter. 
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COPYRIGHTE IMAGE REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
Figure 4.8: Visible camera in The Last Horror Movie. 
  
In some instances, one operator films another; thus the audience can see that there 
are two different cameras and can expect the footage to be a combination of both 
cameras’ footage. The audience will also see who the camera operators are and 
what they look like. The viewer may store any information about the operator that 
they are given. More importantly, the diegesis of the film is much more 
comprehensive than in the imagination of viewers of traditional films. We see the 
camera, the person behind it, and the world around them. The space behind the 
camera is important and will often be imagined by the viewer if s/he is primed to 
recall that this space, and more vitally, this camera-operating character, exists off-
screen. 
 
In order for the audience to get a better sense of the character behind the camera 
and be primed for their involvement with diegetic events, most of these films have 
their camera operator speaking to other characters. Some examples limit this, such 
as Rec which appears as a professional media production rather than an amateur 
home video. In Rec the camera operator is heard from off-camera on only very 
rare occasions. On the other hand, the camera operators of the home video 
examples are not the detached and silent professionals of many of the other types 
of diegetic camera films. Not only is their cinematography often rougher, but they 
are far more involved in the on-screen events. They are audible and addressed by 
those in front of the camera. The operator is clearly someone who has a rapport 
with the subjects and therefore conversations between the operator and subjects 
are more frequent. Establishing characters’ relationships and roles is also part of 
the priming strategy. The operator is included in the events, not a detached 
observer. For example, Judith, the daughter in Exhibit A, holds the camera most 
often; while Micah and Katie, the couple in Paranormal Activity, are the only 
people present and therefore unless the camera is set up somewhere, one is always 
filming the other. In these home movies, the camera is more likely to change 
hands than in the other categories. The informal and amateur approach and the 
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fact that the camera operators are a part of the family mean that there is often a 
desire to capture all people present in the scene including the camera operator. 
This means that the audience are primed to know more about the camera 
operators, effectively increasing our alignment and empathy with them. 
 
Priming of the audience also extends to characters discussing details concerning 
the camera itself and its operation, for example what tape it takes and how much 
battery they have left. This, like Chekhov’s gun, becomes crucial later. Some 
instances include discussions of framing as in Rec when the presenter asks the 
camera operator if her hand is visible in shot (fig. 4.9). This technique of talking 
directly to the camera operator is also often used as priming. The characters 
speaking often look beyond the lens of the camera. This is different from direct 
address as the characters are not staring into the lens and communicating with a 
television or documentary audience but clearly trying to look past the camera to 
the face of the person behind it. This again alerts the viewer to off-screen space, 
ensuring that they recall the camera operator and imagine their position. 
 
IMGE REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
Figure 4.9: Angela checks the framing with her camera 
operator in Rec. 
 
Editing and other aspects of the production of the media product are also 
instrumental to priming structures. For example, in Rec the presenter whispers 
into the ear of the camera operator to cut if the interview she is conducting gets 
boring. Her concern is with saving tape and providing entertainment for her 
audience. She is thinking about what should and should not be included in the 
final edit to make the show as appealing as possible. There are also other 
references to the construction of the media product with visible clapperboards, 
microphones, and presenters calling for retakes if a piece to camera does not go as 
well as they wanted. These nested cues prime the viewer to expect the artifice of 
media representation, while simultaneously urging the viewer to read the film as 
more authentic than its traditional fictional counterparts. Each cue is another 
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reminder for the viewer to imagine that they are watching a mediated piece of 
non-fiction. 
 
The presence of the camera is also emphasised for the audience by having minor 
characters notice it. For example, a character in Rec immediately glances at the 
camera as the operator is moving up the stairs towards him. The body language 
and repeated looks directly into the camera suggest a man ill at ease with the 
technology that is facing and filming him. It also forces the viewer to imagine the 
off-screen space directly behind the camera, because we have to remember what is 
making the man uncomfortable and remind ourselves that this is a continuous 
point-of-view shot from the camera and the audience by extension.  
 
Sometimes these characters will simply steal a wary glance at the camera (fig. 
4.11), while others will try to avoid its gaze by moving out of shot (fig.4.10). 
Other characters demand or ask for things not to be filmed, particularly in extreme 
circumstances. For example in Rec, when the characters first discover that they 
are trapped in an apartment block, a police officer asks for the camera to be 
switched off and even tries to block its view (figs. 4.12 and 4.13). The 
nervousness or hostility towards the diegetic camera displayed by some characters 
invokes and exacerbates the activation of the viewer’s seeking systems. We want 
to see with our own eyes what is going to happen and so we want the diegetic 
camera to remain on and in an appropriate position for the fictional narrative to 
continue. The characters’ demands for the filming to be discontinued usually 
increase in frequency as events take a turn for the worse. Often the camera 
operators must be more discreet with their filming as evidenced when the camera 
has an obstructed view because it is partially hidden. In The Blair Witch Project, 
Mike and Josh repeatedly ask or tell Heather to stop filming (fig. 4.14). These 
demands, and altercations between subject and camera operator, become more 
heated as the characters feel under threat. In Cloverfield, Hud films an argument 
between a couple from a slightly hidden position down a hall and around a corner 
from the subjects (fig. 4.15). Again, the viewer must imagine and infer Hud’s 
position from the point-of-view of his diegetic camera with a wall covering almost 
half of the frame. This primes the spectator for a film where camera-operating 
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characters may have a lack of privileged access to film their subjects, but also a 
film in which content may be of a secretive nature. Having a lack of privileged 
access can heighten the engagement of the seeking system as viewers find they 
have to search the frame more carefully and pay more attention to the screen to 
find answers. It will also force them to imagine off-screen space more as the 
framing does not allow for an ideal vantage point of certain events. 
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Figures 4.10 and 4.11: Minor characters in Rec repeatedly glance at the diegetic camera. 
Figures 4.12 and 4.13: The camera itself, and its primary function, are discussed in Rec. 
Figure 4.14: Mike demands that Heather stop filming (The Blair Witch Project).     
Figure 4.15: Hud films a heated exchange from a hidden position (Cloverfield). 
 
The audience is also primed in the early scenes to understand the form of media 
product that the production team within the diegesis are planning on making. The 
Blair Witch Project features students making a documentary and the audience 
sees their behind-the-scenes footage as well as the official documentary footage 
intended to be included in their final product. Rec and other films take the form of 
reality television shows being filmed. These latter examples, including Episode 50 
(Smalley and Smalley, 2011) and Grave Encounters (The Vicious Brothers, 2011) 
all feature a presenter in keeping with the typical convention of many reality 
television shows. There is often an element of performance from these presenters 
as in Rec where the presenter dresses up as a firefighter and waddles around (fig. 
4.16). She is clearly doing this for the amusement of the audience, engaging them 
with her irreverence and providing light entertainment. In the home video 
examples, there is still an element of performance for the camera present with 
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some of the characters. The audience is primed to expect that the characters are 
aware of the camera and some may be shy of its gaze and others use it as an 
opportunity to perform. The fathers in Exhibit A and Home Movie are particularly 
keen to act in ways to impress their imagined future audience (which will most 
likely be only their family) and even take to presenting by directly addressing the 
cameras and narrating what is shown. In this way, they show awareness of actual 
media products such as reality TV and documentary and behave in a similar, if far 
more informal manner when addressing the camera. 
 
COPYRIGHTED IMAGE REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
Figure 4.16: Presenter Angela performs for the diegetic 
camera (Rec). 
 
A prominent feature in the charismatic killer category is subjects who perform for 
the camera. The killers directly address the camera and occasionally even direct 
the camera operator, becoming presenters and directors. For example, in The Last 
Horror Movie, the charismatic killer Max tells his camera operator to get a shot 
looking over the edge of the building that they are standing on. The spectator must 
imagine the camera operator, who they have briefly glimpsed earlier in the mirror, 
because they have been prompted to do so by Max’s gaze. Max’s shifting gaze 
signifies that he is no longer addressing the viewer by looking at the diegetic 
camera lens, but is now addressing his camera operator (fig. 4.17). The camera 
movement that follows this request draws attention to the origin of this footage 
and the camera’s position in the diegesis (fig. 4.18). It also reminds the viewer 
that though the diegetic camera is the origin of the footage, this camera can also 
be influenced by the pro-filmic events and subjects on screen and that it is a 
character’s POV. 
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Figures 4.17 and 4.18 : Max directs his camera operator to get a shot over the edge of the 
building (The Last Horror Movie). 
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The viewer is primed to expect these murderers to reveal a great deal about 
themselves, their methods and their psychosis. The subjects often introduce 
themselves, explaining their actions and motives. This moves beyond the viewer 
imagining off-screen space behind the camera; instead the audience imagines that 
the character knows about us as viewers, making us complicit in the violence and 
in some cases, potential victims. Thus it becomes easier to imagine that both 
character and viewer are on the same plain of existence. The character knows that 
we are watching, and we know that he is addressing an audience. These killers 
appear comfortable and charismatic in front of the cameras, allowing the filming 
to take place and inviting the diegetic filmmakers to capture their deeds. The 
extra-diegetic filmmakers attempt to shock the viewer by having the characters 
use the engaging direct address mode and also by revealing elements of the 
humanity of the killers, even as these characters commit morally repugnant and 
socially unacceptable actions.  
 
The murderers featured are almost likeable in their jovial, friendly, and casual 
manner with the cameras. For example, Ben from Man Bites Dog chats amiably 
about the practicalities of corpse disposal and Max dismisses conventional horror 
films and narrates how he got into killing with a matter-of-fact tone. The spectator 
is primed for a confusing experience where the killer confides in him or her, 
making the viewer complicit in the killer’s actions. The direct address and desire 
of the killers to tell their stories and share their point of view make these 
murdering men less monstrous than in traditional horror films. At the same time, 
the realistic aesthetics and matter-of-fact way these men discuss murder is 
unsettling for the viewer. The camera operators often question their subjects, 
asking the kinds of questions that a viewer might also wish to ask and further 
drawing the viewer into the minds of these mundane monsters. In this way, the 
charismatic killer category of films offers the viewer privileged access to the 
subjects whereas in many other diegetic camera films, the point of view 
camerawork limits the viewer, restricting what they can know and see in the story.  
 
The privileged access offered as people directly address the camera and speak 
about themselves in great depth is becoming increasingly familiar to modern 
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audiences due to the conventions of reality television and vlogging. This creates 
an intertextual awareness as the viewer is reminded of other media forms. Wuss 
(2009, p.199) argues that ‘in order to create the necessary stimuli for the reality 
effect, the individual film must neither remain behind the general development of 
cinematic technologies, nor ignore the expectations of the audience regarding the 
current standards for a true representation of reality’. In referencing these 
cinematic technologies on and off-screen (with visible cameras and other 
techniques that suggest the camera’s presence), diegetic camera films prime 
viewers for a recognizably contemporary and self-conscious representation of 
mediated reality. The stimuli differ depending on the form of media that is being 
emulated by the diegetic camera horror film. 
 
Some films in the charismatic killer category share the conventions of the mock-
documentary form. The Last Horror Movie has a camera operator documenting 
the life and murders of a charismatic killer. Similarly, Zero Day is a document of 
two killers and their preparations for a school shooting - resonant of the 
Columbine shootings - but filmed by the perpetrators. Some films prime the 
viewer to read them as documents of mediated realism with the use of traditional 
documentary conventions such as voiceover, cutaways and interviews. Zero Day, 
however, has more in common with home movies with the effect of increasing 
intimacy and engagement with the killer characters. The Last Horror Movie has 
elements of a personal video diary as part of its overall mock-documentary. 
 
The Last Horror Movie and Behind the Mask: The Rise of Leslie Vernon 
(Glosserman, 2006) are also relevant for their attempts to ‘double prime’ the 
audience. They prepare the audience for a traditional fiction film viewing 
experience by using a range of stimulus, before then changing their aesthetic and 
perceptual strategies, replacing the fictional film with a mock-documentary 
aesthetic. This juxtaposes two distinct aesthetic strategies, to emphasise the 
mediated realism of the parts of the film that mimic non-fiction media. 
 
The Last Horror Movie uses a very brief moment of black and white static 
accompanied by the familiar buzz that signals the disruption of normality and 
106 
 
indicates to the audience that they are watching something that has been recorded 
on tape. The filmmakers often use this technique to indicate that there has been a 
jump in the tape. This could be caused by a number of factors that audiences will 
be familiar with if they ever owned a VCR or are familiar with video-recording 
technologies. Sometimes the moment of static can mean the camera was dropped 
or knocked and the recording mechanism stopped working for a moment. In the 
case of The Last Horror Movie, it represents the moment that Max, the killer in 
the film, decides to start taping his own ‘home-made’ film over the teen slasher 
film that was originally on the tape (called ‘The Last Horror Movie’ and available 
to rent from Max’s local video store). 
 
To emphasise that everything after the moment of static must now be read by the 
audience as ‘real’, the preceding few minutes of the film (the real VHS of the 
‘The Last Horror Movie’) are stylised and recognisable as a conventional slasher 
film. The credits resemble a traditional film’s title sequence (fig. 4.19) and are 
accompanied by a radio news report detailing the escape of convicted murderers 
and a typical horror film soundtrack, orchestral and dramatic, with a suspenseful 
tone that would clearly suggest to the audience the genre of the film. An 
establishing shot of  a neon-lit diner with text announcing that the diner is in 
‘Grand Rapids, Michigan’ (fig. 4.20) precedes a shot in which a waitress answers 
a call from a child. The diner’s exterior and interior both hint at iconic Americana, 
also emphasised by the diegetic country and western music playing. We only hear 
the waitress’ end of the conversation, but can infer that it is a child on the other 
end of the phone as she says to him, ‘Michael... you shouldn’t be watching that on 
your own. I told you it was scary’. The use of the name Michael obviously recalls 
Halloween (Carpenter, 1978) in the minds of horror fans, which draws 
associations between this part of the film and other horror fictions. The camera 
movements are smooth and conventional, such as tracking close behind the 
woman as she walks around the diner closing doors and turning off lights. The 
isolated young woman in danger is a common feature of slasher films and genre 
fans will recognise the cues that suggest this character is likely to be killed in the 
opening scene. When her phone rings again, there is only the sound of a distorted 
laugh and then there is the sound of glass breaking within the diner itself. Here we 
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see the typical use of POV structure in films with a point/glance shot revealing the 
woman’s face (fig. 4.21) as she hears the noise. This is followed by the 
point/object shot as she looks in front of her in the direction of where the noise 
came from (fig. 4.22), and then there is a cut back to the point/glance shot of the 
woman looking scared. As she moves towards the noise, she treads on a mask on 
the floor and as she bends to pick it up, the killer is revealed as he attacks the 
woman from behind with a knife. 
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Figure 4.19 The film’s title (The Last Horror Movie). 
Figure 4.20 Establishing shot (The Last Horror Movie). 
Figure 4.21 Point/glance shot (The Last Horror Movie). 
Figure 4.22 Point/object shot (The Last Horror Movie). 
 
These moments help to contrast the ‘movie’ with the ‘home video’ that follows 
the static (fig. 4.23). Max’s face stares in close-up directly into the camera and at 
the audience (fig. 4.24). He directly addresses the camera and audience and says 
that what he has filmed will be ‘much more interesting’ than the film that was 
previously on this tape. The lighting is now more naturalistic (Max is lit by a 
visible desk lamp) and Max appears casual in front of decor that suggests a 
bedroom. Tapes are also visible in the background, highlighting Max’s use of 
video technology in the making of ‘his’ film. He begins by criticising the 
characterisation and script of the original film on the tape, again reinforcing the 
idea that the footage in which we are seeing him is more real than a fictional film. 
It is mediated realism created by stimulus that we would normally associate with a 
vlog or home video. The camera’s static shot implies the use of a tripod and 
Max’s hushed tones and intimate dialogue suggest the camera is not being 
operated by anybody. His handsome face (in full view and not hidden by a mask) 
suggests that this killer is more real and recognisable from the news media than 
from the slashers of fiction films.  
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Figure 4.23 Static (The Last Horror Movie). 
Figure 4.24 Max stares directly at the diegetic camera lens (The Last Horror Movie). 
108 
 
 
Viewers of these films12 enter into a silent contract with the filmmaker, accepting 
certain ‘truths’ in order to gain the fullest enjoyment from their sadistic or 
masochistic, voyeuristic thrills. Through the priming techniques and recognizable 
stimuli, the viewer imagines that the film really is being captured by a character 
within the diegesis and that s/he is now watching the recorded evidence of what 
happened to the characters. The desired effect is that the viewer will be convinced 
by the beginning of the film that his or her mind will not need to consciously 
continue making assumptions and processing new stimuli and this will become a 
spontaneous reaction to the narrative events and stylistic techniques of the film. 
Walton (1990, p.15) argues that ‘spontaneous imaginings tend to be more vivid 
than deliberate ones (…) evidence of the falsity of a proposition imposed 
forcefully on one’s consciousness makes it difficult to imagine vividly that the 
proposition is true’. Therefore, if the film immediately causes certain imaginings 
due to the priming techniques of its early scenes (for example imagining that what 
is being watched is the footage filmed by a real person) then the imagining for the 
rest of the film will be more spontaneous and therefore more vivid and terrifying 
for the viewer. 
 
4.4 Stylistic techniques 
 
Several techniques - such as handheld camera, continuing point-of-view shots, 
and direct address - are used in diegetic camera films to prime the audience into 
reading the film and reacting to it by imagining that it is a non-fiction piece of 
media. Many of these concern the stylistic choices of the production team from 
cinematography and mise-en-scène to editing. Diegetic camera films follow 
specific recognizable patterns, for example revealing the presence of the camera 
on-screen, making the camera operator audible, and having a character address the 
operator, in order to influence the spectator into deliberate cognitive processes 
such as recognising and empathising with the camera-operating character. 
Bordwell (1985, p.52) argues that ‘when alternative techniques exist for a given 
                                                          
12 Unless under the illusion that they are watching a real documentary, as was allegedly the case 
with a few early viewers of The Blair Witch Project. 
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syuzhet purpose, it may make a difference which technique is chosen (…) 
whatever stylistic choice is made may have different effects on the spectator’s 
perceptual and cognitive activity’. For example, while still intending to scare the 
spectator, a traditionally-shot horror film does not so insistently try to limit the 
viewer’s perception to one character’s point of view and this limiting of the 
viewpoint will cause specific cognitive activity. In films such as Halloween and 
Friday the 13th (Cunningham, 1980) there are discreet moments shot from the 
point of view of the murderer. Reading the diegetic camera film is more akin to 
reading the experience of the victim characters. 
 
The cinematography encourages us to imagine the operator, but it is also a 
reflection of the media product being made by the diegetic production team. As is 
the case with documentary footage, a significant amount is handheld and therefore 
shakier if the camera operator is required to move fast or catch something 
spontaneously. Some of the early scenes of The Blair Witch Project appear more 
carefully composed (figs. 4.25, 4.26 and 4.27), as these shots show the official 
documentary footage of the student filmmakers in the film. Interviews are shot 
with conventional ‘talking head’ framing and the students of The Blair Witch 
Project use an establishing shot when visiting the graveyard for their first shot of 
the documentary.  
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Figure 4.25, 4.26 and 4.27: Carefully composed shots (The Blair Witch Project). 
Figure 4.28: ‘Talking head’ interview framing (The Blair Witch Project). 
 
In these scenes, the camera operator is silent as is conventional in a professional 
documentary crew and Heather directly addresses the audience as a professional 
presenter might. The framing appears controlled, and planned with some care. The 
viewer does not necessarily imagine the camera operator when these shots are on 
screen because the camera operator’s presence in the diegesis is not emphasised. 
The shots also seem to have been edited together because as Heather speaks, her 
voice is then used as a sound bridge over a series of shots of the graveyard. To the 
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sensitive viewer, the editing itself provides cues to perceive this as distinct to the 
raw footage that was supposedly found in the woods.  
 
However, the next shot immediately tries to undo this by cutting back to what 
appears to be raw uncut footage straight out of the camera. Here the cuts are 
where the camera was turned on to record and then off again. In contrast to the 
‘official’ documentary footage, the following shot foregrounds the presence of the 
camera operator and appears clearly unplanned and spontaneous (figs. 4.29 and 
4.30). Heather’s voice can be heard from behind the camera exclaiming, ‘Yeehah, 
well we have shot the first scene. The cemetery scene... the opening... is shot’. 
This line of dialogue, while appearing improvised due to her sentence structure, 
also refers to the official documentary footage and prompts the viewer to interpret 
that what s/he is now seeing is behind-the-scenes footage. It also takes Heather 
around five seconds to bring the camera to focus on the road ahead of her (fig. 
4.31) as she is now filming from within a car as the diegetic filmmakers drive to a 
new location. In the previous five seconds of footage before Heather focuses on 
the road, the camera is pointing at the dashboard inside the car, making it clear 
that she has just turned the camera on to record and is then deciding where and 
what she is actually going to shoot. She finally pans the camera around to film 
Josh driving (fig. 4.32), and then cuts immediately after saying the above 
sentence. This cutting from a camera not focused on anything to pointing at a 
human subject for a only a fraction of a second is executed to reflect the way that 
the operator is thinking. Heather wants to capture the joy of getting the first bit of 
footage. The visuals that she actually films are of little narrative importance, 
except perhaps to show that the film crew are moving locations. However, the 
manner in which this shot has been filmed and edited ensures that the audience 
reads it as a realistic depiction of spontaneous behind-the-scenes filming. With so 
little visual information in the shot, the viewer must work harder to piece together 
what is happening in the shot and also imagine off-screen space to understand 
where the diegetic camera is and who is in control. 
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Figure 4.29 - 4.32: Spontaneous, unplanned filming by Heather as she finds her focus (The 
Blair Witch Project). 
 
Films in the home movie category are distinguished by their domestic settings and 
also the use of more amateur-looking photography than other examples. They are 
closer to the behind-the-scenes footage seen in The Blair Witch Project than to the 
students’ conventional documentary framing at the film’s start. The handheld 
camera provides shaky images, the camera and its operator are still glimpsed in 
mirrors occasionally, and the characters frequently discuss the presence of the 
diegetic camera thus showing their awareness of it. All this primes the audience to 
accept the camera as an electrical prop that actually works that is present in the 
world of the film. There are the typical technical imperfections of diegetic camera 
films that add to its claims of authenticity. The audience is primed to accept that 
the camera is not being operated by a professional or even by a film student. The 
film is designed to look as though it has been shot by a complete amateur with 
unnecessary zooms, quick cuts, and incomplete takes. Like genuine home videos, 
there is a persistent sense of spontaneity, with the camera seemingly turned on just 
at the right moment (or even seconds later than desirable) to capture something 
important. 
Exhibit A opens with the subject on screen, a middle-aged father named Andy 
King, asking ‘Yes?’ to an unseen camera operator behind the camera (fig. 4.33). 
The voice of the camera operator (later revealed as Andy’s daughter Judith) can 
then be heard replying ‘Yeah’. This immediately ensures that the viewer will 
imagine off-screen space. The viewer feels as though s/he is positioned in the 
middle of a conversation, not just temporally, but almost spatially. In front of the 
viewer, on the screen is Andy, and somewhere off-screen, behind the camera is a 
young girl. Beginning the shot in this way also alludes to what has been missed in 
this conversation. The viewer will question why the man is asking ‘Yes?’ The 
viewer can easily speculate that the camera has simply been turned on midway 
through a conversation between camera operator and subject. Andy had likely 
asked Judith if the camera is switched on just before the moment she pressed the 
record button. She had not replied as she was waiting for the red record dot to 
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appear in her viewfinder perhaps. Then, Andy asked impatiently, ‘Yes?’ and that 
is the first moment captured. The viewer of Exhibit A will instantly complete at 
least part of this process in order to comprehend the scene. 
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Figure 4.33: The opening shot of Exhibit A as Andy communicates with camera operator 
Judith. 
Figure 4.34 Judith films herself in a mirror (Exhibit A). 
 
Judith’s filming of Andy as she follows him into their house is filmed from a low 
angle as she is much smaller than he is and it is clear that she is not a professional 
camera operator as she films into the sunshine, meaning Gary’s face is dark in the 
opening shot. This first shot also lasts for two minutes, as there is clearly no 
thought about when to cut. The camera changes hands in this shot, as Judith’s 
brother Joe takes the camera from her. This emphasises the relaxed approach to 
who is responsible for the camera operation in home video examples and primes 
the viewer to imagine and to re-imagine who is in off-screen space behind the 
camera. This imagining is continuously aided by dialogue and visuals. For 
example, in the first shot Judith films herself in the mirror (fig. 4.34), and when 
Joe takes the camera from her, she is seen emerging from behind and to the left of 
the camera saying ‘get stuffed’ (fig. 4.36). The cinematography as the camera 
changes hands is also notable as the camera appears to wobble and be swung 
around as if being pulled around by two pairs of hands. The viewer must therefore 
imagine what the brother and sister are doing before it is confirmed by the 
dialogue (‘let him have a turn’) and the appearance of Judith in front of the 
camera. Another notable element of this first shot is that both Andy and Joe 
perform for the camera; Andy while showing the camera around the house and 
Joe when he first sees the camera starts to make faces directly at it (fig. 4.35) 
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Figure 4.35: Joe performs for the camera (Exhibit A). 
Figure 4.36: Judith appears from behind the camera (Exhibit A). 
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Other stylistic elements encourage the audience to ponder why the character is 
filming, and this is usually answered quickly through dialogue, but it also helps to 
set up a narrative. The films that take the form of mock-documentaries are 
constructed to make their forms (documentaries) obvious from the opening 
scenes. Presenters that directly address the camera, having characters shout ‘cut’ 
and presenters that ‘repeat’ takes to get them right, all add to the sense that the 
spectator is watching either the finished product, or a documentary in progress of 
being produced. Films such as The Blair Witch Project purport to show the viewer 
some of the raw footage of a (mostly behind-the-scenes) documentary with very 
little editing compared to a finished piece. Some films such as Rec establish what 
appears to be the production of made-for-television documentaries or reality 
television shows. Either way, the opening scenes make clear the viewing 
experience that is offered to the spectator. 
 
In essence, the priming patterns of the opening scenes consist of numerous 
techniques aimed at misdirecting the audience. The elements already mentioned 
are designed to correspond with the visuals of non-fiction films. The early scenes 
of the film must be convincing in their depiction of these practices in order to 
make the cognitive processes of the spectator follow assumptions and emotions of 
responding to a documentary or reality TV programme. Hallam and Marshment 
(2000, p.227) argue that ‘the closer certain aspects of a film’s depictive elements 
correspond to actuality recording practices, the greater their capacity to appear to 
mediate actuality directly, rather than perform a representative or symbolic 
function’. In order to trick the viewer, or allow the viewer to respond as if tricked, 
the priming techniques used must be carried through the film. This creates a 
consistent sense of mediated realism that is, if not complete enough to deceive, at 
least complete enough to prompt spontaneous imaginings that what is shown on 
screen is what non-fiction footage of these events would look like. 
 
Sensitive readers want to play the game that the filmmakers intend for them. If a 
viewer wishes to imagine a film’s characters are real in order to be able to respond 
to them with real emotions, then the viewer will use the nested cues in the film’s 
aesthetics to make this imagining more vivid. The audience of diegetic camera 
114 
 
films desire a certain thrill from watching the films, a thrill that is most likely 
founded on pretending or imagining that the film is a real documentary or home 
video. If the viewer is not primed efficiently and correctly, then the imagining will 
be a harder task, less natural and less pleasurable. In his work on make-believe, 
Walton (1990, p.23) argues that ‘imaginings induced by prompters (…) are often 
less contrived and deliberate, more spontaneous, than are imaginings in response 
to instructions’. The ideal priming patterns in diegetic camera films are not 
instructions but prompters. They do not tell the audience what to think and feel or 
how to respond, but the elements on display prompt the audience to imagine 
spontaneously, most notably about the mediated reality of the situation they are 
watching. 
 
There are three notable stylistic techniques that warrant further consideration: the 
camera’s presence, POV shots and technical imperfections. These are immediately 
noticeable when watching diegetic camera films and are essential to their priming 
strategies. 
 
A key element in the priming strategy of diegetic camera films is preparing the 
viewer for the self-conscious strategies displayed in the films. The fact that a 
character in the diegesis is holding the camera and filming the events that are 
being watched by the film audience has to be carefully constructed. This is 
achieved through cinematography, dialogue and other techniques. The priming 
strategy then aims at making the spectator aware of the camera’s physical 
presence within the diegesis, not simply when recording events, but also the 
impact that the camera has on the characters that are present. James Keller (2004, 
p.56) posits that ‘the audience becomes hyper-conscious of the camera’s presence, 
not because of the artful, well-designed images, but because there are so few of 
them’. Unless the camera is glimpsed in a mirror or one camera films a second 
(which often happens in the early scenes of these films) the viewer does not 
actually see the camera. If the films have more than one diegetic camera, part of 
their priming strategy is to prepare audiences for the switching between cameras. 
Often this is made easier by showing differences in the footage from each camera. 
For example, the characters in The Blair Witch Project use a colour digital camera 
115 
 
and a black and white film camera (see figures 4.25 and 4.29) to help differentiate 
between the behind-the-scenes and official documentary and also to prime the 
audience to remember who is carrying which camera. In the opening scenes, Josh 
holds the film camera, while Heather holds the digital camera. We know this due 
to seeing the cameras in their hands and particularly with Heather’s footage, the 
fact that we hear her from off-screen as she films. 
 
The cutting between different cameras also draws attention to the fact that these 
films have been edited. Some films prime the audience to expect this editing in 
their opening titles, referencing the fact that the footage has been trimmed and 
ordered to create a narrative, but others take it for granted that the viewer would 
understand that someone has done this. For example, The Blair Witch Project 
appears as the diegetic camera footage of the students and, in many ways, 
unedited (as I already established in this chapter). However, the intercutting of 
two different cameras throughout the film clearly suggests that the footage has 
been edited for narrative and dramatic effect. The early intercutting primes the 
viewer to expect this and, ideally, not to question it. Viewers may find themselves 
questioning why the footage of both cameras is intercut and, furthermore, the 
presence of an editor complicates the identity of the enunciator. However, the 
sensitive viewer should be able to accept the intercutting of both cameras’ footage 
as a technique utilised by the extra-diegetic filmmakers in order to make the 
narrative flow.  
 
In films where the camera is not visible because there is no second camera to 
capture a shot of it (such as Man Bites Dog), other techniques are used to prime 
the spectator for the viewing experience and for being continually aware of the 
camera’s presence. This is done through the continuous point-of-view shots. 
These shots often reflect the actions, feelings, curiosity and fears of the camera-
operating character. If camerawork draws attention to itself by being shaky, jerky, 
and disorienting, then viewers are likely to be aware of its use. The construction 
of POV shots aids in viewer awareness of the camera because (particularly if the 
camera operator is coded as amateur) their camerawork will often be noticeable 
and distracting. This forces the viewer to imagine off-screen space, and moreover 
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to question and hypothesize about what the camera operator is doing behind the 
camera. This creates uncertainty and fear and can ensure that the viewer is 
actively searching the visuals for clues about what is happening behind the 
camera. 
 
The spectator is primed early in diegetic camera films to accept what s/he sees as 
POV shots, even without the use of point/glance shots. The significance of these 
shots is likely to be diminished when compared to a more traditional film’s use of 
the technique. As these shots constitute a substantial part of diegetic camera films 
as opposed to being used sparingly in other films, they are simultaneously more 
and less significant. Branigan (1984, p.71) argues that ‘the POV shot cannot be 
recognized until we learn its elements and attach special significance to them’. 
Although Branigan is not referring to diegetic camera films, it is worthwhile 
considering how the POV shot is established in these films if they do not follow 
more traditional construction patterns such as including a point/glance shot. POV 
shots are more significant because of the frequency of their use in the films, but 
this means that they potentially have less impact than carefully chosen moments 
of POV in other films. For example, the use of a POV shot in a slasher film can 
create incredible tension as it signifies the killer’s presence in close proximity to 
his or her potential victims. These shots are carefully, and sparingly, used to 
suggest that the victims are being watched at critical moments. 
 
Diegetic camera films use POV shots continuously. If we accept that the camera 
itself as a prop in the diegesis provides a point of view, then every shot is a POV 
shot. If we only accept that a sentient, living, breathing entity can have a point of 
view, then only whenever a character is holding a camera, can the shot be called a 
POV shot. However, there are different degrees of subjectivity to these character 
POV shots and I argue that some of these shots when the character holds the 
camera are actually only showing the point of view of the camera, rather than the 
point of view of the character. For example, when Josh films the official 
document in The Blair Witch Project (see Figs 4.25-4.28), these shots might be 
taken from his point of view, but they are not subjective. They do not offer an 
insight into Josh’s mind. Similarly, some shots in Rec are more accurately 
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described as POV shots than others, even though all of the shots in the film are 
filmed by Pablo the camera operator. Sometimes he is attempting to make a piece 
of television and at other times he is clearly just filming everything he witnesses 
like an ordinary bystander with a camera. As a general rule, when the 
cinematography becomes more hectic, there is a greater sense of the POV of the 
operator. These shaky shots are more like traditional POV shots than the former, 
because they remind the viewer to imagine the operator off-screen and what must 
be occurring to the operator that has caused the cinematography to become so 
erratic. This implies that the operator is reacting to what is around him/her rather 
than merely setting up a shot for the programme (see fig 4.37 and 4.38). In the 
shot represented by the still image in figure 4.37, the camera moves slowly and 
evenly as Pablo walks backwards while keeping his subjects framed in the centre 
of the shot. In this shot, it is easy to forget that Pablo is present as we are 
concentrating on his subjects and their conversation. In the shot represented by the 
still image in figure 4.38 the camera moves rapidly as Pablo chases Angela 
frantically and the framing is erratic and we are given a much greater sense of 
Pablo’s fear and panic. Pablo remains quiet throughout the film, whereas less 
professional camera operators such as Hud in Cloverfield and Heather in The 
Blair Witch Project give us an even greater sense of the shots being their point of 
view because they are so frequently audible from off-screen. 
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Figure 4.37: The camera moves slowly and evenly as Pablo walks backwards while keeping 
his subjects framed in the centre of the shot (Rec). 
Figure 4.38: The camera moves rapidly as Pablo chases Angela frantically and the framing is 
far less careful (Rec). 
 
In some shots, POV and subjectivity is less important than the subject being 
filmed. The cinematography and the operator are less noticeable and therefore the 
viewer concentrates more on the character on screen (see fig. 4.37). In other shots, 
the cinematography and camera operator are just as important as what is on screen 
and this makes the shot more like a traditional POV shot (see fig. 4.38). Finally, 
there are shots where what appears on screen is almost completely irrelevant as 
the most important visual and aural information being conveyed to the viewer is 
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contained in the way the filming is being conducted and the off-screen sound of 
the operator. For example in figure 4.39, it is impossible to tell what Heather is 
filming in The Blair Witch Project. Her torchlight and some twigs are visible but 
in the entire 13 seconds of the shot, there is very little visual information 
conveyed. It is mostly pitch black with a torchlight illuminating a small circle of 
the ground around Heather. However, her audible breathing and the rapid 
movement of the camera and torch encourage the viewer to imagine how Heather 
is feeling and what she is doing off camera. 
 
IMAGE REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
Figure 4.39: Heather’s torchlight and some twigs (The Blair Witch Project). 
 
Shots like Heather’s torch-lit run through the woods are technically frustrating. 
They are underlit and the camera movement is too rapid to allow a clear look at 
the scene. Editing is also significant, as diegetic camera films often prime the 
spectator for a heavily disjointed experience. Jump cuts, shots that seem 
unnecessary, shots held too long or cut during someone talking all feature in the 
films and often the early scenes set this out in order to prime the viewer for what 
appears to be raw footage. For example, about six minutes into Cloverfield, when 
Hud is first given the responsibility of being the camera operator, a sequence of 
shots reveals little to the viewer except that Hud is inexperienced with the camera. 
Jump cuts like the one shown in figures. 4.40 and 4.41 below also encourage the 
viewer to imagine what has occurred between the camera being turned off and on 
again. In the first shot (fig. 4.40) we can see that Hud is panning the camera to 
find a new person to get a ‘testimonial’ from. We can infer this because he has 
just recorded his first testimonial with Jason and has declared that the task of 
capturing testimonials is ‘actually kinda fun’. As soon as he captures this 
character in frame, the shot cuts immediately to the second shot (fig 4.41). It can 
be inferred from this cut that Hud has had a short conversation with this character 
while the camera was switched off. He has at the very least secured this 
character’s attention and ensured the man is positioned quite centrally in the 
frame. This means that the viewer has imagined the off-screen time and space 
between cuts and attempted to fill in the blanks. However, there then follows a 
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series of shots (figs. 4.42 - 4.45) that only last a second each and appear to be not 
focussed on capturing much useful visual or narrative information. The viewer 
sees what looks to be the ceiling, and then three shots of a room full of people. 
The camera is always moving fast and does not seem to have a focus. The purpose 
of these shots is to show that Hud is still at the party, and that he is arbitrarily 
pressing the record button while he finds people to capture for their testimonies. 
What is in frame is less important than the erratic yet authentic manner in which it 
is filmed. The viewer’s seeking system may be activated as s/he tries to make 
sense of this quick succession of shots, but more likely s/he will imagine Hud 
behind the camera learning how to operate it. 
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Figures 4.40 and 4.41: Hud finds a subject, then stops recording to explain what he is doing, 
before starting to record again (Cloverfield). 
Figures 4.42 - 4.45: Quick shots capturing little useful visual or narrative information 
(Cloverfield). 
 
The impact that these techniques have on audience members’ cognitive functions 
is debatable. Anna Powell (2005, p.5) writes about the use of ‘fragmented images 
and blurred focus’ in horror films in general and how these techniques undermine 
‘normative perspective’. These techniques, while not the technical imperfections 
like those previously discussed, can have similar effects. Powell (2005, p.5) goes 
on to argue that these techniques affect ‘the spectator’s sense of cognitive control 
over the subject matter as our optic nerves and auditory membranes struggle to 
process confusing data’. If the opening scenes of these films are shot and edited in 
a way that confuses the viewer, then we are being primed to process the 
information we receive by imagining what is occurring behind the camera. In 
order to process the visual data, we must imagine the camera operator and attempt 
to understand why s/he is filming in the manner s/he is. 
 
Technical imperfections also prime the spectator for the ongoing presence of a 
camera operator within the diegesis. The viewer is primed to accept that his or her 
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perspective will be limited to what the camera operator chooses to shoot, and 
therefore the majority of the film will be from the point of view of the character 
carrying the camera. The stylistic techniques employed in diegetic camera films 
will all aid the audience in reading the cameraperson as what Buckland (2000, 
p.101) calls ‘the embodiment of the real enunciator’. The impression given is that 
there is no director or writer here, but instead just a character creating their own 
film with a camera as real events occur in front of them. To return to the scene 
from Cloverfield analysed above, the quick cuts and camera movement suggest 
that what we are seeing is what Hud is choosing to film. He is the sole operator of 
the camera. A viewer would imagine that a director or a writer of a fictional film 
called Cloverfield would take more care over the scripting, filming, selection and 
editing of footage for the fiction film. Every stylistic technique employed in the 
film primes the viewer to imagine that the camera operator is the real enunciator, 
and it is therefore an important cognitive task for the viewer to imagine the 
presence and actions of this operator in order to comprehend the scene and the 
manner in which it has been filmed. When the viewer imagines that the camera 
operator is the real enunciator, a particular mood of anticipation is created and the 
viewer is then primed to respond to the film in emotionally congruent ways. 
 
 
4.5 Creating mood and emotion 
 
Diegetic camera films, like most other films, attempt to establish a mood early so 
that audiences will be more likely to feel certain emotions as they continue 
watching such as a sense of dread or anxiety that will likely orient how they will 
feel for the remainder of the film. Joseph Laycock (2011) argues that diegetic 
camera films are particularly adept at instilling ‘an enduring sense of unease’ in 
the audience. This is largely due to the stylistic techniques they employ, as 
previously discussed. Following on from Greg M. Smith’s (1999, p.120) claim 
that ‘a primary task for a film’s early sequences (…) is to establish an emotional 
orientation that will guide the audience through the film, encouraging them to 
evaluate cues in mood-congruent ways’, the priming techniques will now be 
considered beyond their use in helping viewers to understand how to interpret and 
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read the films but also in how they establish mood and therefore lead to the 
desired emotions for a horror film. Films must attempt to create emotion in order 
to satisfy the audience. Emotions occur in no small part due to the mood that is 
created during the course of the film and set up early by the priming strategy. 
Hills (2005, p.25) concurs by arguing that ‘horror can immerse its audiences in an 
“anticipatory” mood or ambivalence that endures across the text’.   
 
Different to emotions, moods last for longer and are less intense. Greg M. Smith 
(1999, p.113) argues that their ‘orienting function encourages us to express a 
particular group of emotions. While they are not as intense as emotions, their 
longevity helps make them a crucial part of the emotion system’. If a viewer is 
convinced to become anxious (mood) then they are more likely to jump at shocks 
and feel fear at the presence of a monster because their mood points them towards 
these emotions. Moods are likely to continue throughout a film, particularly if 
they are fed by certain techniques, predominantly in the priming pattern at the 
start of the film. Smith (1999, p.113) argues that moods ‘have an inertia. Moods 
tend to keep us oriented toward expressing and experiencing the same emotion’. 
Smith (1999, p.114) goes on to discuss the impact of a fearful mood on the 
audience: 
 
[It] puts us on emotional alert, and we patrol our 
environment searching for frightening objects. Fear makes 
us notice dark shadows, mysterious noises, and sudden 
movements and thus provides more possibly frightening 
cues. Once we see a frightful sight, this bolsters the mood 
and makes it more likely that we will continue to evaluate 
future stimuli as frightening, thus sustaining the fearful 
mood. This cycle continues as long as emotional stimuli 
are present.  
 
Diegetic camera films often put the audience on emotional alert with their stylistic 
cues from early scenes. Putting the viewer on emotional alert begins with the 
choice of words in the opening text as established earlier in this chapter (see figs 
4.1-4.6). Except for the charismatic killer examples, none of the focus films 
feature any monsters in their opening scenes. The Blair Witch Project has a 
number of visual cues that hint at the horror element of the narrative; Heather 
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films her book ‘How to Stay Alive in the Woods’ and there are a number of 
iconographic elements such as cut-out ghost decorations on display as the film is 
set around Halloween. Only the dialogue spoken by the interviewees that Heather 
questions further hints at the monster that is central to the narrative, but it is also 
made clear that the documentary that the characters are making is about the legend 
of the Blair Witch. Similarly, in Rec there is no real evidence of the film having 
monsters, but because the film mimics reality television, it is clear that the 
presenter is looking for something exciting to occur to keep viewers interested. 
The home video examples, Cloverfield and Exhibit A, have nothing apart from 
their opening titles to suggest the horror element of what is to occur. Therefore, 
these films not are not creating a typical horror mood in their opening scenes. 
Without emotive music cues or the ability to intercut scenes and distance the 
audience from the protagonists and create suspense by introducing monsters, the 
early scenes create a particularly realistic mood by mimicking other media forms. 
While the opening text instils dread, the opening scenes do not offer much in the 
way of visual cues to ensure that this mood is continued.  
 
In contrast to Carroll’s cognitive account of art-horror and object-directed 
emotions, Greg M. Smith and others have claimed that an object is not needed in 
order to feel emotions and that a pervading mood will push audiences towards 
certain emotive reactions to films. Hills (2005, p.24) argues that ‘by restricting 
discussion to object-directed emotion, such theories have removed objectless 
affects (such as mood and anxiety) from scholarly analysis altogether’. In 
addressing this, Hills has opened the door for a rigorous analysis of how emotions 
are not solely directed at or caused by single objects. Rather, horror, and in 
particular diegetic camera horror, primes the spectator to experience more than 
just what Hills (2005, p.25) calls ‘“occurrent” emotions, that is emotions that 
occur at one moment and then pass’. Horror films often instil a sense of dread 
from the earliest frames, even before any monster or threat is made visible. By 
creating a mood or ‘affective experience of anticipation’ (Hills, 2005, p.25), 
certain emotions are likely to recur throughout the viewing of the film. The 
opening text introduces this mood; the viewer anticipates the disappearance, 
murder or ‘sighting’ that is suggested in the text. The opening scenes then focus 
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on creating not only the anticipatory mood but, more prominently, the ‘reality 
mood’. This is promoted through the nested cues that create mediated realism. 
Furthermore, the viewer must imagine that the real enunciator is the camera 
operator in order for this reality mood to be continued throughout the film.  
 
A mood has to be sustained over the course of a film in order to increase the 
chances of certain emotions being felt in the audience. A film will not only rely on 
its early priming scenes to establish the mood but will also require what Greg M. 
Smith (1999, p.118) labels ‘emotion markers’. These textual cues elicit ‘brief 
moments of emotion’ and therefore ‘reinforce the mood’s predisposition and 
encourage the mood to continue’. Analysis of the opening scenes reveals that 
these are not often strictly what I would label emotion cues because they are very 
much focussed on reinforcing the reality mood, rather than an emotion of fear or 
anticipation. The primary function of the early scenes of these films is not to 
create fear but to convince the audience of authenticity and encourage them to 
imagine that the film is a documentary or home video or reality television 
programme. These cannot be accurately labelled emotion cues; instead, they are 
the nested cues that create a perceptually realistic film and prime the audience for 
mediated realism. These pro-filmic conventions of documentary realism such as 
location shooting, presenters talking to camera and on-camera interviews with 
‘witnesses’ work in a similar way to emotion markers, frequently reinforcing the 
reality mood. In The Blair Witch Project, Heather immediately addresses the 
camera in the first shot, acting similarly to a documentary presenter. In the 
following shot, we see from her POV as she films some books and talks about 
them from behind the camera. Her left hand is visible in the frame (fig. 4.46) as it 
picks up some of the books to show them to the camera more clearly. This shot is 
less typical of a documentary presenter and more reminiscent of a home video. A 
similar shot is used in Exhibit A as camera operator Judith shows the 
camera/audience some belongings in her room while talking about them (fig. 
4.47). The following shot in The Blair Witch Project reveals the location of a road 
being used and within five minutes there are voxpops that act as on-camera 
interviews to therefore reinforce the reality mood. 
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Figure 4.46 and 4.47: Visible body parts of camera operators (The Blair Witch Project and 
Exhibit A). 
 
On the other hand, there are other cues that cause the viewer to empathise with the 
camera operator, establishing a more empathetic mood. For example in the 
opening scenes of Exhibit A, we are privy to private moments when the camera 
operator Judith is alone with her camera. She even introduces the camera to the 
girl next door (that Judith has a teenage crush on), saying ‘camera... meet Claire’. 
Combined with the zooming in and extreme close up that Judith tries to capture of 
Claire, this ensures that the audience is likely to empathise with Judith’s feelings. 
Emotion markers such as these encourage the viewer to sympathise with the 
camera operator from the beginning of the film. In a similar way, Heather’s 
determination to get her project underway in the opening scenes of The Blair 
Witch Project is frequently reiterated by her dialogue from behind the camera. 
When Heather says things like ‘we’re already going to be behind schedule’, the 
viewer can either find her relatable as a determined young filmmaker, or perhaps 
annoying for being too ‘pushy’ or ‘bossy’. In either case, these moments of point-
of-view shot combined with audio from the off-camera operator work as emotion 
cues to encourage the viewer to be aware of the camera operator’s mood and 
feelings. 
 
If the style does not convince the viewer to imagine that what they are watching is 
‘genuine’ footage, then the impact of the film will be considerably lessened. 
Rhodes (2002, p.60) argues that the problem with many diegetic camera films is 
‘the (un)believability of film crews shooting in the kind of terrifying 
environments depicted’. However, if the priming is successful and the audience is 
convinced to imagine that they are watching the footage filmed by a believably 
dedicated filmmaking character then this will be less of a problem when the 
events become more terrifying. Recent examples such as the recent sequel to The 
Blair Witch Project, Blair Witch (Wingard, 2016) have overcome this criticism by 
employing cameras that can be worn like ear-pieces. This wearable technology 
can be left filming constantly (no matter how dangerous a situation the character 
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is in) and captures an embodied continuous point of view of the character that 
wears it. But in the focus films of this thesis, the cameras need to be held by the 
characters or set up somewhere by the characters. In this case, the viewer must 
believe that the character would continue to film even in dangerous or terrifying 
circumstances. Again, markers such as Heather’s mention that they are ‘behind 
schedule’, or that Judith likes to take photos and has just received a new camera, 
prime the audience to expect that these are characters that are committed to 
capturing their experiences. In the home video examples, there is more of a focus 
on specific events that give the camera operators a believable and realistic reason 
to be filming. For example, Exhibit A shows a father announcing his promotion to 
his family and Cloverfield begins with a leaving party. These events prime the 
audience to believe in the use of a camera for seemingly ordinary domestic events. 
Similarly, in many of the films the camera is newly purchased (Paranormal 
Activity, Exhibit A) and the operator wishes to test it and to use it frequently as it 
is their new gadget or toy. The continuing point-of-view shots only make sense to 
the viewer if s/he is convinced of the camera operator’s intentions. The reality 
mood and empathy with the camera operator has to be achieved for the viewer to 
have spontaneous imaginings that the film could be a non-fiction document.  
 
In the case of The Blair Witch Project and Rec, the subjects of these 
documentaries and shows are often the search for proof or investigations of 
supernatural or events shrouded in mystery. This gives the characters believable 
motivations for continuing to film even when they are in danger. These reasons to 
keep filming and desires to capture proof or reveal some truth are essential and the 
viewer must be primed to expect that the characters will keep filming to achieve 
their goals and to create a satisfying media product for their intended future 
audience. Our seeking system is activated by the recognition that these characters 
are also seeking evidence, and that our points of view are aligned with the 
characters’. 
 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
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The viewer of diegetic camera films is primed from the earliest scenes to 
hypothesise that what s/he is witnessing is authentic footage captured by real 
people in real situations with their own diegetic cameras. The technical quality of 
the footage is often very rough except in the case of those that mimic professional 
expository documentaries. The camera’s presence is repeatedly emphasised 
through a number of recurring techniques such as having the operator point the 
camera at a mirror or hearing the operator speak from off camera. Often the 
audience learn details about the camera operators from what they say and what 
they choose to film in these early scenes. This causes the viewer to become 
extremely active in imagining off-screen space; locating where the camera is, in 
whose hands it is held and often even imagining the immediate situation, 
emotional state, and activity of the camera operator. 
 
The effect of these techniques is to allow for more spontaneous imaginings that 
what is on screen could be real and thus to heighten the sense of dread and fear 
central to the horror genre. The viewer is primed to engage with the films as if 
s/he is watching a media product that deals with factual evidence or that purports 
to be real documented proof of a supernatural or horrific event. The viewer is not 
duped into believing in the veracity of the footage, but s/he can more easily 
imagine it is if the priming has been effective. The sensitive viewer is engaged in 
spontaneous imaginings of the film as a non-fiction piece of media. The opening 
titles prime the viewer to hypothesize about the fates of the characters as very 
often it is made clear that only the footage remains from the event captured. 
 
Audiences are also limited to the point of view of one or perhaps a small number 
of characters. There are no objective shots unless there are instances when the 
diegetic camera has been set up by a character. The camera always has limitations 
and the audience are primed for a more restricted experience than they are used to 
from other films. The characters that are holding the cameras are frequently 
central to the stories and they are established as important by either being shown 
(in a mirror, on another camera) or heard (their off-camera voice). The other 
characters will acknowledge and converse with the camera operators unless what 
the viewer is seeing is supposed to be a final cut of a mock-documentary. Usually 
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however, the footage is either being shown supposedly with limited editing or it 
was an amateur production where the camera operator is not a professional to be 
ignored by the people in the pro-filmic event. This has important implications for 
the viewer’s engagement with the characters, and this will be discussed in chapter 
5. 
 
Finally the priming strategies of the films create a mood. The mood will be an 
anticipatory one with opening titles that make the viewer concerned for the 
characters and the viewer will feel heightened fear for characters that s/he 
imagines are in a non-fiction piece of media.  Most of all, the desire is elicited to 
get the viewer to imagine that the film is a genuine recorded audio-visual 
document in order to heighten feelings of sympathy, empathy and fear. This will 
create the ‘reality’ mood and a more immediate and immersive response to the 
films and the characters that appear to be real and caught on tape, not actors 
performing in a fiction. The stylistic techniques previously mentioned work as 
emotion cues to keep the viewer primed for this realistic experience and it is the 
intention of the filmmaker that these stylistic cues will be inputted into the 
memory of the viewer so that when events get more supernatural or less 
believable, the viewer will retrieve these cues that led them to read the film as 
plausible and realistic. 
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Chapter 5: Camera operator interaction with viewers and profilmic subjects: 
The case of home movies 
 
In this chapter I will analyse heightened engagement in diegetic camera horror 
films which creates empathy between the viewer and the camera operator, most 
notably when considering how the camera is used as a tool for communication 
with an imagined future audience. To this purpose, I will focus predominantly on 
examples from the home video category: Exhibit A, Cloverfield and Paranormal 
Activity. These films feature the greatest interaction between the camera operator 
and the viewer, and the camera operator and the profilmic subjects.  
 
Firstly, following Murray Smith’s notions of recognition, alignment and 
allegiance, I will consider how the camera operator is constructed as a character. 
This will involve further examination of the POV shots used and, more 
specifically, of how these shots become a significant part of the performance of 
the camera-operating character. As a result, I will show how sound and off-screen 
space encourage the viewer to imagine the camera operator. I will then analyze 
how information is accumulated by the viewer and camera-operating character 
and the effects of this epistemological alignment on empathy. I will also consider 
alignment between responses of the spectator and camera operator, both in the 
cinematography and in the cognitive and bodily response of both viewer and 
character at crucial moments of decision-making (for the characters) in the films.  
 
After demonstrating that the camera operators are recognisable as predominantly 
off-screen characters and therefore must frequently be imagined by the viewer, I 
will then analyse how interactions affect allegiance. I will focus on the 
interactions between camera operators and the viewer, and between camera 
operators and profilmic subjects. I pay particular attention to the ways that many 
camera operators and other characters in diegetic camera films seek to reach out 
beyond the diegesis to the supposed ‘finder’ of the footage. I will demonstrate 
how the viewer becomes an imagined (by the character) part of the diegesis. I 
argue that this makes the viewer feel a heightened level of engagement with the 
film and its characters, thus becoming more attentive to what the character says. 
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Despite this, the viewer may not increasingly empathise or have a differing moral 
evaluation of the character. Finally, an examination of the interactions between 
camera operators and their profilmic subjects will ascertain how empathy can be 
produced, and how the diegetic camera aids this process.  
 
5.1 Recognition of camera operators and cinematography as performance 
 
There are many examples of characters in these films using the camera to 
demonstrate their interests, motivations, concerns and feelings. The 
cinematography becomes a key part of the performance of these off-screen 
characters. In Cloverfield, Rob lovingly films Beth when she is asleep. Jason only 
has the camera for a few minutes but turns it around to film his own face twice, 
demonstrating his narcissism. Hud spends a significant amount of time at the 
party trying to film Marlena discreetly. All these examples reveal the desires of 
the camera-operating characters, but there is more to their use of the camera than 
just being able to tell who a character desires. Hud assumes the role of citizen 
journalist when he and his friends leave the party. He takes it upon himself to 
capture his surroundings and the spectacular nature of events going on around 
him. For example, on the Brooklyn Bridge he films the headless Statue of Liberty, 
the burning overturned oil tanker and the people trying to escape Manhattan by 
crossing the bridge. Joe in Exhibit A is a different camera user from either Hud or 
his sister Judith. He uses the camera for play and to amuse himself and his future 
audience. He films his father’s buttocks, beatboxes to camera, and pretends to 
spank his father by holding his hand in front of the camera and using forced 
perspective. Judith demonstrates her increasing concern for her father by secretly 
filming him using night vision and investigating what he has been doing while 
alone in the shed at night. Her camerawork suggests she is often distant and 
hidden from her subjects (peering from behind objects, using night vision) and is a 
result of her decision that she has made to hide her filming from her parents. In 
Paranormal Activity, Micah is deeply sceptical about the paranormal as he 
constantly moves towards strange noises and possible sources of danger. He even 
grabs his camera first before rushing to see why Katie is screaming, a clear sign 
that this is a character determined to keep filming and to capture proof no matter 
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what the cost. Through their cinematography, we can imagine the characters and 
the performances of the actors that play them. 
 
The amateur camerawork emphasises the emotions of the users as they do not 
need to remain calm and objective when shooting a home video. In Exhibit A, 
when Andy asks Judith ‘why do you hate me?’, he zooms in to an extreme close-
up on her eyes, mirroring his desire to read her thoughts, by examining the 
expression in her eyes. This is followed by his taking the camera and prying into 
his family’s belongings, giving him access to their secrets and letting him inside 
their heads. Micah in Paranormal Activity shows a similar need to control and 
understand what is going on around him by using his camera. His decision to set 
up the camera overnight on a tripod with a clean view of his bed and the hallway 
leading to his bedroom demonstrates his desire to capture everything, even when 
he is asleep. At the time when he is at his most vulnerable, he leaves the camera in 
the best possible position to watch over him and Katie, in order to give himself a 
better understanding of what is menacing them. Similarly, when Andy puts the 
camera down in Exhibit A, he does so in order to break into his daughter Judith’s 
secret padlocked box and to then capture the photos she keeps inside. Again, 
Andy’s determination to reveal to his family the secrets that they all keep, is clear 
by his ensuring that the photos he finds can be seen by the camera, and by 
extension his family in the future. This reveals that even when the camera is put 
down by characters, its employment and positioning are still revealing in terms of 
the thoughts and feelings of the characters that set it up. Though a camera placed 
on a tripod or other static surface may disconnect the viewer’s perceptual 
identification with the character, it still allows the audience to understand and 
learn about the character, such as Micah, who placed the camera in this position.  
 
These moments when the camera is not being held by the operator also allow the 
viewer to see the operator on screen. The producers of home videos are more 
likely to turn the camera on themselves, with Micah, Hud, Judith and Andy all 
extending their arms at points in the films to then switch the cameras’ gazes to 
their own faces. Micah does this when he is talking to his camera, pretending it is 
a living creature and asking how it feels. Hud films himself in order to tell his 
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imagined future audience that ‘if this is the last thing you see, then I died’. Andy 
also uses the camera, not as a last will but as a confessional tool, finally choosing 
to admit to the camera (and future viewers) that it was him who assaulted his 
work colleague. These close-ups filmed by the operators themselves provide an 
intimacy that would not be present if there was another camera operator or 
character present in the shot. Most revealingly, Judith sets up the camera in her 
room in order to practice her manner of behaving in front of Claire. These private 
moments are only supposed to be seen by Judith herself when she plays them back 
and therefore the viewer is given a privileged insight into this character’s 
insecurity and how she wishes to be seen by others.  
 
The creators of home videos are less likely to go out in search of danger than 
professional (or even amateur or student) documentary makers. In Cloverfield, 
Hud is driven to keep filming for posterity and his desire to ensure the curiosity of 
his intended future audience is satisfied, but he is also trying escape the monster. 
In home videos, the threat usually comes to the victims. In Paranormal Activity, 
Micah is more determined to capture evidence, even if that means putting his 
girlfriend at risk. He may not go out in search of the danger, but he taunts the 
demon by shouting at it and he also goes out and purchases a Ouija board, in order 
to try and make contact with it. Hud’s camerawork suggests a character that is 
trying to evade a threat and therefore only catches glimpses of the monster, 
whereas Micah’s camerawork suggests a character actively attempting to capture 
and therefore confront a ghost. 
 
The camera operators of home videos are also by definition more amateur than the 
documentary-making characters. This means that cinematography can frequently 
be more stylised and meant to look less carefully considered than in other 
examples of diegetic camera films. In Cloverfield, Hud’s cinematography is often 
incredibly hectic, as he is running for his life or being attacked. Hud generally 
does not stop filming the monster; instead, he catches very brief glimpses before 
turning and running the other way. In the subway tunnels in Cloverfield, not only 
does the darkness make it difficult for the audience to see what is happening, but 
the attack of the small creatures also mean that the camera is more active as Hud 
132 
 
is flailing around, concentrating on fighting off the creatures. Just like Hud does 
in the tunnel, Judith uses night vision in Exhibit A in order to be able to film her 
father smoking in the garden. Andy then uses this same mode to film his family 
when he has cut the electricity in the house. Thus the film’s switch to a green tint 
that makes profilmic events visible in the pitch-black darkness, but is not as 
effective as traditional lighting for filming in the darkness. However, it does 
reveal the determination of the camera operators to capture their subjects even 
without optimal filming conditions. Furthermore, night time and reduced vision 
will increase the mood of dread. 
 
The home video camera operators are identifiable by their exaggerated amateur 
filming techniques that add to the mediated realism. Aspects of the 
cinematography are recognisable to many viewers from genuine home videos. 
Short bursts of filming accompanied by abrupt cuts suggest the excitement that 
comes with carrying a camera at a party for instance, where events grab an 
operator’s attention for brief moments but the character is clearly not giving their 
full concentration to filming. The amateur may miss the start of conversations or 
events and then get bored of filming them before they end. They may be amused 
by the camera and their own ability to record. For example, Judith experiments 
with the camera’s visual settings while filming herself and looking at her own 
face on the camera’s viewfinder screen. Similarly, whereas a professional operator 
like Pablo in Rec is unafraid to get as close to the action as possible, the distance 
from which amateurs film their subjects can also be telling. Judith films Claire 
from afar as she is shy. When Rob has to tell his mother that his brother Jason is 
dead, Hud also films from afar, demonstrating not only a lack of professional 
commitment to capturing the emotions of his subject in close-up, but also his 
inability to express his sympathy for his friend. In this case, we are more likely to 
empathise with the emotions of the off-screen Hud, than with the sad emotions of 
the on-screen Rob. The camera’s position has become a stimuli that the viewer 
uses to process the off-screen performance of the character. In figure 5.1, we can 
interpret and imagine Hud’s desire to offer Rob privacy. Hud is a considerable 
distance from his subject and films from a slightly low angle. There is an object in 
the lower third of the frame that suggests Hud is positioned behind this object. He 
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is also to the left side of Rob and not in Rob’s eye line. His camerawork is not 
driven by a desperate need to acquire the specific information contained in the 
conversation between Rob and his mother on the phone, but instead his 
camerawork suggests a camera-operating character demonstrating concern for his 
bereaved friend, but providing his friend the space he needs for privacy. He is 
watching his friend, but not from an intrusive position. Hud films this shot 
primarily to get his audience to feel for Rob, but the shot reveals Hud’s feelings as 
well. 
 
COPYRIGHTED IMAGE REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
Figure 5.1: Hud films Rob from a discrete distance (Cloverfield). 
 
5.2 Alignment of information accumulation and cognitive and bodily 
response 
 
Much of the camerawork in the home video category of films suggests that the 
camera operator is attempting to systematically acquire information about 
profilmic events and, as a result of this, this information is received by the viewer 
as well. Our vision is aligned with the operator’s vision. If the operator chooses to 
film something, we gain some visual knowledge of the object. If the operator’s 
point of view of the object is limited by his or her position, then our own 
knowledge will be limited. This epistemological alignment will have an impact on 
the viewer’s empathy for these characters. Furthermore, said alignment might 
affect not just the emotions of the viewer but also the bodily responses of both 
camera operator and viewer when they are startled by something, for example, 
that appears suddenly in front of the lens and on the screen. Here, we can see that 
the startled bodily response is linked to the emotion of being shocked or surprised. 
When a diegetic camera operator is shocked, the cinematography reflects this 
character’s shock, and the camera movement itself may cause the viewer to be 
startled more so than if the object that shocked a character was captured by a static 
camera operated by an extra-diegetic operator that remains unaffected by the 
object. 
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In Cloverfield, it is mainly Hud who is systematically attempting to acquire 
information by wielding the camera. Having Hud hold the camera limits the 
spectator’s knowledge of what is happening in Manhattan to what Hud captures. 
Generally, our knowledge is exactly the same as his knowledge, except that he 
can see more than what is captured through the lens of the camera. In that sense, 
our vision of the diegesis is restricted to only what is captured, whereas he can use 
his eyes to look around and see more of what is off-screen. However, despite this 
discrepancy between our (and the camera’s) vision and Hud’s own vision, we 
learn things as he does; the only exception being when it is revealed that Hud does 
not know that Rob and Beth have slept together. As viewers, and because our 
vision is aligned with the camera that had already previously recorded Rob and 
Beth’s morning in bed together, we were privileged witnesses to events that the 
camera recorded. This is significant as it makes Rob’s investment in saving Beth 
more intense for the viewer. However, from the moment that Hud takes control of 
the camera, we learn about the events in the diegesis as he learns. For example, 
when the first impact of the monster’s presence is felt in Manhattan, the camera 
and its microphone capture an audible rumble and the sight of the lights of many 
buildings going out. We are ‘trapped’ with the vision of Hud’s camera as he and 
his friends watch the television news, race to the roof of the building and then 
escape the building. It is telling that Hud spends significant time filming the 
television screens he finds in a store, as these screens show images of the monster 
from the privileged vantage point of a television camera in a helicopter. This is 
the only opportunity for the real enunciator to show any other perspective on the 
profilmic events apart from Hud’s camera’s perspective. The real enunciator has 
fake enunciator Hud rely on a further diegetic narrator (a news programme camera 
operator) to reveal the kind of footage of the monster that Hud cannot capture. 
What is achieved by this double framing is the effect of further mediated realism. 
If the camera operator wishes to find out more about the events that are occurring 
in the diegesis, then their attention would naturally turn to the news media. 
Cloverfield is a film that allows for object-oriented fear as eventually there are 
some relatively clear glimpses of the monster from Hud’s POV, not just glimpses 
of the monster on the television screens that Hud films. When we see the monster 
on the television screens, we know there is no immediate need to fear for the 
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camera operator, but when Hud captures the monster itself on-screen, there is a 
more immediate fear for him. The monster is revealed to Hud in the same way 
that it is revealed to us and we learn about its appearance in the same manner as 
him, making us more able to empathise with his awe and fear.  
 
In Exhibit A, the camera is often in the hands of Judith, the daughter of the King 
family. Though her brother and father take the camera out of her hands at some 
points, it is mainly Judith’s POV the viewer is aligned with. She is often peering 
around corners and spying on her family and others from a distance, therefore 
never giving the audience a privileged or ideal view on a scene. However, while 
some of what is in the frame might be obscured due to her hidden position, Judith 
is comparable to Hud in her determination to understand what is happening in the 
diegesis. To some extent Hud is trying to give his imagined future viewers a 
glimpse of the monster, while Judith is trying to find out the reasons why her 
father is behaving strangely. We learn about Judith’s father’s financial problems 
as she does. She films the lottery tickets in a dustbin bag and captures her father’s 
face in close up when it is revealed that he has to find a large sum of money 
within a few days. Because of her camera-operating position, we are more likely 
to empathise with Judith’s concern for her father than empathise with her father’s 
own stress and anxiety. We accumulate information as she does and this means 
that our minds process the new information through a lens of how Judith will be 
feeling. We do not feel as though we are Andy’s daughter and mimic Judith’s 
responses the new information, but due to our access to, and alignment with 
Judith, we are encouraged to imaginatively project ourselves into her situation. 
Because of Judith’s careful filming of her father’s face, we are also focussed on 
his reactions which means Judith and the viewer knows more about how Andy 
really feels than the rest of his oblivious family members that are not seeing a 
privileged view of his face in close up. 
 
In Paranormal Activity, it is mostly Micah that does the filming, but his partner 
Katie also holds the camera on occasion. The spectator sees much of the events 
from Micah’s POV as he investigates his house for the source of strange noises. 
Significant sections of the film are also filmed from the perspective of the camera 
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which has been set up on a tripod in the corner of the couple’s bedroom to give 
them, and the viewer, a privileged view of what is occurring during the night 
while they sleep. While the viewer is often forced to search the frame (particularly 
in darkness) as the characters search for evidence of what taunts them, the camera 
remains static overnight, making the process of searching the singular framing of 
the room for movement easier than the hectic camerawork in Cloverfield. On the 
other hand, the static single shot limits our vision in terms of the number of 
angles, positions, distances or focal range that an extra-diegetic narrator could 
employ. There may be no distinct object that is visible and promotes object-
oriented fear, but there are enough strange occurrences such as the bed sheets 
being moved by an invisible force that are caught on camera that will make fear a 
likely response to the film. This positioning of the camera overnight also means 
that there is a disconnect between characters’ knowledge of events and the 
viewer’s. While the characters, including Micah, are asleep our knowledge of 
what is occurring in the diegesis is greater than theirs. This lack of perceptual and 
epistemological alignment moves us away from empathy and more towards a 
sympathetic fear for the couple who we can see are in danger but who are not 
aware of it until they watch back the footage on the tape. This is resonant of the 
traditional narration of horror where the viewer is aware of danger when 
characters may not be. 
 
Even without a camera operator behind the camera in these scenes, having the 
origin of the vision being a diegetic camera still leads to a startled response when 
the camera itself is attacked. In the final shot of Paranormal Activity, Micah’s 
lifeless body is thrown at the camera and knocks it over. In this shot, we have no 
knowledge of what is happening outside of the bedroom as the diegetic camera is 
positioned inside the bedroom and beyond the door of the room is only darkness 
(fig. 5.2). Katie had been audible screaming earlier thus leading Micah out of the 
room without the camera. The silence and the static shot continues and there is no 
new audio or visual information until Micah is suddenly launched from the dark 
space beyond the door frame into the camera (fig. 5.3). The viewer is likely to 
have an involuntary startled response here because of the epistemological 
alignment with the camera. Though the camera itself does not have the capacity to 
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be startled, it does move its position when it is hit by the body and then falls to the 
floor (fig. 5.4). By having the origin of our vision in the diegesis disturbed, we are 
startled. Despite our possible previous hypothesising, it is only after this 
movement that it is confirmed that Katie has probably killed Micah as she is 
visible in the door frame with blood on her shirt. Again, because the death of 
Micah occurs outside of the frame where Micah has set up the camera, we must 
imagine off-camera space beyond the door frame to hypothesise about what is 
occurring in the diegesis. This heightens dread as the viewer is imagining possible 
scenarios and fears what s/he is about to find out. 
 
IMAGES REMOVED ROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
Figures 5.2 - 5.4: Micah is thrown at the camera, knocking it to the floor (Paranormal 
Activity). 
 
There are several other more visceral examples of this in Cloverfield when Hud is 
attacked while holding the camera. In these cases, Hud’s startled reaction to new 
stimuli in his vision is reflected in the cinematography and the viewer is likely to 
be in turn startled by both. For example as Hud is flying over the city, he 
witnesses and films the smoke that has erupted from explosions caused by bombs 
dropped on the monster. His audible reaction from off-screen is one of elation as 
he films the smoke, clearly believing that the monster has been destroyed. 
Moments later, the monster leaps from the smoke and hits the helicopter that Hud 
is in, causing him to silence his exclamations and move the camera abruptly and 
most likely involuntarily. The viewer of this is likely to have a similarly startled 
reaction as the monster and rapid camera movement are both unexpected new 
visual stimuli. As illustrated in figures 5.5 and 5.6, the monster emerges so rapidly 
from below the large cloud of smoke that it is barely discernible visually, but the 
response of the operator (both audio and visual) confirms its presence for the 
viewer. Therefore, the epistemological alignment with the camera can create a 
similar response from both viewer and operator because of the interaction between 
the operator and the profilmic events. 
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  IMAGES REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
Figures 5.5 and 5.6: The monster emerges so rapidly from below the large cloud of smoke 
that it is barely discernible visually (Cloverfield). 
 
5.3 Interaction with the viewer 
 
In the home movie category, there are many characters that choose to directly 
address the camera and, by extension, the viewer of the footage. In these films, the 
subject is more likely to have a personal relationship with someone that s/he 
intends to view the footage. In this section, I will examine how the viewer is 
engaged in this type of communication in Cloverfield, Exhibit A and Paranormal 
Activity. I will also consider who exactly the viewer is imagined to be by the 
characters, and how this affects the actual viewer’s cognition of the films.  
 
Firstly, in Cloverfield many characters share their testimonials that are intended 
for Rob to take away with him and watch in the future after he moves to Japan. 
These characters address the camera directly and have a very specific viewer in 
mind. For example, Lily looks directly into the camera (fig. 5.8) and says ‘I think 
of you as a brother, and I hope you think of me as a sister’. This message reveals 
that Lily is using the camera as a tool of communication, looking into its lens with 
a specific intention to address Rob. She imagines the future viewer watching the 
footage as being Rob only. The actual viewer does not imagine being Rob and 
receiving this message, but feels an increased engagement in the events taking 
place and sympathy for Lily who appears to be using the camera as confidant as 
well as a communication device. Lily’s gaze into the lens gives the impression of 
eye contact with the viewer (Rob), and we are given a sense of immediacy, as 
though we are seeing the footage at the moment of its recording. This is a message 
she may not feel comfortable giving to Rob in person and it is easy to imagine that 
it helps Lily to know that the use of the camera provides temporal distance 
between delivering the message to Rob and him receiving it. This is easy to 
empathise with for many viewers as they will be aware that speaking to a camera 
lens is a different experience to speaking (emotionally, personally and directly) to 
someone with whom you are making eye contact. This is in part due to 
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confessional conventions of vlogging and reality television. The viewer feels as 
s/he is intercepting a personal message during the temporal jump between the 
recording of the footage and Rob’s viewing of it. The viewer may also be 
encouraged to imagine what it would be like for Rob to receive this message after 
he has moved to Japan and how that would feel. This perhaps leads us to 
empathise more with Rob; he is the protagonist and he has made the decision to 
leave all of his friends for a new life in Japan. Throughout the testimonials when 
the camera is being directly addressed, we are more likely to imagine Rob as the 
future viewer, rather than Hud as the present camera operator. However, this is 
instantly reversed when the characters on screen finish giving their messages to 
Rob and then revert to directing their gazes beyond the camera to Hud (figs. 5.9 
and 5.10) who is now relegated to the off-screen space behind the camera. This 
small shift in eye line (compare figs. 5.7 and 5.9) reminds the viewer that Hud is 
the current viewer of the footage as he is recording it with the diegetic camera. 
Here, the viewer returns to imagining Hud in off-screen space. 
 
  IMAGES REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
   
Figures 5.7 - 5.10: Jason and Lily both shift their gaze depending on whether they are 
communicating with Rob, the imagined future viewer, or Hud, the current camera operator 
(Cloverfield). 
 
When the intended audience is acknowledged in these films, the imagined future 
viewer is usually someone that the subjects know. At Rob’s party in Cloverfield, 
the profilmic subjects are talking to Rob who they know will take the tape away; 
but later, when Hud is filming the disaster in New York, he is uncertain about 
who exactly will watch the footage, and therefore he is communicating with his 
unspecified imagined future viewer from behind the camera. He may not have a 
specific viewer in mind, but he is aware that there will be people that will want ‘to 
see how it all went down’, leading the viewer to imagine who might watch this 
footage (we know from the titles that the government has possession of it), or at 
least who Hud might imagine will watch the footage.  
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In Exhibit A, Judith often communicates with a very specific imagined future 
viewer from behind the camera. Judith seems to hope that Claire, the girl she 
likes, will one day see the footage. She films Claire and leaves quiet messages for 
her, for example when she whispers ‘we’re thinking of moving. Can’t believe it... 
as soon as you move in here’. She also leaves messages for her father, such as ‘I 
want to help’ and ‘I need to show you how much you’ve changed’. When Judith 
films her subjects, she does so from a distance so that the subjects do not know 
that she is filming them and cannot hear her words. We are the privileged viewers 
that hear her thoughts that she speaks aloud (similar to traditional voiceover 
narration), and the words that she would like to say to others but cannot. Because 
the origin of her point of view is distanced from her subjects, we imagine where 
Judith is; usually hidden indoors behind a window while her subjects are outside 
(figs. 5.11 and 5.12). Her voice reminds us of her presence and encourages us to 
imagine where she is standing in relation to the people that she films; the people 
with whom she uses the diegetic camera to communicate. Later when Andy is 
holding the camera, he tells his family that he loves them, again hoping that they 
will one day see the footage. The camera is a means of communicating and more 
specifically of saying things that characters are too afraid to say directly to others. 
While this occurs, we receive privileged access to the private thoughts of the 
camera operators and increased empathy with them. 
 
IMAGES REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
Figures 5.11 and 5.12: Judith films from inside while her subjects are outside (Exhibit A). 
 
Despite this clear awareness of having an audience, the characters also sometimes 
use the camera as a surrogate confidant. Whether they are considering who will 
watch the footage or not, some characters find that talking to the camera is a 
means of expressing how they really feel, without having to reveal these thoughts 
to an actual person. In the home video category, it is often the camera operators 
who reveal their thoughts from behind the camera. For example, Hud mutters to 
himself in Cloverfield, ‘no one ever listens to me ever’. Both he, and then later 
Rob and Beth, turn the camera on themselves (figs 5.13 and 5.14) in attempts to 
leave a kind of final message for the future viewer of the tape. In Exhibit A, Andy 
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also uses the camera to deliver some final words of love for his family before he 
dies. The camera is the keeper (and then later distributor) of secrets and Andy 
uses it to admit that it was he who earlier attacked his co-worker. He even asks the 
camera: ‘Happy now?’ after murdering his daughter. So central has the diegetic 
camera become to the plot and the family’s communication that Andy even 
blames it for making his son hate him, his daughter betray him and his wife give 
up on him. His actions are motivated by Judith’s earlier use of the camera. The 
footage of her father that she has captured previously has subsequently been 
screened to a party full of guests, including all of the family members. He now 
blames the camera for revealing his secrets. We feel like privileged witnesses, but 
do not share a killer’s desire to murder his family. Perhaps, his use of the diegetic 
camera can increase our sympathy for Andy because we have a privileged insight 
into how he feels about his family. 
 
  IMAGES REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
 
Figures 5.13 and 5.14: Hud and Rob turn the camera on themselves (Cloverfield). 
 
Similarly, in Paranormal Activity and Exhibit A, there are other points when both 
Micah and Andy talk to the camera as if it were a character. Rather than 
imagining a future viewer or the off-screen camera operator, we imagine the off-
screen camera itself. For example, Micah asks the camera if it is okay and if it has 
enough batteries (fig. 5.15), treating his new toy like a pet. Andy’s attitude 
towards his family camera is much bitterer: he tells it that it works for the family 
and even insults it by saying: ‘No one else will listen to me so now it’s your turn, 
you one-eyed little fucker’ (fig. 5.16). The cameras are hubs of family activity as 
there is always a character that enjoys using the camera and capturing important 
moments in the family’s life. The viewer must therefore imagine the camera’s 
presence in order to comprehend the scenes. When a character like Micah or Andy 
addresses the camera itself, there is no need to imagine a future viewer, but only 
the actual piece of technology itself and where it is positioned in the diegesis. The 
viewer does not imagine what it is like to be the camera, nor does s/he empathise 
or sympathise with the camera. In these cases, the camera operator has positioned 
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the camera away from the eyes of any of the characters, and therefore we are not 
sharing the point of view of anything except the camera. Our perception is aligned 
with the camera, and as it is conceived of as the only current viewer, we do not 
imagine ourselves being directly addressed despite the eye contact that seems to 
occur due to the character’s gaze into the lens. This makes the viewer imagine the 
camera and its position, but allows us to focus on the subject on-screen, rather 
than imagining the actions of an off-screen operator. For these moments, we are 
perceptually aligned with the camera as a prop, but are learning about the on-
screen subject. 
 
  IMAGES REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
Figures 5.15 and 5.16: Micah and Andy address the cameras directly (Paranormal Activity 
and Exhibit A). 
 
These moments when a camera operator puts the camera down or turns the camera 
around to film themselves are more common in the home video category than in 
other diegetic camera films. For example, Judith practices saying ‘hi’ to the 
camera (fig. 5.17) in order to impress Claire. In Paranormal Activity, Micah sets 
the camera up every night to film him and Katie in bed (fig. 5.18). In these cases, 
we must imagine the camera and its position in the diegesis, but also that the 
future viewer is likely only to be Judith or Micah who are filming themselves only 
to watch back the footage themselves. We do not necessarily imagine these 
characters watching their own footage in future, but we must imagine that this is 
the purpose of the footage and for this reason, we feel privileged that we are 
watching footage that has not been intended for an audience to watch. Like 
Cloverfield’s governmental warning, this footage is forbidden. This can have an 
impact on our emotions about the characters, particularly in the case of Judith 
where we can sympathise with her lack of confidence. 
 
  IMAGES REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
Figures 5.17 and 5.18: Cameras are set up by characters to film themselves (Exhibit A and 
Paranormal Activity). 
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In both Paranormal Activity and Cloverfield, there are times when we do not need 
to imagine that the camera operator will one day watch the footage back as this 
process is explicitly dramatised. In Cloverfield, Hud replays the first sighting of 
the monster for a crowd on the street, whereas in Paranormal Activity, Micah 
uploads the footage to his computer and watches it back for evidence of the 
paranormal activity he hopes to capture. This is necessarily presented differently 
in both films. In Cloverfield, because Hud is using the camera’s LCD viewfinder 
screen, the viewer misses the moment of seeing people gather around the camera 
for a glimpse at the monster. The moment when  Hud stops recording is signalled 
by a cut to Rob and Beth on their Coney Island trip, which was on the card before 
Hud started filming. When it cuts back to the scene on the street, it can be 
interpreted that Hud has rewound the footage, screened it for the people around 
him and he is now recording again. Here the viewer is left to imagine what 
happens in the temporal jump between Hud saying that he has the monster on the 
tape, the shot of Rob and Beth, and the cut back to the street. The viewer has to 
imagine that the camera has a tape being recorded over, thus justifying the Rob 
and Beth flashback, but must also imagine the moment with the people on the 
street actually watching the footage. Here we feel less privileged than in a 
traditional film, as the employment of the diegetic camera device means that we 
cannot see something of interest (the people watching the footage). However, in 
Paranormal Activity, because Micah has taken the card out of the camera and 
uploaded the footage to his computer, the viewer then gets to watch him watching 
back the footage. Either way, the audience is aware that the characters within the 
film can watch the footage, which is a part of the diegesis and can now affect the 
narrative. For example, capturing the monster or footage of the ghostly activity 
spurs both camera operators on to keep filming. This heightens the mediated 
realism of the films as the footage captured is afforded the status of evidence by 
the characters. We are to imagine that the footage is not only visible to the non-
diegetic audience, but it is also central to the character’s knowledge of the 
diegesis.  
 
Though the home video category films do not have formal presenters as in Rec 
and The Blair Witch Project, the amateur filmmakers in home videos often take 
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on the role of a surrogate presenter. This is their chance to present themselves to a 
wider audience of whoever they imagine might watch their footage in the future. 
At the end of Cloverfield, Rob explains what has occurred so far, gives the time 
and date, and introduces himself to camera (see fig.5.14 ). This is Rob being 
formal and emphasising the mediated realism by grounding events in a specific 
time. He knows that he is in the middle of a huge catastrophe and that if someone 
finds the footage, it might be of great importance. Here we feel privileged again 
that the character in the diegesis recognises that there is a viewer. If we imagine 
that the film is real, as a sensitive viewer that wants to play the film’s game would 
do, then we are the finder of the footage and we can imagine that Rob’s words as 
enunciator have reached us from the past. 
 
Due to the footage being intended for a limited, intimate and personal audience of 
only other family members, some of the characters are willing to act foolishly. 
Part of this is the fake presenting that Andy does in Exhibit A. Andy’s fake 
presenting and his direct address to camera are often supposed to be amusing and 
engaging for the audience, such as when Andy puts on glasses, a fake beard and 
holds a spoon to his mouth as if it is a microphone (fig. 5.19). The idea of making 
his ordinary domestic life more interesting and his attempts to represent himself as 
a fun-loving father figure are exaggerated by the presence of the camera. This 
references the convention of TV reporters directly addressing the camera and 
emphasises that the characters are aware that they are subjects of a camera’s gaze 
and creators of a “real” media text. In Exhibit A, the family even try to set up an 
accident for ‘You’ve Been Framed’, the television show where viewers send in 
their amusing home video clips. The references to film and television also extend 
to the character’s attempting to make their home videos more exciting by adopting 
certain other conventions of the movies. For instance, when Joe is filming his 
family members chasing each other, he can be heard making fast-paced exciting 
music with his mouth, to accompany the chase. 
 
IMAGE REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
Figure 5.19: Andy puts on glasses, a fake beard and holds a spoon to his mouth as if it is a 
microphone (Exhibit A). 
145 
 
 
Despite the fact that these films all begin as home videos, their characters still 
show awareness that other people could watch the footage and a certain amount of 
shyness when confronted by a camera. In Cloverfield, Beth worries that the 
footage of her in bed could end up on the Internet, while Katie in Paranormal 
Activity does not explicitly state her concerns, but always rebuffs Micah’s sexual 
advances on camera. In Exhibit A, Judith is concerned about her father playing 
back the footage in front of a party full of people, as only she is aware of the full 
contents and the secrets contained on the tape. All of these instances encourage 
the viewer to imagine other ways that this footage could be used and abused. This 
also reminds the viewer of their privileged position as voyeur; someone who is 
supposedly watching footage that s/he is not supposed to be seeing. 
 
The characters in Cloverfield are the most acutely aware that they have stumbled 
into the middle of something truly incredible and horrific. The home video of a 
farewell party becomes a newsworthy amateur recording of an apocalyptic event 
where thousands of people die due to the destruction in the city. Hud very clearly 
recognises this, stating ‘people are gonna wanna know how it all went down’ and 
‘people are gonna watch this’, referring to his footage as an important article that 
will need to be shared with the world. We are frequently reminded that Hud has a 
wide audience in mind for the footage and in our minds, we are a part of that 
audience that Hud has imagined. Therefore, we can imagine that we are a part of 
the diegesis, connected to Hud by his desire to share the footage with the world. 
 
Micah in Paranormal Activity and Andy and Judith in Exhibit A have no clear 
intentions of sharing their footage with anybody. Judith may address her narration 
to Claire, but she is unlikely to ever show the other girl the footage. On the other 
hand, Andy is keen to ensure that the curiosity of his family is satisfied by 
revealing all their secret belongings to the camera. It is interesting that Andy uses 
other forms of visual media as proof of his family members’ secrets. The photos 
of Claire, Joe’s video of a sex act that he recorded on his own phone and finally a 
photo of an ultrasound scan that reveals that his wife had a third baby that she 
aborted. This double framing is where the camera is considered to be the ultimate 
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tool of proof, providing evidence of facts that cannot be questioned, although 
Andy still manages to misread the ultrasound, thinking that it is not of an aborted 
child, but an ultrasound of his son Joe. The viewer imagines that the footage is 
just one more piece of visual proof like the photos and the phone video in the 
diegesis, but is also reminded that photographic evidence can be misleading and 
can be misread. This employment of photographic evidence adds to the mediated 
realism as we are encouraged to interpret footage and photos as authentic 
documents, like the diegetic camera footage itself. However, we also become 
increasingly aware that while the footage has clearly been made with a viewer in 
mind, it is subjective and is in many ways skewed by the presence of the camera 
operator. 
 
 
5.4 Interaction between camera operators and profilmic subjects 
 
In the home movie category, the cameras’ presence in the diegesis is also 
emphasised by the camera operators’ lack of objective distance from the on-screen 
proceedings. The operator is likely to be audible as s/he interacts with the people 
s/he films. At the same time, the camera is also more likely to change hands than 
in any of the other types of film. For example, in Cloverfield, the camera changes 
hands from Rob to Beth to Jason to Hud within the opening scenes of the film. 
Similarly, in Exhibit A, the mother is the only person in the family who does not 
hold the camera, meaning that it ranges from being in the hands of Judith, Andy 
and Joe at various points. This means that the camera operator and profilmic 
subjects can often switch positions between being on and off-screen. The viewer 
does not have to expend as much mental energy remembering what the camera 
operator looks like, because they are more likely to have seen the character 
recently. It also makes imagining the character holding the camera easier for the 
viewer, than if we rarely or even never see the camera operator. Though we may 
spend less mental energy remembering the character because of their obvious 
presence in the diegesis, we are more likely to imagine them behind the camera. 
In turn, we are more likely to interpret the footage as specifically the operator’s 
(often subjective) point of view. In terms of recognition, alignment, and 
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allegiance, the recognition of a character being constructed behind the camera is 
clearer because they are more often visible and audible, but our alignment with 
the point of view of characters might shift rapidly. When the camera changes 
hands, we often see what Branigan calls a retrospective POV shot. This is what 
Burch calls off-screen space becoming concrete. For example in the sequence 
below (see figs 5.20 to 5.22) from Cloverfield, the camera is taken from Rob’s 
hands by Beth. In the first shot, we see Rob’s POV of Beth and the following shot 
begins with part of a hand covering the lens of the camera before the camera is 
positioned in the hands of the new operator and we now see Beth’s POV of Rob. 
The hand obscuring some of the frame acts as a reframing as we can literally 
imagine that Beth is holding the camera and positioning it more carefully in her 
hands so that she can film Rob from her point of view. This is an example of what 
Branigan defines retrospective POV shot structure as we know the identity of the 
character whose point of view we have shared confirmed for us when the 
point/glance shot is revealed after the point/object shot. In the case of Cloverfield, 
the point/glance shot that reveals Rob’s face is also a new POV shot, this time of 
Beth’s POV. The shot of Rob also makes what was previously off-screen space 
and imagined by the viewer, now concrete as we no longer need to imagine Rob 
behind the camera. Rob’s voice is also audible in both shots in the sequence 
which means there is a continuity of audio from Rob’s off-screen voice through to 
seeing him on-screen and hearing his words in the second shot. 
 
IMAGES REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
Figures 5.20 - 5.22: The camera is passed from Rob to Beth (Cloverfield). 
 
This kind of camera operation is also a clear indication of how the 
cinematography is often more amateurish than in any of the other categories of 
diegetic camera film. In no traditional fiction film would the viewer be made 
aware that the camera operator is changing. Even most non-fiction media products 
would not have the camera being passed from operator to operator and this is why 
the interaction of the camera operator with the profilmic subjects is an excellent 
cue to enhance the mediated realism of these films and to ensure the viewer’s 
imagining of off-screen space. Only in a home video would such switching of 
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viewpoints between operators be considered typical. Another example of amateur 
camera operation is when the operators occasionally reach out from behind the 
camera, so that their hands become visible in the frame as they interact with 
people or props. In Exhibit A, when Judith films the belongings in her room, she 
reaches out to pick up a shell and holds it up for the camera. In Cloverfield Rob 
throws food at Beth as he films her. In these cases, personal imagining is strongest 
as we imagine seeing from the POV of the character, and we have that character 
breaching the edge of the frame with a part of their body. The off-screen character 
must be imagined in order for what is seen on screen to make sense to the viewer. 
This is typical of the horror genre, in particular the use of the POV shot in slasher 
films that encourages the viewer to imagine that the killer is watching potential 
victims. 
 
This imagining of the off-screen character is also strongly supported when the 
camera operator is involved in conflict or decision making with the profilmic 
subjects. At these times, there is also the possibility of increased empathy with the 
camera operator. The best examples of this are not in the home movie category of 
films, but in the segments of The Blair Witch Project where the protagonists have 
largely forgotten about filming a documentary and are in essence now only 
filming a home video of their time lost in the woods. In the scenes where the three 
student filmmakers cannot find the map that they have been relying upon to get 
them out of the woods, the camera is first used by Josh to interrogate Heather. In 
this shot (that has a duration of over one and a half minutes) Josh questions 
Heather about the whereabouts of the map, and Heather also questions Josh. 
Heather is the profilmic subject captured in a medium shot (fig.5.23), whereas 
Josh is the off-screen, but audible, camera operator throughout the shot. Although 
Heather is the subject and it is her performance that we witness on screen, it is not 
Heather that we empathise most with here. Josh’s voice as he questions Heather 
and persistently claims that he does not have the map permeates the mind of the 
viewer more forcefully than the visuals. The way that Josh has targeted Heather 
with his gaze and refuses to stop filming for a minute and a half and his persistent 
voice from off-camera adds to our understanding and recognition of Josh as a 
character and we may even feel more allegiance with him as he voices his 
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concerns. This is because we have more access to his feelings than we do to 
Heather’s. 
 
Similarly, in a scene a few minutes further into the film, Heather holds the camera 
when Mike admits to kicking the map into a creek. This is another shot that lasts 
for roughly a minute and a half and although Mike and Josh are on screen, it is 
clearly with Heather that the viewer will feel most allegiance. Her camerawork is 
less stable than Josh’s in the previous shot discussed and her tone from off camera 
turns to screaming and crying. As she screams at Mike, she cannot even keep the 
camera on his face (fig. 5.24), demonstrating her fury. Not only do we feel a 
moral allegiance with her due to the fact that Mike has done something stupid and 
dangerous; it is her persistent dialogue from off-screen and the frantic 
cinematography that aids in our allegiance and empathy with her. This 
demonstrates the importance not only of point-of-view shots, sound and off-
screen space to the viewer’s cognition of diegetic camera films, but also how 
important the specific interactions are of those that are behind and in front of the 
cameras. 
 
  IMAGES REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
Figure 5.23: Heather is the profilmic subject captured in a medium shot, whereas Josh is the 
off-screen, but audible camera operator throughout the shot (The Blair Witch Project). 
Figure 5.24: As Heather screams at Mike, she cannot keep the camera on his face (The Blair 
Witch Project). 
 
There are other examples where, due to the camera operator’s interaction with 
profilmic characters, we are more likely to empathise with the operators. Judith 
uses the camera and its viewfinder to show her father what he looks like when he 
starts behaving strangely at a barbeque. Filming Andy’s face, Judith tells him to 
look at himself. The viewer recognises that she is flipping the viewfinder as 
Andy’s eyes move slightly to the left of the lens so that he can see himself. She 
uses this live recording footage to try to make him see that he is acting manically 
in front of the barbeque guests. This interaction through the diegetic camera is 
intimate between father and daughter. Even though Andy is the profilmic subject, 
150 
 
it is Judith (the off-screen camera operator) with who the audience more strongly 
empathise as she feels concern for her father. 
 
The camera operators in home videos are more likely to be noticeably involved in 
events. They are not objective documentary makers to be ignored by the 
characters on screen, but instead they are insider members of a group; whether 
that be a family or friends. Therefore, their interactions with the other characters 
and the events depicted are increased and it is easier to recognise them as 
constructed characters. Micah and Katie are a couple and take it in turns using the 
camera. Hud is part of a group of friends and while he does most of the filming, 
others also get times when they use the camera. Similarly in Exhibit A, three 
family members share the task of filming. The ease with which the camera can be 
moved from one character to another shows the informality of the productions and 
the transient nature of the fake enunciator. The camera-operating characters 
become more identifiable due to their shifting roles in the diegeses. Perceptual 
identification becomes stronger when the POV is shared between viewer and 
camera operator and also when that operator interacts with the other subjects on 
screen. This is most notable with Hud in Cloverfield as he engages with other 
characters and the extraordinary events unfolding around him. The camera falls as 
he falls and when people run from the Brooklyn Bridge, Hud is amongst them. 
Though we may not see his terror, it is imprinted on the camerawork, the audio 
and the editing as he runs for his life. He is more participant than observer. 
Similarly, when Andy takes the camera towards the end of Exhibit A, it is his hand 
the spectator sees emerging from behind the camera to set off the smoke alarm in 
the house. While the viewer may not feel allegiance with Andy because of his 
actions, they get a deeper understanding of him as he stands in the dark of his 
house, filming his family with night vision and desperately attempting to make 
them realise why he is behaving this way. So integral and integrated are the 
camera operators to the groups that they film, that their footage is often replayed 
for the subjects on screen. The desire to watch and share footage immediately is 
an increasingly recognisable trait in contemporary media culture with the 
prevalence of YouTube and social media and this adds to the mediated realism of 
the films. 
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5.5 Empathy, affective identification, and allegiance with camera operators 
 
The audience feels a strong sense of empathy with camera operators Hud in 
Cloverfield, Judith in Exhibit A and Katie in Paranormal Activity due to their 
almost overwhelming imprint on the film. Hud and Judith are persistent talkers. 
They reveal what they are thinking frequently from off-screen while holding the 
cameras. Hud’s fear and awe are all clear from his camera movements, his audible 
screams, and his talking as if to himself, but really for the camera. Hud makes it 
clear that he wants the world to see his footage as he imprints his feelings over the 
audio and visuals. This is clearly his document and his experience of the monster 
attack. As a result, it is very difficult for the viewer to forget that Hud stands as 
the enunciator and that he is present in the diegesis. His voice requires us to 
imagine him behind the camera. It also means that, regardless of what Hud is 
capturing with his camera, our empathy often lies with him as his feelings 
overwhelm the performance and visible emotions of those he films. We are 
constantly getting a privileged insight into the minds of the vocal camera 
operators. 
 
Judith also makes her feelings very clear. Unlike Hud, she hopes that no one will 
ever see her footage, except perhaps the object of her affections. Judith has strong 
feelings for Claire, but instead of revealing her emotions to her, she addresses 
Claire through the camera, secure that Claire will never view that tape. However, 
Judith’s love/lust is clear from her zooming in on Claire and it is easy for the 
viewer to affectively identify with Judith’s sense of longing. Though the spectator 
may not be in allegiance with Judith as they may question the decision to film a 
girl without her permission, the spectator will be able to empathise with Judith’s 
longing through her use of the camera. Later, she is sad that the family will be 
moving and then feels concern for her father’s deterioration, and because she talks 
to the camera about this, the audience gets a privileged insight into her feelings, 
helping the viewer to share those emotions.  
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In Paranormal Activity, Micah is much less open about his feelings and so is 
harder to affectively identify with. Katie on the other hand may not control the 
camera as often as Micah but is more open with her emotions and therefore easier 
to empathise with. Her failure to cope with what is happening in the house makes 
it easier to affectively identify with her than with Micah, who feels in control and 
tends not to take things as seriously. However, motivational identification with 
Micah is more likely as he is driven by a desire to capture evidence of what is 
happening in his house. The viewer of a horror film called Paranormal Activity 
will want to witness some kind of evidence of a supernatural entity so will 
identify with Micah’s desire to document an explanation. This means that the 
viewer and Micah have an alignment of activated seeking systems. Even though 
there is this alignment of systems and motivational identification, it does not 
necessarily lead to empathy or allegiance. Micah may not believe in the 
supernatural explanation at first, but he wants to capture proof that something is 
tormenting his girlfriend and the viewer will also want him to capture this proof. 
Both viewer and character seek proof through the utilisation of the diegetic 
camera. 
 
This means that the viewer can strongly relate to the characters’ compulsion to 
keep filming, no matter what the circumstances. This is a fundamental part of 
recognising the character that is being constructed behind the camera. In 
Cloverfield, Hud is at first reluctant to take the responsibility of filming Rob’s 
leaving party but he almost immediately begins to enjoy the process. The quick 
cuts and flurry of camera movement that follows his assumption of the camera, 
along with his frequent declarations of ‘I’m documenting’ suggest that he is 
excited by the camera and keen to capture whatever he can. His off-screen voice is 
almost constant; whether he is telling people why he is filming, screaming or 
praying to God, his emotions come through insistently. Throughout all of this, it is 
generally easy to understand why Hud keeps filming as we have rarely stopped 
imagining him behind the camera. 
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Micah’s use of the camera is for documentation and evidence collection rather 
than for communication. He wants to capture proof of whatever is taunting his 
girlfriend. Katie states that he is fascinated with electronics and this is clearly 
evident by his decision to buy a big camera. Katie finds his choice of camera 
startling when she first sees it but Micah is unmistakably keen to have the best 
gadgets. His television is large, his laptop setup contains software for editing and 
analysing audio and his camera has to be capable of picking up very quiet sounds 
and minute movements in high definition. Often from behind the camera, Micah 
emerges as a controlling and somewhat arrogant presence in the film. His 
determination to capture on camera a sighting seems to take precedence over 
Katie’s wellbeing as he goads the demon in their house into revealing itself, even 
when advised strongly not to communicate with it. 
 
This makes Micah a difficult character with whom to ally. On the other hand, 
Katie appears to be the victim of both the demon and Micah, and is therefore 
much easier to empathise with. Similarly, when Andy takes the camera from 
Judith in Exhibit A and decides to go through his family’s belongings in order to 
find out their secrets, the spectator cannot be in allegiance with him in the same 
way that s/he can with Judith. His actions may be in some ways understandable 
and we may feel some empathy with him, but his behaviour is also morally 
reprehensible. When he finds and films his wife’s dildo, his son’s drugs and his 
daughter’s collection of photos of Claire, he is clearly trying to rid the house of 
secrets as well as taking some revenge on his family for turning on him. Our 
seeking system may be satisfied that the character has sought and found objects of 
interest, but because these were private and hidden objects, it is difficult to feel 
allegiance with the seeker of such objects. The diegetic camera, the recognition of 
the camera operators as characters, and the alignment with their points of view 
can increase empathy, but they are unlikely to affect feelings of allegiance with 
some characters. 
 
Most of all, the home video camera operators demonstrate both a desire to be 
witnesses and a lack of faith in their own sight or their own cognitive capacity for 
memory. The footage is their proof of an event and nothing less will do. This is 
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confirmed continuously in the films, particularly Cloverfield. Hud captures 
testimonials from the people at Rob’s leaving party so that Rob will have proof of 
the event and also proof of how everyone feels about him. The fact that Hud’s 
footage is being recorded over the older footage of Rob and Beth at Coney Island 
means that Rob has no proof of his enjoyable day spent with Beth. It is not just 
Hud that feels this need to record everything in order to have proof of it 
happening. When Rob enters the party and makes a short speech, there are other 
cameras visible in the frame, as other party attendees feel the desire to record 
Rob’s speech as something to remember him by. When there is a distant rumble 
and tremor, the people at the party gather around the television to witness the 
news footage before running to the roof of the building to see for themselves. This 
urge to watch recorded footage continues with Hud filming a TV in an electronics 
store. McKenzie (2011, p.41) notes that:  
 
there are several instances where the wider world is seen 
as Hud aims the camera at television screens (…) where 
the footage of the monster is finally clear, contrasting with 
the first-person view which barely see the monster because 
of its great size and the smoke and destruction around 
it. But it is a world-view mediated by news readers and 
commentary.  
 
When Hud finally captures a glimpse of the monster through the smoke, it has to 
be replayed so that others can gather around and see what he saw and recorded. 
Viewers who have ever felt a strong desire to film or photograph something in 
order to maintain a memory of the subject will understand and empathise with all 
of these examples of diegetic camera use. However, this does not mean that we 
are always in allegiance with these characters, especially when they act 
immorally. 
 
5.6 Allegiance with camera operators engaging in amoral behaviour 
 
Many of the diegetic camera films feature scenes where camera operators engage 
in what most viewers would consider to be ethically questionable behaviour. For 
example in the home movie category, Andy in Exhibit A takes and controls the 
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camera in the last act of the film. Eventually, he leaves the camera recording as he 
murders his family both on and off-screen. However, this is the only example in 
either the documentary and reality television and home video categories where the 
camera operator actually engages in murder. On the other hand, what is 
particularly significant in the charismatic killer category of films is how the 
diegetic production crews become increasingly complicit in their subjects’ crimes. 
In Man Bites Dog and The Last Horror Movie, the camera operators become more 
and more involved in the killers’ plans. Remy and the sound recordist characters 
in Man Bites Dog are increasingly on camera as the film continues and eventually 
take part in disposing of bodies and actually participating in some of Ben’s 
crimes. Equally, Max’s camera-operating assistant in The Last Horror Movie is 
often directed by Max, not only in terms of telling the operator where to point the 
camera, but eventually Max persuades and directs the assistant to carry out a 
murder himself.  
 
The decisions of the camera operators to continue filming is often extremely 
morally dubious in itself. Even before some of the crews join their subjects on 
screen and participate in murder, rape, and body disposal, their complicity in 
murderous actions is unquestionable. All of the camera operators stand by as 
objective observers to murder as their subjects kill in front of the cameras. In the 
films featuring charismatic killers as the subjects of the mock-documentaries or 
mock-home-videos, there is less likely to be perceptual identification with a 
recognisable camera-operating character. Though Man Bites Dog, Zero Day and 
The Last Horror Movie all have diegetic camera operators, they are often not 
constructed as recognisable characters throughout much of the films. This is 
because the camera operators are mostly silent and their cinematography is not 
persistently used as a stimulus to encourage the viewer to imagine the operator’s 
off-screen presence. We learn much less about these camera operators than we do 
in the home video examples. Only Andre and Cal in Zero Day, who mostly film 
each other, can clearly be identified as strong presences behind the camera, 
interacting with events and characters on-screen frequently. Their film is more 
like the home video examples as opposed to Man Bites Dog and The Last Horror 
Movie, which are in some ways closer to the mock-documentary examples. In the 
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former, there are shots that are more clearly coded as the subjective point of view 
of a character whereas in the latter, the majority of shots are more objective with 
less of the operator’s presence stamped on them through movement or off-camera 
audio. Therefore the viewer is less likely to feel as though they are recognising 
and in perceptual alignment with the camera operator because there is less 
imagining of off-camera space and a stronger focus on the profilmic subject rather 
than the operator.  
 
For example in The Last Horror Movie, the camera operator does not speak or 
emerge from behind the camera until over 20 minutes into the film. It is also 
relevant to note that this is the moment when the operator is asked by Max to help 
him move a dead body. Though the operator has been visible in mirrors earlier in 
the film, his face has always been obstructed by having the camera in front of it. 
As the operator has always remained silent even when being spoken to, our 
imaginings of him are limited, and there is not a great deal of character 
construction until he speaks and then emerges from behind the camera. Only 
when the operator says ‘but I’m filming’ in response to Max’s request for help 
moving the body do we now recognise that this is a character being constructed 
that we may need to start imagining more fully. As the operator puts the camera 
down and moves on screen to help Max (figs. 5.25 and 5.26), he becomes 
concrete and our imagining of him in off-screen space becomes more persistent. 
However, he largely maintains his silence behind the camera except in a couple of 
scenes and it is only when he decides to try committing murder himself that we 
learn more about him as a character. The moment where we first see the camera 
operator properly on screen (and not reflected in a mirror) is also the moment 
where we are likely to begin to morally evaluate the character. Our imaginings of 
the character lead us to question the morals of someone who would stand by and 
film as people are murdered in front of his camera. 
 
  IMAGES REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
Figures 5.25 and 5.26: The camera-operating assistant becomes profilmic subject (The Last 
Horror Movie). 
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Max’s assistant in The Last Horror Movie wants to commit a murder but decides 
against it when faced with his first victim. He then displays traits that the viewer 
might desire to possess as he chooses to stand up to Max and therefore here we 
may feel some allegiance with him. However, even before this, we must consider 
that the horror film fan may find the camera operator sympathetic or may feel a 
strong sense of empathy with him or her because both operator and viewer share a 
fascination with the murderers. Any viewer that continues to watch these films 
through to the end shares a similar desire with the diegetic camera operators to 
watch these killers at work. The difference is that the audience knows that none of 
the on-screen murder is real, whereas the characters have no such knowledge. 
 
In these films, recognition of the camera operators as constructed characters can 
be enhanced if they are audible from behind the camera. The more interaction 
they have with their subject, the likelier it is that the viewer can recognise them as 
a construction. In Man Bites Dog, it is frequently Remy the director who appears 
on screen, not the camera operator. The subject of the film, Ben, does not often 
address the camera or its operator. Instead his gaze is usually to the left of the 
camera, emphasising that there is another person present apart from him and the 
camera operator. Occasionally Andre the camera operator is audible, but such 
occurrences are infrequent and the only time he emerges from behind the camera 
is when he passes the camera to Remy, while Andre takes part in the rape of a 
woman. This makes Andre quite a difficult character to imagine as his appearance 
becomes fully concrete in the mind of the viewer for a brief moment towards the 
end of the film, as his time on screen is so limited. Similarly, we do not learn a 
great deal about the camera-operating character from the cinematography either. 
Only on the rare occasions that Andre is addressed by the profilmic subjects, or 
when the camerawork emphasises his presence (such as when he is running after 
Ben and the camera shakes as he runs) are we likely to imagine Andre behind the 
camera.  
 
With their desire to investigate and reveal the daily lives of these killers, the crews 
are in constant danger. By following serial killers, these camera operators are 
risking their lives in keeping the camera close to the murderers. Usually, camera 
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operators follow their subjects until the end (their own deaths or the death of their 
subjects). In Man Bites Dog, the crew continue to follow Ben despite the clear 
danger after having multiple sound recorders killed. They follow their killer until 
they become accomplices, their footage becoming the proof of how complicit they 
have become with Ben’s crimes. Because of this transference from being 
documentarians to accomplices, the crews are not sympathetic and seem to have 
engaged in their own perverse allegiance with the killer they document. However, 
when the production crew engage in rape on camera and appear to take pleasure 
from the act, this is when any allegiance with the characters will surely disappear. 
There is no perverse allegiance with the characters, only an amoral fascination 
with the idea that camera operators can indulge in such behaviour after being 
exposed to the actions of a murderer for a prolonged period. There is no sympathy 
or empathy for the characters when they choose to rape an innocent woman. We 
might expect this from the charismatic killer characters, but the production crew 
have thus far been observers and their transgression is impossible to ally with. I 
will explore the behaviour of camera operators further in chapter 6. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
To consider how the viewer is affected by diegetic camera films, we must 
understand that the camera operator is a character in the diegesis and this 
character must frequently be imagined in off-screen space. The cinematography of 
operators can aid in this imagining as it becomes a part of the performance of the 
character behind the camera. The presence of the frequent off-screen dialogue and 
the cinematography that increasingly reflects the feelings and distress of the 
camera operators in the home video examples creates more empathy and a greater 
engagement with the films. We feel as though we are receiving a privileged 
insight into the camera-operating characters’ thoughts. We recognise the 
characters’ compulsion to keep filming and though we do not share the desire to 
film, we do want the characters to keep filming in order for their story to continue. 
Both the operator and the viewer want to investigate and learn things about what 
is happening in the diegesis. This can be described as either motivational 
identification or an alignment of seeking systems. This may lead to a degree of 
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empathy between viewer and character, but I do not believe that in many cases it 
will have an effect on allegiance, particularly when camera operators act 
immorally.  
 
Therefore, if we learn about the emotions, thoughts and desires of camera 
operators even when they are off-screen, then cinematography in the diegetic 
camera film becomes a significant part of the performance of the actors. The use 
of the cameras aid in demonstrating the interests, motivations, concerns and 
feelings of the operators and can encourage us to empathise more with the 
emotions of the off-screen operator, than with the emotions of the profilmic 
subjects. Even when the camera is set up outside of the hands of an operator, its 
position can still inform us about the character that set it up. 
 
However, in a small number of cases when the camera is set up by a character it 
can mean that there is a lack of perceptual alignment with any character. 
Furthermore, these are rare moments when there is a lack of epistemological 
alignment between the viewer and the camera-operating character. This can move 
us away from empathy and more towards sympathy with the subjects on screen. 
These are relatively infrequent moments in the film and more often due to the 
perceptual alignment between operator and viewer, our knowledge of what is 
occurring in the diegesis is similarly limited thus leading to epistemological 
alignment. We should feel a similar sense of object-oriented fear as the operator 
when they film something extraordinary, monstrous or unexplainable. This is 
heightened in the way that we do not have a privileged view of such monstrous 
phenomenon. Our insight into the camera operating character’s emotions might be 
privileged, but the vantage point from which to get the best view is often 
compromised.  
 
Establishing who the intended or imagined viewer of the film is supposed to be in 
the minds of the characters is also part of the imagining that the viewer must 
engage in when watching the films. The intended audience can be a specific 
character in the film, or the camera operating character might imagine that his or 
her footage will be viewed by a much wider audience. On other occasions, the 
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diegetic camera seems to be the only viewer and the camera operator or the 
characters on screen do not seem to be envisaging that anyone else will watch the 
footage in future. In all of these cases, the actual viewers can feel like we are in a 
privileged position because we imagine that we are the interceptors of the footage. 
Some of the footage is clearly not intended to be seen by strangers and some of it 
is, but in both cases, we imagine ourselves to be the privileged few with access to 
this footage.  
 
When characters are exposing their emotions because they are using the camera to 
communicate with loved ones, this heightens the sense of privilege, but also the 
empathy with these characters. We affectively identify with these characters more 
than others, and more than with those characters that do  not have such a specific 
intended audience in mind for the footage. Our personal imagining is also affected 
because while we may continue to imagine the camera operator, there will be 
occasions where we are encouraged to imagine the specific future viewer that the 
operator or profilmic subject has in mind for the footage.  
 
In the cases where we are strongly reminded that the camera is also the viewer of 
events, we do not affectively identify or empathise with the camera, but we are 
more forcefully encouraged to imagine its presence in the diegesis.  
 
The interactions of the camera operator with the profilmic subjects are also 
important to analyse in order to ascertain how the diegetic camera device affects 
the cognition of the viewer. In these interactions the voice of the off-screen 
operator is significant in encouraging empathy with the operator and our 
imaginings of the operator. Our recognition of a character being constructed 
behind the camera is much stronger if the operator is audible, or if s/he frequently 
appears on screen due to the camera switching to different operators or the 
operator filming themselves a lot. The frequent changing of camera operators can 
act like a retrospective POV structure, therefore making off-screen space become 
concrete and confirming the viewer’s imaginings of off-screen space and 
characters. I have also argued that due to the strong recognition of the character 
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behind the camera and the prolonged alignment with their POV, allegiance can be 
heightened with these operators in moments of conflict with profilmic subjects. 
 
However, having a character as the camera operator does not change our moral 
evaluations of that character because the action remains immoral, and the shock of 
a camera operator acting immorally provokes a negative emotional response. The 
diegetic camera will not cause viewers to forget their morals or empathise or feel 
more allegiance with a character that engages in morally objectionable actions 
such as murder. What does need more investigation is the idea that the charismatic 
killers themselves may be able to provoke unusual emotions in the viewer due to 
the employment of the diegetic camera, as I will investigate in the following 
chapter. 
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Chapter 6: Problematic Allegiance with Charismatic Killers: Man Bites Dog, 
The Last Horror Movie and Zero Day 
 
In this chapter I will focus on how the use of the diegetic camera affects the 
viewer’s cognition of the stories, events, and characters in films belonging to the 
charismatic killer category of focus films. Firstly, in order to show how the killer 
characters can be recognised as subjects that are worthy of our attention and elicit 
amoral fascination, I will analyse how the narration generates what could be 
considered a combination of human and ‘inhuman’ aspects of the killer characters. 
I will then analyse the techniques used to reward this amoral fascination, and 
based on this evidence, I will ascertain how these techniques affect allegiance by 
complicating the moral orientation of the killer characters. Perhaps, the most 
significant of these techniques is the interactions between the profilmic killer 
characters and the viewer. In order to demonstrate the importance of these 
interactions, I will analyse how they affect the viewer’s moral evaluations of the 
killer by having the characters encourage the viewer to evaluate some of their own 
moral choices outside of the diegesis. With particular reference to Max in The 
Last Horror Movie, I consider how his combination of video diaries, footage 
filmed by his assistant and his questioning of the spectator provoke the viewer to 
evaluate some of their own moral choices, not only with respect to spectatorship, 
but in other areas as well. All of the charismatic killer films encourage the viewer 
to question their own fascination with on-screen violence and the killers that 
perpetrate it. The origin of our vision of the films is the diegetic camera and as the 
camera operators become more involved in the crimes of the killers that they 
document, our own complicity with the crimes committed on camera is at stake. 
 
Furthermore, I will determine how increased alignment with the killer characters 
affects viewer’s responses. By this I do not mean the POV alignment discussed in 
the previous chapter. Instead, I mean the alignment with the killers in the sense of 
our access to their knowledge and feelings. By analysing the viewer’s alignment 
with these characters, I will demonstrate how the viewer may experience more 
complex feelings of attraction and repulsion than if a diegetic camera were not 
utilised. The viewer’s access to the subjectivities of these killers provokes feelings 
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of intimacy, but also heightened disgust towards these characters. Based on this 
evidence, I will ascertain if feelings of hatred or fear are lessened due to the 
empathy and sympathetic allegiance encouraged through the employment of the 
diegetic camera. In particular, to ascertain the role and affect of charismatic killer 
characters, I will analyse the use of video diaries and interrogate Carl Plantinga’s 
concept of the ‘scene of empathy’ (1999, p.239) in order to set forth how diegetic 
camera films complicate ideas around close-ups and performance. Instead of 
offering an emoting character, the video diaries use close-ups and performance to 
reveal characters that are difficult to empathise with due to their lack of emotions 
when discussing immoral activities. 
 
I will be referring back to Murray Smith’s structure of sympathy throughout this 
chapter, but I also wish to offer an intervention by evaluating this structure when 
applied to the diegetic camera film. I argue that recognition and alignment are 
heightened in the charismatic killer film, but that allegiance is largely unaffected 
due to the importance of our moral evaluations of the actions of characters, as 
opposed to how these actions are stylistically represented. 
 
6.1 Recognition of killers and amoral fascination 
 
Recognising characters as killers in diegetic camera films requires far less 
imagining on the part of the viewer than was the case with off-screen camera 
operators. The killers are presented on screen for much of the film’s running time 
and their actions are clear from the early priming sequences. Max in The Last 
Horror Movie is first revealed while beating a man over the head with a brick 
within a few minutes of his first appearance on screen. Similarly, Ben in Man 
Bites Dog is first seen strangling a woman to death on a train and then disposing 
of her body. Only Andre and Cal do not kill in the opening scenes of Zero Day. In 
fact, they do not kill until the final scenes of the film. However, they hint at the 
‘big-ass mission’ that they are planning when they film themselves outside of 
their high school. The following scene shows them talking about the ammunition 
that they have collected and therefore the viewer can hypothesise that their plan 
may involve guns and what they refer to as their ‘nemesis’: their high school. 
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Zero Day tells a similar story to Elephant (Van Sant, 2003), but with the diegetic 
camera as a narrating device in order to make the film more authentic to the 
actions of the real killers in the Columbine shootings that inspired both films. This 
lack of immediate violence makes the two boys in Zero Day perhaps more worthy 
of attention and fascination than the killers in the other films. Zero Day builds 
towards its shocking and violent climax, slowly feeding the audience information 
about what is going to occur at the end of the film, rather than offering an 
immediate representation of murder from the opening. The diegetic camera is key 
to this release of information as it is almost always (except in a couple of scenes 
where Andre’s father or Cal’s friend does the filming) the boys themselves who 
must take it in turns filming each other. This also gives the film a greater sense of 
mediated realism. When the pair have to set their camera up on a tripod to film 
themselves or pass the camera between each other’s hands, these moments act as 
nested cues that can potentially remind the viewer of home video productions that 
s/he has seen in the past. When watching The Last Horror Movie and Man Bites 
Dog, the most difficult thing to imagine is the kind of person who would be a 
camera operator when making a documentary that follows a killer, or the kind of 
person who would watch the footage. Because Andre and Cal hide their intentions 
from everyone around them and only reveal their plans to the future viewer of the 
footage, it is easier to imagine that the footage is real, particularly to viewers that 
are aware of the real-life tapes (labelled “The Basement Tapes”) that the 
Columbine High School killers (Langman, 2014) are known to have made 
preceding their massacre. 
 
The diegetic camera functions as the medium for all of the killers to share their 
plans, methods and actions. The killers immediately tease the audience with their 
matter-of-fact discussions of their actions. The conversational tone of the killers 
and the direct address in the case of Max in The Last Horror Movie is unexpected 
and unsettling considering the subject of their dialogue.  In Man Bites Dog, Ben 
recounts how he disposes of bodies and how he finds targets based on how much 
money he thinks he can rob from them. He reveals the more mundane aspects of 
murder than committing the killing itself. This is also intercut with far more 
commonplace scenes where we meet his jovial, shop-keeping mother who 
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discusses what a ‘lovely boy’ Ben was when he was younger. Similarly, in Zero 
Day, we meet Andre’s family in a typical suburban home and learn that he has 
caring parents (who have just bought him the diegetic video camera for his 
birthday) and what seems to be a good relationship with them. They sit at the 
table, chat informally and make jokes with each other. Also in The Last Horror 
Movie, scenes of murder are intercut with scenes of Max showing his more 
ordinary job of being a wedding videographer and his regular relationships with 
family and friends. In the opening scenes, Max also describes in great depth how 
he came to commit his first murder, attempting to justify it to the viewer and 
explain how someone might become a killer.  
 
The banality of these killers and their facial characteristics complicates the idea of 
a generic moral structure associated with the horror film. If monsters are often 
encoded through their iconic appearances and therefore ensure the disgust or fear 
of viewers, the charismatic killers defy this easy recognition of a monster and 
belong more fittingly to the serial killer subgenre. The killers do not wear masks, 
have hideous deformities or hold distinctive weaponry. Neither is their presence 
on screen or their essentially ‘evil’ traits emphasised by non-diegetic music to aid 
our moral orientation as in the case of many films that foreground villains. The 
diegetic camera device does not allow for the inclusion of non-diegetic music as 
this would be undesirable when the conceit is that the film is unpolished raw 
footage. Furthermore, the moral structure of these films is not defined along 
binary oppositions such as good vs evil or natural vs unnatural and therefore the 
filmmakers are not encouraging our antipathy towards the killer characters by 
placing them into opposition with other characters that we may have been more 
temporally and spatially aligned with. Techniques such as sinister music, or the 
iconography of the traditional horror monster are not utilised here in order to 
distinguish the killers from their more ordinary, and morally neutral victims. This 
means that the viewer’s response is less guided towards fear and hatred in typical 
ways. However, it enhances the mediated realism, which in turn makes viewers 
respond to these characters by imagining that they could be real, and are therefore 
deserving of fear. 
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Smith introduces the idea of ‘relative desirability’ (1995, p.194) where our 
sympathies are directed towards some characters because within the film, these 
characters may appear less repulsive than others. We recognise that outside of the 
diegesis, the behaviour of these characters would be considered amoral but 
because the film has positioned them alongside other characters with even more 
morally objectionable behaviour, we might create a hierarchy of sympathies 
during the film. Watching the charismatic killers, we may try and recognise the 
characters that are in some way ‘worse’ then them. The killers may even direct 
our assessment of other characters in order to attempt to gain sympathy for 
themselves. For example in The Last Horror Movie, there is a scene in which Max 
is dining with his sister Sam, her husband John, and their son Ben. Max 
impersonates a gecko in the way he eats. Ben then copies Max. When John 
chastises Ben, the diegetic camera (held by Max’s assistant) pans back and forth 
between John and Ben. John’s tone of voice, his lack of a sense of humour, and 
our lack of alignment with him in the film position him in opposition to Max. 
John sits at the opposite end of the table from Max, further highlighting the 
antagonism of these men that have different ways of modelling behaviour for a 
child. The following scene aligns us with John and Sam as they discuss Max’s 
behaviour at the dinner table. Although we are not aligned with Max in this scene, 
the diegetic camera’s position behind the bars of the stair rail (fig. 6.1) encourages 
us to imagine that the assistant (or perhaps Max) is filming the couple 
unbeknownst to them. Their hushed tones and the fact that John does not raise 
these concerns directly with Max might for a moment make us consider John an 
unpleasant character. Sam disagrees with most of what John is saying, further 
making John appear to be an unreasonable character. Even though we are not 
aligned with Max, this scene is exemplary of how we might be encouraged to 
position John lower in our hierarchy of sympathies than Max.  However, most 
viewers will remember that Max is a murderer and that the assistant is secretly 
filming a private conversation. Therefore, this hierarchy might be directed by the 
film, but viewers are unlikely to consider John relatively less desirable than Max. 
Max is a recognisable murderer, whereas John is simply a stern father that wants 
his son to learn table manners. However, the following scene after John and 
Sam’s hushed conversation shows Max addressing the camera directly while he is 
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driving. We are now again aligned with Max. He gives us full access to his 
thoughts on John, calling him a ‘wanker’ and eventually conceding ‘I suppose I 
shouldn’t be too hard on him’. This prompts the viewer to consider John as 
someone who does not understand Max and by directly addressing the camera and 
speaking his thoughts, our alignment with Max is cemented even if we do not 
necessarily ally with him. We are encouraged to understand Max and his opinions 
and motivations, even if John does not. 
 
IMAGE REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
Figure 6.1: The camera operator films from behind the stair rail (The Last Horror Movie). 
 
For viewers interested in the processes that turn people into murderers, the matter-
of-fact way in which all of these killers discuss their activities appears to offer 
privileged access to the minds and lives of the killers. The diegetic camera aids 
this sense of privilege; the killers are offering the cameras an insight into their 
lives that they could not reveal to most people. But in Man Bites Dog and The 
Last Horror Movie, the character that is getting the killer to share so many details 
about himself is behind the camera. As a result, the viewer often feels as though 
s/he is being addressed by the killer. 
 
6.2 How the diegetic camera directs moral evaluations of the characters 
 
The most significant element of the narrational and aesthetic approaches of these 
films is the diegetic camera and, moreover, the direct address of the killers. Many 
of the subjects of the charismatic killer category act as presenters of 
documentaries and TV shows. They directly address the cameras and 
acknowledge their future audiences. Cal and Andre in Zero Day introduce 
themselves to the camera and frequently explain their actions. They show the 
camera and audience their preparations for ‘Zero Day’; acquiring weapons, 
throwing eggs at a bully’s house and Andre even pretends at one point to be 
presenting a TV show. In this particular scene (fig. 6.2), Andre directly addresses 
the camera saying ‘Hello, and welcome to today’s episode of Home Gun Review.  
Today, we’re going to be showing you how to make a big gun small and easier to 
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conceal’. He then points behind him (fig. 6.3) and moving away from the camera, 
says ‘come on in’ with a smile. Andre imitates the conventions of presenters in 
television programmes directly addressing audiences with a welcome, a 
description of what is coming up in the show, and inviting the audience (and 
camera) to follow him somewhere. Similarly, Ben and Max from Man Bites Dog 
and The Last Horror Movie respectively, all explain their actions gleefully to 
camera. The combination of killer characters and direct address can be disarming. 
While the killers talk about actions such as preparing weaponry, murder, and 
disposing of bodies, their gaze into the camera and often jovial manner can create 
mixed emotions in the mind of the viewer. The imitation of presenters primes the 
viewer to feel welcomed and to perhaps mirror the smiles of the character on 
screen. The response invited is one of incredulity that characters can at once seem 
friendly and frightening. 
 
  IMAGES REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
Figures: 6.2 and 6.3: Andre behaves like a TV presenter (Zero Day). 
 
Max in The Last Horror Movie and Cal in Zero Day shoot their own video diaries 
where they set up the camera themselves, pointing at their own faces as they 
speak about their thoughts and feelings directly to the viewer. In these scenes, 
they use a more intimate and confessional tone, rather than performing as 
presenters. This also creates a greater alignment with these characters than with 
other characters. When profilmic subjects behave more like presenters, the viewer 
can imagine that the character might be performing as much for the camera 
operator as they are for the future viewer. This is why the behaviour of characters 
might seem different when they have set the character up themselves; there is less 
of a sense that they are acting for a person who is in the room with them. The idea 
that there will be a gap between when they record their thoughts to the camera and 
when a viewer will actually watch the footage seems to provide the characters 
with a greater urge to reveal their emotions. Because we can infer from the killer 
characters’ behaviour and monologues that they are filming their video diaries 
themselves, the viewer then does not have to imagine a diegetic camera operator. 
Particularly in the case of Zero Day, where the camera operator (Andre or Cal) is 
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usually audible, Andre’s absence is noticeable when  Cal makes his private video 
diaries. The viewer can sense that Cal is not talking to Andre who is usually 
behind the camera and is instead directly addressing his imagined future viewers. 
Without this need to imagine the operator in off-screen space, the viewer can feel 
added engagement with characters like Cal and Max, but arguably still not 
increased empathy. 
 
For example, Cal confesses to the camera in his first video diary some of his 
reasons for committing the massacre that ends the film. His monologue reveals a 
great awareness of having a future audience. He says things like ‘I’m staring at 
you through the tape’ and ‘we’re going to leave you all behind’. His eyes gaze 
directly into the camera when he says this (fig. 6.4). The viewer is unlikely to 
empathise with Cal’s feelings that the massacre is going to be ‘unreal’ or 
‘beautiful’. However, we can come to a greater understanding of Cal’s personality 
through this video diary. It is similar to a traditional theatrical soliloquy, giving 
the viewer access to the thoughts and feelings of Cal that he might even be 
resistant to share with Andre, his accomplice in the crime. It is also interesting to 
note that only Cal makes video diaries. Even though Andre often seems to present 
to viewers when Andre and Cal are together and therefore it might be inferred that 
he is the ringleader, Cal’s video diaries suggest that he is just as keen (if not more 
so) to commit the massacre. The object-oriented fear that viewers may feel when 
faced with a very human ‘monster’ like Cal is due to his ability to discuss the 
massacre he intends to commit with a smile on his face and then moments later 
discuss something incredibly banal like the tuning of his sitar that he plays in one 
of his video diaries (fig. 6.5). Rather than feeling empathy when watching Cal’s 
video diaries, the viewer is more likely to feel fear or surprise that a person can 
outwardly appear so ‘normal’, but have such antisocial and sadistic personality 
traits that he only reveals to his diegetic camera. 
 
  IMAGES REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
Figures 6.4 and 6.5: Cal’s video diaries (Zero Day). 
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Similarly, Max in The Last Horror Movie reveals a great deal about his 
personality in his video diaries that punctuate the other footage filmed by his 
assistant. We can infer from the first video diary that Max is filming these himself 
as we see him move away from the camera after he has presumably started 
recording (fig. 6.6). Again, in the scenes where there is no camera movement or 
audible camera operator, the viewer is much more likely to feel as though Max is 
directly addressing him or her (fig. 6.7) and there is no need for the viewer to 
imagine a camera operator. This means that when Max directly addresses the 
camera, the viewer will feel a heightened sense of engagement with the film. 
When Max addresses us saying ‘you probably don’t approve’ and leans into the 
camera to say ‘me evil, you good?’ (fig. 6.8), the viewer is prompted to make 
judgements about their own life, rather than the character in the film. Max does 
this repeatedly, posing questions to the viewer in order to encourage them to 
consider their own behaviour, rather than contemplate anything from the diegesis 
itself. He asks the viewer why they would not sell their television in order to use 
the money to help save a starving child for example. While this question does not 
make a viewer think any differently about the character Max perhaps, it does 
encourage the viewer to consider what their answer to Max’s question actually is. 
When Murray Smith refers to the notion of ‘relative desirability’, he considers this 
to be something that occurs when we create a hierarchy of sympathies with 
characters within the text. When Max reaches out beyond the diegesis to the 
viewer, our hierarchy of sympathies may breach the internal/external division. 
Perhaps we may start to consider our own moral choices as less sympathetic and 
this will make us see Max in a more sympathetic light. In this case, we may 
potentially place ourselves as the future viewer below Max in our hierarchy of 
sympathies. 
 
IMAGES REMOVED ROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
    Figures 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8: Max’s video diaries (The Last Horror Movie). 
 
However, it must also be noted that some of these killers are not as determined to 
try and reach out to the future viewer and instead have more pronounced 
relationships with the camera operators and crew. Whereas Cal and Andre have 
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only each other, all the other killers have a crew to follow them around. Ben from 
Man Bites Dog more frequently talks to the director Remy than he does to the 
actual camera and future audience. This ensures that we have to imagine off-
screen space and it can also lessen the immediacy of the film. When Cal or Max 
talk directly to the camera and therefore the viewer in their video diaries, it can 
make the viewer feel a more immediate connection with the footage. When we are 
forced to imagine the presence of a camera operator and production crew, it can 
remind us of the fact that this has been recorded previously, and that we are 
watching the footage after a temporal jump between the time of recording and the 
time of viewing. In the case of imagining the camera operator that films a killer, 
we may enjoy the transgression of watching the killer, or even imagine what it 
would be like to be the camera operator that is in such close proximity to the 
murderous behaviour. In this case, our moral judgements may be of both the killer 
on screen and also the diegetic production crew.  
 
While Ben in Man Bites Dog seems slightly less media-savvy and is much more 
likely to address the crew or camera operator than some imaginary future 
audience, Cal and Andre from Zero Day and Max from The Last Horror Movie 
are preoccupied by ensuring they give their future audience the exact message that 
they wish to share. The use of the word ‘you’ is crucial here in pointedly directing 
their speech at their intended audience. As Cal and Andre approach completion of 
their mission, they leave a message directly for their parents, the media, and the 
bullies who taunted them. They are consistently aware of who they hope will see 
the tapes and when they should see them. The viewer of the film is addressed as 
one of the privileged people with access to these tapes. Our emotional reactions to 
scenes like this are likely to be sadness and perhaps fear. Ethically, we abhor the 
premeditated nature of these killers’ actions, but there may also be another side to 
our emotional response. Due to the young age of the characters and the way they 
address us directly, we may feel sadness that we cannot converse with these 
characters; that someone cannot speak to them and try to change their attitudes 
and affect their future behaviour. Some viewers may even feel sympathy for these 
young men who are so clearly based on the real Columbine killers and leave these 
messages for the world in order to explain their behaviour. Here, the iconography 
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of fresh-faced white middle class young adults encourages us to sympathise with 
the characters more than if they were masked, disfigured, or repulsive monsters. 
 
Max from The Last Horror Movie is similar in that he also looks like an ordinary 
man and he also knows exactly who he is supposed to be addressing as well. He 
has recorded his own ‘movie’ over the tape of another movie called ‘The Last 
Horror Movie’. Anyone who now rents this fictional film will get to see Max 
talking directly to them. He constantly taunts the viewer, questioning them and 
making assumptions about them. He opens with ‘Hello, I realise this isn’t what 
you were expecting’ before teasing the viewer with short bursts of violence and 
asking ‘you’re interested now aren’t you?’ Max is targeting the average horror 
movie viewer, but trying to make him or her realise that s/he is hypocritical if s/he 
does not like his film of supposedly ‘real’ violence when s/he is happy to watch a 
fiction film full of fake murder. He continually interrogates and accuses the 
viewer, saying things like, ‘now you really hate me don’t you?’ and ‘why are you 
still watching?’ More than any other charismatic killer, Max tries to engage with 
the viewer. In this case, Max believes that although he is being watched on screen 
by a viewer, he is not a fictional character in a film. He has made it clear that this 
is not a film that you can rent in a video store, and rather it is a real home video 
that he has created. An audience will find themselves evaluating their own moral 
choices because Max directly speaks to the viewer from out of the diegesis. He is 
not speaking about other characters in the story world, but directly asking the 
viewer questions about their own moral choices. When Max questions how many 
children could be saved from starving if the viewer would only sell their 
television, the direct address monologue encourages the viewer to consider his or 
her own ethical behaviour. By the end of the film, he even attacks a person who 
he has followed home from the rental shop after they rented ‘The Last Horror 
Movie’. The filmmaker attempts to destabilise the boundaries between diegetic 
and non-diegetic and convince the viewer that Max could be waiting for the real 
viewer to finish the film before he attacks. How scared the audience might feel 
towards this ploy may depend on how they morally evaluate themselves for sitting 
through a film that purports to contain scenes of real murder. 
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The charismatic killers in these films are also generally keen to gain some 
prominence or validation from being filmed. Andre and Cal from Zero Day are 
particularly keen for people to know how they went about preparing for their 
mission. They make reference to the fact that after their massacre, people will 
want to scrutinise their videos for clues as to why they committed it. Similarly, 
Max has points he wants to make and is determined to make sure that people see 
his film and question their own beliefs while watching it. Andre, Cal and Max all 
want their audiences to see them as rational individuals who do what they do for 
their own reasons, and not simply because they are crazy. Ben in Man Bites Dog 
even offers to help finance the remainder of the film so that the crew can continue 
to follow him. These instances explain the need for the camera in the diegesis and 
make the prolonged and sustained alignment with these characters a desire of the 
killer characters themselves, rather than a desire of an extra-diegetic narrator.  
 
The act of filming and capturing footage on camera is essential to the killer 
characters’ desire to be revelatory and transparent, and allow access for audiences 
to their subjectivities. In The Last Horror Movie, Max directs his assistant with 
the camera and treats his film as an experiment in some parts. For example, he 
sets up the killing of a couple who are facing each other and tied to chairs, with 
two cameras so as to be able to capture the stabbing of each, but also the reactions 
of the opposite victim. In the sequence below, he explains the experiment (fig. 
6.9), then instructs his assistant to film the male victim as he stabs the female 
victim (fig. 6.10). We must imagine the murder of the female victim from the 
sounds we hear coming from off-screen. In figure 6.11 the assistant then films the 
female victim (now deceased) as Max stabs the male victim, leaving us to imagine 
the second off-screen murder from the sounds we hear. However, Max has set up 
a second camera to capture the moments where he commits the murders, but he 
withholds the footage. This allows Max to pause between committing the murders 
and revealing the footage. In this pause, he directly addresses us and asks if we 
are curious to see the footage of the murder (fig. 6.12). The footage of the murders 
(figs. 6.13 and 6.14) are then cut in to make our imaginings of the off-screen 
murders concrete. There is no alignment with either Max or the victim at the 
moment of murder. Instead of sympathising with the victims, we are encouraged 
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to question our own curiosity and amoral fascination with the killer and the 
graphic details of the murders.  
 
IMAGES REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
Figures 6.9 - 6.14: Max’s experiment (The Last Horror Movie). 
 
Andre and Cal in Zero Day are the most deliberate in documenting their 
preparations, but also their motives. One of their major concerns is that the 
footage will be pored over by the media in the aftermath of their school shooting. 
The footage is therefore precious to them, and it is their desire that it will be 
watched by people after their deaths. They introduce themselves to camera as the 
‘army of two’, Cal creates frequent video diaries and they even film themselves 
storing their footage in a safety deposit box. These scenes show how precious they 
consider their footage to be and how it must remain undiscovered before their 
deaths. The pair talk about who will watch the tapes and how they ‘bequeath’ the 
tapes to the media when they are gone. We are given constant access to their 
subjectivities due to their reliance on the diegetic camera. Cal calls those who see 
the tapes first – in their unedited form before the media cut up the footage  – the 
‘privileged few’. Andre and Cal have the benefit of planning the time and manner 
of their own deaths. This means that their footage can contain what they deem is 
proof of their parents not knowing anything about their plans, and also Andre’s 
cousin’s innocence of any wrongdoing as they show that they stole his guns 
without the character’s knowledge. Andre and Cal even burn many of their 
possessions in an attempt to convince the viewer that music, films, and 
videogames are not responsible for their actions. They acknowledge that by the 
end, there will be thirty hours of footage ‘to sift through’, giving the viewer a 
detailed account of their preparation but also leaving the viewer of the film to 
understand that what they are watching must be edited excerpts. However, despite 
perhaps imagining what might be in these thirty hours of footage, the viewer feels 
like s/he has privileged access to these characters through the diegetic camera. 
Their keenness to relieve anyone or anything else of any blame in their crime 
makes it challenging to place Andre and Cal in a hierarchy of sympathy with any 
other more or less morally objectionable characters.  
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Furthermore, in the penultimate scene of Zero Day when Andre and Cal have put 
down their diegetic camera and left it outside the school, the film switches to 
surveillance camera footage supposedly taken from inside the school as Andre 
and Cal commit their shooting spree. In this scene, there is a lack of access to the 
subjectivities of the either the killers or their victims. We can see the killers’ 
actions as they move around the school and shoot students but our perspective is 
always limited to what the surveillance cameras can see (fig. 6.15). This does not 
allow the viewer to read the facial expressions of either victims or killers. The 
audio is from a phone call made to the police by one of the victims that is now 
deceased. In this audio we hear screams and the killers talking and shouting and 
the sound of gun shots. However, it is often impossible to ascertain who is 
screaming or crying (fig. 6.16). The employment of surveillance camera footage 
means that this is where our alignment with all of the characters is most limited 
and it is also the moment where the killers commit their most heinous actions. 
Therefore, at this crucial moment in the film, alignment and allegiance converge 
as we are distanced from the killers in terms of our perception of them and also 
our moral evaluation of their behaviour.  
 
  IMAGES REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
Figures 6.15 and 6.16: Surveillance camera footage (Zero Day). 
 
6.3 Empathy, the killer’s face, and the close-up 
 
More often than not, medium shots and close-ups are used to capture the 
performances of the actors, and therefore the facial expressions and bodily actions 
of the characters. In the video diary scenes of The Last Horror Movie, Max 
chooses to film himself in close-up. In each of the films, there are moments when 
a killer’s face is caught in close-up but these are unlikely to make the spectator 
ally with them as s/he has made a negative moral evaluation of the character. No 
matter how familiar the characters become through recognisable emotive facial 
expressions, the viewer resists empathising with the killers due to a number of 
factors. Plantinga (1999, p.239) labels certain moments in a film as ‘scenes of 
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empathy’. This is where the locus of attention is on a face often in close-up, the 
pace of the film may slow to allow the viewer time to read the character’s facial 
expression, and consequently the viewer is invited to contemplate the interior 
emotional experience of a character. Plantinga argues that these moments linger 
on the human face to ‘elicit, clarify, and strengthen affective response - especially 
empathetic response’ (1999, p.240). The video diary scenes in diegetic camera 
films work differently from Plantinga’s concept of scenes of empathy, but there 
are similarities that are worth exploring. 
 
Plantinga argues that scenes of empathy work because the viewer is likely to 
experience emotional contagion. We ‘catch’ the emotions of the character on 
screen due to affective mimicry and facial feedback (1999, p.242). Affective 
mimicry occurs when we simply mimic the facial expressions of others and facial 
feedback is the theory that our facial expressions cause us to feel the emotions we 
express. Therefore if we see a character smiling, we are also likely to smile 
(affective mimicry) and furthermore when we begin to smile, signals are sent to 
our brains that make us feel happier (facial feedback). Plantinga references an 
experiment that demonstrates that the faces of people who are listening and 
watching a storyteller will often mirror the facial expressions of that storyteller. 
The charismatic killer characters are excellent examples of storytellers whose 
facial expressions we could potentially mirror. For example in Man Bites Dog, 
when Ben enters the apartment of an elderly lady with a heart condition, he kills 
her by shouting at her unexpectedly, knowing that she will have a heart attack. 
Ben smiles with what could be read as a mixture of pride and amusement on his 
face (fig. 6.17). He speaks to the camera directly, while the woman presumably 
dies behind him. The viewer could mimic Ben’s smile and find Ben’s amusement 
at the situation humorous, but I believe that most viewers will resist the affective 
tenor of these characters despite many aspects of the film that might ordinarily 
elicit empathic responses. Though Ben’s direct address draws the viewer’s 
attention to him, it is the elderly lady who attracts our sympathy. Some viewers 
will locate black humour in this scene, finding its horribleness funny. However, 
Ben’s amusement is directed towards the viewer and the diegetic camera’s claims 
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to realism make this harder to laugh at than other examples where black humour is 
used in films. 
 
IMAGE REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
Figure 6.17: Ben’s amusement at murder (Man Bites Dog). 
 
Plantinga identifies a range of elicitors (1999, p.248) that he argues are 
characteristics of the film that are designed to elicit an emotional response. These 
elicitors are attention, duration, allegiance, narrative context and affective 
congruence and are worth considering in turn in relation to the charismatic killer 
category of diegetic camera films. I argue that charismatic killer films do not 
encourage empathy despite some scenes sharing the traits of what Plantinga 
defines as ‘scenes of empathy’. The diegetic camera can be used to elicit 
responses from the viewer, but in the case of charismatic killer films, the response 
elicited is rarely empathy. For example, to return to the video diary scenes in The 
Last Horror Movie and Zero Day, it is clear that many of Plantinga’s elicitors are 
present. Attention is focussed on the facial expressions of the killer characters (see 
figs. 6.4 and 6.7) and furthermore, these are often long, uninterrupted takes so the 
duration of the shots should potentially give the viewer time to ‘catch’ the 
emotions of the character. What is missing is the allegiance of feeling attraction to 
these characters. Both Max and Cal have their video diaries positioned 
intermittently through the narratives and although Cal does not kill anyone until 
the end of the film, the viewer is unlikely to develop any allegiance with him. 
Max kills regularly, so in between moments where the camera is positioned to 
focus our attention solely on him and what he is saying, we are frequently 
reminded that he is capable of committing murder.  
 
On the other hand, Cal’s video diaries are not positioned between scenes of 
violence. They are leading to the violence we know is coming, therefore 
heightening viewer feelings of dread. We see Cal and Andre playing with 
fireworks and then preparing bombs in the scenes before Cal’s video diaries. The 
use of fireworks appears harmless, but having Cal discuss what can be used as 
shrapnel in a homemade bomb will leave the viewer with a feeling of anger 
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towards Cal. This means that the narrative context does not encourage allegiance. 
However, Plantinga also argues that laying the proper foundations for eliciting 
empathy also involves watching a character in a private moment. He argues that 
scenes of empathy work most effectively when the character is not being observed 
by any other character and, therefore, when the viewer reads the character’s facial 
expression, s/he will know that the character is not performing or faking an 
expression for the benefit of other characters. This is where the use of the diegetic 
camera complicates the notion of elicitors. Although the video diaries clearly 
show the killer characters Max and Cal alone, they are also both aware of their 
imagined future audience. We witness long takes of the characters speaking their 
private thoughts, often pausing and revealing shifting facial expressions, but their 
employment of a diegetic camera is more likely to create feelings of antipathy 
than sympathy or empathy. We feel privileged as viewers to get what seems to be 
an insight into the minds of the killers, but we must also question how much the 
killers are performing for the audience they know will one day watch the footage. 
The video diary offers some illusion of privacy but the diegetic camera also 
affects how the character behaves. Therefore, the employment of the diegetic 
camera does not elicit empathy and, conversely in fact, is more likely to elicit 
antipathy. I would suggest that this is the case because the viewer may resent the 
character and camera for keeping secrets from the authorities. The viewer dislikes 
the character for revealing his thoughts to a camera and not to another character 
who might have been able to stop the murders. The viewer also may feel an 
irrational antipathy towards the camera for not being found by someone who 
could stop the killers from committing murder. 
 
Finally, Plantinga also argues that scenes of empathy are aided by affective 
congruence (1999, p.254). For example, if sad music accompanies a close-up of a 
character with a morose facial expression, then the viewer will be more likely to 
catch the emotion from the character. Diegetic camera films are notably lacking a 
non-diegetic soundtrack. While music could be utilised to make the viewer feel 
sad, happy, or angry at the character, diegetic camera films do not encourage this 
affective congruence. A soundtrack could be added to the films but it would 
lessen the mediated realism. The charismatic killer category of films therefore 
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privilege mediated realism over encouraging empathy or antipathy. While the lack 
of music to reinforce the affective congruence could feel estranging, it does not 
because of mediated realism. We might expect sinister music when a murderer 
discusses their behaviour in a traditional film, but in diegetic camera films, the 
music would actually have the effect of lessening the realism created by the 
aesthetics. 
 
Furthermore, there is not a non-diegetic soundtrack added over scenes of murder. 
The camera does occasionally linger on the faces of victims during murders in 
Man Bites Dog and The Last Horror Movie but these are not structured like 
Plantinga’s scenes of empathy in terms of narrative context, allegiance or 
affective congruency. For example in The Last Horror Movie Max stabs a woman 
in the stomach and directs his camera-operating assistant to get a close-up of the 
woman as she dies. The close-up guides our attention as the woman breathes 
rapidly and stares at the diegetic camera. The duration of the entire shot is 
approximately three minutes from Max descending the stairs in the woman’s 
house to when she finally appears to take her last breath. The final two minutes of 
this shot is focussed on the woman’s face and for the majority of those two 
minutes, Max’s face also shares the frame (fig. 6.18). The scene is less about 
encouraging our sympathy for the victim and more about aligning us with Max 
and giving us access to his thoughts on the murder. Due to our lack of access to 
the victim (prior to this scene), if this is a scene of empathy, then it is designed to 
elicit our catching of Max’s feelings of excitement. Nevertheless, despite our 
alignment with Max, the duration of the shot and our attention being guided, it is 
difficult to feel any allegiance with Max during this scene.  
 
IMAGE REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
Figure 6.18: Max and one of his murder victims (The Last Horror Movie). 
 
 
6.4 Moral Structure: Killers and camera operators 
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I will now return to Murray Smith’s concept of allegiance in order to consider 
how allegiance might be encouraged by creating a moral structure or hierarchy 
within a film. To return to the scene from The Last Horror Movie described in the 
previous paragraph, it is important to remember that three characters are present - 
Max and his victim, and the off-screen camera operator. With three characters to 
morally evaluate, it is therefore useful to employ Smith’s notion of the graduated 
moral structure (1995, p.207) and how this may affect allegiance. The charismatic 
killer films have quite complex moral gradations with the characters frustrating 
clear binary oppositions of values. The killer characters, their victims, and the 
camera operators are often all in the same scene. We generally learn very little 
about the characters and the camera operators must frequently be imagined in off-
screen space. Therefore, our attention is mostly on the killers who are represented 
as being capable of evil actions. However, they have a combination of culturally 
negative and culturally positive traits. Smith calls a character like this an ‘alloy’ 
(1995, p.209), arguing that our judgement of such a character is less severe than if 
s/he were to have no culturally positive traits. Smith believes that an alloy 
character denies the viewer the opportunity to have an uncomplicated hatred 
towards that character. For example in The Last Horror Movie, because we see 
Max picking his nephew up from school and having a generally positive 
relationship with his sister and his grandmother, we are encouraged to think about 
Max in a more nuanced manner than if he were only seen killing people 
throughout the film, as in a traditional serial killer film. 
 
However, even a scene such as this one is structured to create suspense and 
encourage the viewer to fear Max’s intentions. In this scene, the diegetic camera 
first films the boy from a distance as other children from the school can be seen in 
the frame but walking away (fig. 6.19). The camera zooms in slowly and as the 
sound of the group of children starts to dissipate, the boy standing against the wall 
is framed so that he is the only character in shot (fig. 6.20). We immediately sense 
that the camera operator is watching this lone boy specifically and waiting for the 
other children to disperse. There is a cut to the following shot which is almost like 
a point/glance shot, in that if we read the preceding shot as Max’s camera-
operating assistant filming the child (the point/object shot) then the following shot 
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of Max’s face (fig. 6.21) as he looks off-camera suggests that it is he that is 
watching the child (along with his camera operator). Max is also surrounded in the 
frame by the bushes behind him, suggesting he may be hiding himself from the 
other children that exited the previous shot. In the next shot, we follow Max as he 
approaches the child (fig. 6.22). Since this is the first time that we have met the 
child, we do not yet know that he is in fact Max’s nephew. When Max says ‘are 
you waiting for your Mummy?’, it also suggests that Max might not know the 
child and therefore he is not supposed to be picking him up. Everything we have 
been told about Max up to this point suggests that he is a killer and that the film 
he is making is about killing. When he asks the boy ‘do you want to be part of our 
film?’ and points towards the diegetic camera (fig. 6.23), it raises the viewer’s 
concern for the boy. Here we have a case of Max as murdering psychopath 
appearing to be abducting an innocent young boy. When Max leads the child 
away, the last audible part of his conversation is Max telling the boy he has his car 
nearby (fig. 6.24). The diegetic camera operator does not follow as Max and the 
boy walk away. This has two functions; as a result, we cannot hear the rest of Max 
and the boy’s conversation. Secondly, we can imagine that if the camera operator 
has any morals, perhaps he does not want to film what Max is about to do to the 
boy. However, the next shot then reveals that Max is dropping the boy at home 
and we are now led to realise that this is the home of Max’s sister and this boy is 
his nephew. 
 
 
IMAGES REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
Figures 6.19 - 6.24: Max picks up his nephew after school (The Last Horror Movie). 
 
Due to the viewer’s lack of information about Max and the boy’s relationship, 
s/he cannot assess the risk of the situation. In fact, we are positioned to read Max 
as a threat to the boy and to morally evaluate Max in the most negative terms. The 
revelation that he is actually taking the boy to his mother ensures that our moral 
evaluation of Max must change. We recognise that Max does not simply display 
culturally negative traits and that he is being represented in the text as morally 
complex. This scene and a number of others play with audience expectations of 
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what Max is capable of. Similarly, in a later scene where Max visits his 
grandmother, the relationship between Max and the old lady is not revealed at the 
beginning of the scene. We see Max arriving at a door, knocking on it and then 
the door is opened. However, before the door is opened Max turns to the diegetic 
camera and stares at it for a moment. This shot is not a scene of empathy, but as 
Max turns to face the camera and allows the viewer to see his facial expressions 
clearly, it does give the viewer a chance to try and read Max’s facial expressions. 
With the narrative context setting Max up as a murderer in the mind of the viewer, 
the look that Max gives the camera is unsettling (fig. 6.25). His eyes narrow and 
his jaw clenches slightly. It is likely that a viewer might hypothesise that Max has 
bad intentions towards whoever opens the door. When his grandmother says 
‘yes?’ as she appears, it is not a warm welcome of recognition, but more of a 
questioning of who Max is and what he wants. When she asks ‘what’s all this?’ 
and stares at the diegetic camera (fig. 6.26), Max tells her (like he did with his 
nephew) that they are making a film. This again reminds the viewer of the 
presence of the camera operator, but also that the purpose of this film is for Max 
to explain why he kills people. It is only after a minute of the grandmother 
pouring tea, when Max finally calls her ‘grandmother’, that the viewer may feel 
able to relax in relation to Max’s intentions. In terms of storytelling technique, 
this creates a rhyming pattern. Like the scene with his nephew, this scene also sets 
Max up as a threat to what appears to be an innocent and vulnerable character. We 
fear Max as a cold-hearted murderer and question his intentions towards these 
secondary characters. But again, like in the scene with his nephew, we are forced 
to re-evaluate our perception of Max’s morality.  
 
IMAGES REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
Figures 6.25 and 6.26: Max visits his grandmother (The Last Horror Movie). 
 
What complicates the moral structure of these films further is the inclusion of the 
diegetic camera operators. Where do these characters fit in the moral structure? 
Do we receive enough information about the camera operators to make informed 
moral evaluations about them? I believe that we do, but where we would position 
these camera-operating characters on a spectrum of moral behaviour differs across 
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the films. Because these camera operators are predominantly off-screen in The 
Last Horror Movie and Man Bites Dog, perhaps their subjectivities are not clear 
enough to the viewer so that they cannot function as what Smith calls ‘a 
personalized emblem of a clear moral state’ (1995, p.214). What is clear is that 
there is likely to be a disparity between the viewer’s responses to what s/he sees 
and how the fake enunciators respond to what they film. While the spectator is 
aware of watching a fiction text, the camera operators are responding to what is 
real in the diegesis to which they belong. The fictional filmmakers witness murder 
and rape and do little to interject in most cases; sometimes they participate. We 
must contemplate the morals of the diegetic camera operators who believe that 
what they are filming is real. Our moral evaluation of these camera operators can 
in some cases be more unsympathetic than towards other characters. For example, 
Remy and his crew in Man Bites Dog become accomplices to Ben’s rape and 
murder of a woman. In this case, we judge these characters more severely for their 
actions. Their emergence from off-screen observers to on-screen participants is a 
shock. Prior to this scene, the diegetic crew had only participated in activities such 
as drinking with Ben. If the viewer related to the operator, it was because they 
shared the position of observer to Ben’s crimes. The emergence of the crew 
(director, camera operator and sound recorder) from off-screen to engage in a rape 
on camera is a shock and a jarring betrayal for the viewer. It questions the 
culpability of observers and encourages viewers to question their own culpability 
when watching such events. However, because the viewer is aware that they are 
watching fiction, but imagines the diegetic crew as engaging in what they 
perceive as real events, the viewer judges these characters more critically. We 
expect evil actions from Ben, but to see the diegetic crew engage in these actions 
is shocking. The amoral fascination with Ben that the viewer and the diegetic 
crew shared has now become something else. The viewer might be forced to 
question whether amoral fascination can lead to amoral behaviour. It is during this 
scene that Ben starts to be repositioned on the moral spectrum. Instead of 
evaluating Ben as the most morally reprehensible character, the crew have 
become the more guilty characters for their part in Ben’s crimes.  
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Furthermore, soon after this scene takes place, the narration begins repositioning 
Ben again. He is represented as a victim because a number of the characters that 
he is close to are murdered. Due to our alignment with Ben, it is his distress that 
we witness as his family members are killed. However, due to our persistent 
alignment with Ben throughout his random, unprovoked and cruel killings earlier 
in the film, viewers will not easily forget what they have seen. Even when Ben 
discovers the body of his mother and there is a prolonged shot of Ben reacting to 
the discovery, it is not a successful scene of empathy due to the viewer’s memory 
of the crimes Ben has committed. Although Ben is experiencing a terrible event 
and this might be an ideal time for the viewer to feel some sympathy for him, this 
would suggest that the viewer forgets the narrative context developed thus far in 
the film. The memory of the viewer and the narrative context developed this far in 
the film will ensure that the viewer remains disgusted by the actions of both Ben 
and the crew that follow him, particularly as the viewer is never given the 
opportunity to recognise or become aligned with whoever is attacking Ben’s 
family. Our moral orientation is not dynamic in this case because though we may 
be being encouraged to sympathise with Ben by the end of the film, it is a rare 
viewer that will change their earlier evaluation that Ben is a monstrous character. 
 
On the other hand, our moral evaluation of the camera operator in The Last 
Horror Movie is likely to be less severe and more dynamic. When the camera 
operator does emerge from off-screen to participate in a murder, he is unable to go 
through with it. He is first interviewed on camera by Max in a lengthy single shot. 
We can imagine that Max is now the off-camera operator in this scene as his voice 
can be heard as he speaks from somewhere presumably behind the camera. This 
long take works like a scene of empathy and Max continually zooms in from a 
wide shot to a close-up (fig. 6.27) thus ensuring that our attention is focussed fully 
on the assistant. Max does a significant amount of the talking, which also allows 
the viewer to concentrate on the facial expressions of the assistant. It becomes 
clear that even if he is claiming that he is ready to start committing murder, the 
assistant’s facial expression suggests that he is conflicted. In the following shot, 
Max is again the camera operator as we can infer from his off-screen voice as he 
tries to choose a victim for his assistant (fig. 6.28). This shot again shows that the 
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assistant is having doubts. Max’s control of the camera and filming of potential 
targets reveals his willingness to target anyone from businessmen to mothers with 
children. Our point-of-view alignment with Max does not create allegiance with 
him, but instead we feel more closely aligned with the assistant as this is another 
opportunity to read his facial expressions and decipher how he is feeling (fig. 
6.29). The shot ends with the voice of Max saying ‘this one looks a possibility’. 
Again, the assistant does not seem to be an active participant in choosing this 
victim so we may place him in a more positive position on our moral spectrum. 
The next shot reveals the assistant trying to hurt the victim with a piece of wood 
(fig. 6.30), but after some failed attempts to kill her, Max enters from off-screen to 
kill the victim because the assistant is unable to do it. Our evaluation of the 
assistant remains more positive than our evaluation of Max here. Max taunts and 
questions the assistant (fig. 6.31). Though it is still Max’s point-of-view we are 
aligned with, we are given time to read the assistant’s facial expressions, 
recognise his emotions and we are aligned with him as a character more so than 
when he was an off-screen operator. When the assistant holds a knife out towards 
Max and tells him that Max must stop committing murder (fig. 6.32), the assistant 
finally becomes a subject for our allegiance. This is an example where moral 
orientation is dynamic and our feelings for this character are likely to shift and 
develop.  
 
IMAGES REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION 
 
Figures 6.27 - 6.32: The camera-operating assistant becomes the subject (The Last Horror 
Movie). 
 
What is lacking in all of the films is any time spent aligned with the victims 
making it almost impossible to feel much empathy towards them. The use of the 
diegetic camera and our prolonged and total alignment with the diegetic crews and 
the killers mean that the narration largely avoids aligning us with any victims. The 
only scenes featuring victims are the scenes in which they are murdered. There is 
no opportunity to fully recognise these characters as likeable, sympathetic or 
complex human beings. Even altruistic emotions for the dying characters are not 
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encouraged because of the lack of alignment. Murder scenes may even feature 
some elements of scenes of empathy such as attention and duration, but these 
scenes also lack the narrative context and affective congruency to encourage an 
empathetic, or even fully sympathetic response. In the case of most murder 
scenes, the viewer’s attention is divided between the face of the victim and the 
face of the murderer and it is our amoral fascination and continued alignment with 
the murderer that encourages us to focus our attention more on the face of the 
murderer. This aligns the viewer more with the camera operators who choose to 
make killers the subjects of their films, rather than focussing their (and our) 
attention on victims.  
 
As a result, the moral centre of the charismatic killer films lies with the murderers. 
Only the morality of the diegetic crews is considered beyond the central character. 
The viewer is not aligned enough with the victims to learn anything of them as 
people. The secondary characters in all of the films fail to deliver their own moral 
stances except in rare occasions. In The Last Horror Movie for example, it is only 
the assistant who challenges Max’s morals and he is murdered soon after. Max’s 
sister and her husband argue over Max’s behaviour at the dinner table, but Max is 
never challenged directly. Max’s moral stance is so pervasive that he uses it to 
question the morality of the viewer, as I have previously discussed. Similarly, Ben 
is never challenged in Man Bites Dog until someone begins killing his loved ones. 
This only suggests that Ben is a part of a cycle of vengeance where violence is 
doled out as retribution for former acts of violence. Likewise, Andre and Cal in 
Zero Day argue that their actions are vengeance for being insulted and tormented 
at their high school. Their moral stance is delivered directly to the diegetic camera 
in a video diary where they both carefully explain the reasons for their future 
massacre. By aligning us so completely with the killers, their morality is rarely 
challenged and it is up to the active viewer to make moral evaluations of his or her 
own, perhaps in opposition to the morals of the principal killer characters. 
 
Furthermore, the moral resolutions of the films complicate allegiance in the 
charismatic killer category. The killer’s morals remain unchallenged in all of the 
films. In The Last Horror Movie most obviously, the film ends with Max 
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threatening the viewer directly by suggesting he is targeting the current viewer of 
the film as his next victim. In this case, the moral resolution is one that directs us 
to imagine that Max’s crimes can go unpunished and that by watching his film, 
the viewer has become positioned as a target. Max may have encouraged the 
viewer to question his or her own morals, but when Max directly addresses the 
camera at the end of the film, his words are supposed to create object-oriented fear 
as the viewer evaluates him as a dangerous character. On the other hand, both 
Zero Day and Man Bites Dog offer slightly more complex moral resolutions. 
Andre and Cal achieve their goal of massacring students and then killing 
themselves. Their parents and the police fail to stop them and because the boys’ 
desire was to kill themselves, they essentially die unpunished for their actions. 
The final scene of the film however takes place in the days following the 
massacre. Crosses for each of the killed students have been erected outside the 
school. There are also two crosses for Andre and Cal. After the surveillance 
camera footage of the shooting massacre, Zero Day switches to a new fake 
enunciator for this final scene where a group of young people go to the newly 
erected crosses, find Andre and Cal’s and set light to them. This is an unsettling 
final image as the immediate association of burning crosses in the minds of many 
viewers with some knowledge of American history will be the actions of the Ku 
Klux Klan. Whether the young men in the final scene are ignorant of this 
association or whether they are aware, but unbothered by the signification, the 
moral resolution of the film is complicated by their actions. The viewer may 
empathise with the desire to desecrate the crosses of the killers, but the imagery of 
burning crosses is a symbol of intimidation, racism and a misguided use of 
religious symbols. This image ends the film with the killers as the final victims of 
vengeful actions and therefore further complicates the moral resolution. 
 
Finally, Man Bites Dog is more conventionally moral in its resolution. Ben and 
the diegetic crew are all killed in the final shot of the film. Being aligned with Ben 
as he discovers the murder of his loved ones might have directed the viewer 
towards a fleeting moment of sympathy for him, but seeing both Ben and his crew 
die feels like a conventional form of justice as violent characters are often killed 
in films in violent ways. Ben and the crew’s deaths at the end of the film are likely 
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to be the only moment of the film where the viewer can feel any relief or delight 
in amoral actions. We do not get to see the character that commits these final 
murders. There is no recognition or alignment with this unknown character, but 
his or her actions feel like the most moral actions in the context of the narrative 
that has preceded this final shot. It is unlikely that our allegiance has been swayed 
by the presence of a diegetic camera, even as its fall to the ground signifies the 
death of the camera operator. As a result, I believe that no truly perverse 
allegiance with monstrous characters has been constructed or even encouraged. 
 
 6.5 Conclusion 
 
To consider how the viewer is affected by films belonging to the charismatic 
killer category, it is essential that we understand how the employment of the 
diegetic camera affects how we perceive the characters that are in front of the 
camera. The diegetic camera offers increased intimacy and engagement with these 
characters, heightening our fascination with them and limiting our access to the 
victims. However, it also encourages us to imagine these killers as more realistic 
and recognisable than traditional film villains and therefore to find them scarier. 
Murray Smith’s structure of sympathy allows our engagement with these films to 
be broken down into recognition, alignment and allegiance. The process of 
recognising the killer characters is a less demanding task than recognising the 
camera operators as characters as I have established. Recognising the killers is 
easier because it requires less imagining of off-screen space (if any at all) and 
instead the viewer can give the on-screen killer their full attention. This attention 
is rewarded because these killers may not be attractive in terms of culturally 
positive traits, but they are subjects that are amorally fascinating, particularly due 
to their combination of bizarre and banal facets in their lives. 
 
In these films, the diegetic camera is employed less as a device to ensure that we 
imagine the off-screen operator and more as a method for the killer characters to 
speak directly to their imagined future viewers. This means that the viewer is in 
prolonged alignment with these killer characters, not in terms of their visual point 
of view, but in terms of access to their subjectivities. The video diary segments of 
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the films are a particularly notable aspect of diegetic camera use and are in stark 
contrast to the surveillance camera footage employed in some of the final scenes 
of Zero Day. I have argued that video diary scenes share some of the elicitors as 
Plantinga’s ‘scenes of empathy’, but that the video diaries in charismatic killer 
films work in a different way. The narrative context and lack of affective 
congruency created by non-diegetic music almost ensures that we do not ally with 
these killer characters and despite our privileged alignment with these killers, 
these video diaries would be more accurately be labelled scenes of antipathy than 
scenes of empathy. 
 
Finally, I have considered how the recognition and alignment with killer 
characters does not necessarily lead to allegiance even when the killers appear to 
be the moral centres of the films. There is a moral spectrum in the films, but this 
is affected by our prolonged alignment with the killer characters. We perceive 
secondary characters through the prism of the thoughts of the central killer 
characters. However, this does not necessarily lead to the viewer positioning the 
killers higher in a hierarchy of sympathy compared with other secondary 
characters. The diegetic camera is again at the centre of the moral resolutions of 
the films, but it is not necessarily the contingent factor that affects our final 
evaluation of the characters. 
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Chapter 7: Re-definitions, classifications and summary conclusions   
 
In light of the analyses presented in the preceding chapters, there are many 
conclusions to be drawn about the widespread use of the diegetic camera in 
contemporary horror. I have argued that the systematic employment of the 
diegetic camera is likely to have an effect on viewer emotions and the way the 
viewer processes the films. I have situated mediated realism as a key factor that 
moulds our response to these films. Priming and nested cues in the early stages of 
the films aim to elicit mental schemata associated with the viewing of non-fiction 
media forms. The stimuli that arise from the use of the diegetic camera are 
organised in the viewer’s mind and encourage the viewer to respond by imagining 
that the characters are not works of fiction. The diegetic camera allows for a more 
pronounced and prolonged alignment with camera operators and charismatic killer 
characters. However despite this, I am not convinced that this sustained alignment 
provokes increased allegiance with characters that we morally evaluate in 
negative ways. 
 
Diegetic camera films combine the two directions taken by the earliest films; 
using elements of both documentary and fictional narratives and merging them 
into a distinctive contemporary media form. Arguably, they could be considered 
more interactive and immersive than the recent spate of films made utilizing 3D 
technologies. While many 3D films attempt to immerse the viewer in the diegetic 
world through the use of stereoscopic cameras, or of a post-conversion process, 
diegetic camera films rely more on the off-camera sound of camera operators, 
point-of-view shots and shaky, fast camera movements to immerse the audience 
and encourage their imaginings of off-screen space. In many ways, diegetic 
camera films are an evolution of film towards other media forms such as virtual 
reality, video games, simulators and theme park rides. While bigger budget films 
attempt to innovate and improve the audience experience using more expensive 
technologies such as 3D and IMAX cameras, diegetic camera films feature 
innovations at the lower end of the budget scale. Critics have started to write 
about ‘found footage fatigue’ (Brew, 2011), but the aesthetic and perceptual 
strategies of these films seem to be showing no signs of abating. Diegetic camera 
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films are still being made in the horror genre, but increasingly other genres such 
as the superhero film (Chronicle) and crime drama (End of Watch) are benefitting 
from employing some of the strategies of these films. However, in light of the 
analysis contained in this thesis, the classification of these films under the ‘found 
footage’ catch-all title has become unfit for purpose and new ways of classifying 
and interpreting these films must be established.  
 
7.1 Re-definitions and classifications 
 
The usefulness of the term ‘found footage’ has its limitations. It was previously 
coined to describe ‘films like Bruce Conner’s A Movie (1958) or Christian 
Marclay’s The Clock (2010), assembled out of existing footage scavenged from 
different sources’ (Bordwell, 2012). Bordwell has suggested the term ‘discovered 
footage’ in order to avoid confusion and while both of these terms allude to the 
ruse that these films are made up of footage that has already been shot by 
someone and is now being made available to the public, there are more 
distinctions that must be considered. In this thesis, I have divided the films into 
three categories; firstly those that take the form of mock-documentaries or reality 
television shows. These ‘pseudo-documentaries’ (Bordwell, 2012) still have 
differences within them that are significant. Some take the form of expository 
documentaries and the ‘found footage’ is actually only a small part of the total 
film, such as The Last Broadcast. More commonly, there are those that begin in 
the participatory mode and continue in this way, but become less about making a 
sellable media product and more about documenting a hitherto unforeseen disaster 
unfold such as The Blair Witch Project and Rec. The ‘charismatic killer’ films 
straddle the line between documentary and home video. The killers themselves, or 
the crews that follow them, clearly want the footage to take the form of a 
documentary, but the amateurishness, and also the fact that the killers must often 
film themselves, give these films an aesthetic quality closer to home videos. The 
‘home video’ examples are more self-explanatory; amateurs wield their cameras 
in the domestic sphere in order to capture special occasions in the home or 
mysterious events in and around the home. However, in some cases, again these 
classifications are not sufficient. For example, Cloverfield begins as a home video, 
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but by the end Hud is attempting to document a cataclysmic event that is 
newsworthy and could easily constitute a large part of a documentary on the 
subject.  
 
In some of the films, it is made very clear that the footage has been found, and 
often by whom it has been found, whereas in others this knowledge is assumed. In 
most cases, the films end with the death of the camera operator and the dropping 
of the camera, but in others the film continues after the death of the camera 
operator, as in Zero Day when the final scene introduces a completely new camera 
operator who captures the burning of the crosses. Very few of the films allude to 
the author, or editor of the final cut of the footage. What they all share is their use 
of the diegetic camera, making Ingle’s use of this term to describe the films very 
apt. However, while this term applies to all of the films, further differentiation is 
needed to classify the breadth of different camera types that are used in order to 
create these films. This is becoming increasingly important as diegetic camera 
filmmakers have innovated and added new technologies to the roster of camera 
types that have already been used in these films. It is difficult to use this as a 
means to classify the films. For example, the climax of Chronicle utilises footage 
from a multitude of cameras in the hands of many different operators. There is 
camera phone footage, surveillance camera footage, and TV news camera footage. 
These films can therefore not be divided by how they are shot without significant 
areas of overlap. 
 
Heller-Nicholas (2014) categorises the films further by considering the ‘thematic 
and subgeneric diversity that has flourished’ (p.149) since 2007. Heller-Nicholas 
divides those found footage films that have taken exorcism as their subject matter 
such as The Devil Inside (Bell, 2012), those that centre the family at the heart of 
the horror such as Exhibit A and finally those films from around the world that 
‘engage with a number of diverse socio-political elements’ (p.150) such as The 
Tunnel (Ledesma, 2011). These useful subdivisions help to identify recurring 
tropes of diegetic camera horror films, but only account for a limited number 
made since 2007.  
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A further consideration for classifying these films should be the increasing use of 
surveillance cameras and cameras that are used for communication purposes. 
Originally, this thesis considered these films as a separate category, but in order to 
limit the scope, films such as The Collingswood Story (Costanza, 2002), My Little 
Eye (Evans, 2002) and Alone With Her (Nicholas, 2006) remain unexplored. In 
these films, webcams, surveillance cameras and tiny portable spy cameras are the 
diegetic cameras and there is an increasing employment of such technology in 
recent films. Paranormal Activity 4 (Joost and Schulman, 2012) exclusively uses 
built-in laptop cameras, as does Unfriended (Gabriadze, 2014) which only shows 
what one character is seeing on her computer screen as she communicates with 
her friends through Skype and also occasionally engages in instant messaging and 
browsing the Internet. Invasion (Pyun, 2005) and End of Watch are also notable 
for their use of police car dash-cams, particularly the former whose footage is 
almost completely captured on the dash-cam of one car. The employment of the 
diegetic camera in films such as Invasion and Unfriended have implications for 
narrative structure, alignment and self-consciousness and must be explored further 
in order to consider the changing relationship between audiences and screens and 
characters and cameras. 
 
 
7.2 Conclusions and contribution  
 
Throughout this thesis, I have drawn numerous conclusions with regards to 
priming, self-consciousness, and allegiance in diegetic camera films. In chapter 1, 
I have identified a thematically organised genealogy of the diegetic camera horror 
film, explaining how these antecedents have influenced diegetic camera horror 
films and allow contemporary audiences to comprehend the aesthetics of these 
productions and their mediated realism.  
 
  7.2.1 The importance of priming 
 
With regards to priming, chapter 4 has explored how the audience is invited to 
imagine that the footage before them is more authentic than the footage presented 
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in a traditional fiction film. The camera’s presence is emphasised in order to 
highlight to the viewer that they are watching a construction. However, if viewers 
are to play along with the game that the filmmakers designed, then they must 
imagine that the characters within the film are responsible for at least the shooting 
of the film, if not the editing. Within some of the films, this means learning about 
the characters who operate the cameras, and in others priming merely involves 
understanding that there is someone (who remains largely anonymous) operating 
the camera. The production techniques and aesthetics make imagining that the 
footage is non-fiction and filmed by an enunciator in the diegesis easier. The 
viewer is active in imagining off-screen space; imagining where the camera is, in 
whose hands it is held and often even the emotional state and activity of the 
camera operator. No viewer, particularly those who have seen more than one 
diegetic camera film, is fooled into believing that what s/he is watching is real 
footage. However, for those who wish to imagine that this is what a ghost sighting 
looks or feels like, or what a serial killer would sound like in real life if captured 
by available media technology, the apparent capturing of these moments by a 
diegetic crew make them seem more real, more immediate, and often more 
engaging. 
 
Audiences of diegetic camera horror do not engage with the films as if they are 
documentaries, but the priming techniques attempt to ensure that if a viewer wants 
to imagine that they are watching real footage, then it will be easy to do so. 
Drawing on techniques that will be recognisable to most people from news 
footage, documentary, reality TV, user-generated content on the Internet as well 
as home videos, the filmmakers blur the boundaries between fiction film and non-
fiction forms of media, creating an affective mediated realism. This creates a 
‘reality mood’ which has the potential to generate a more immediate and 
immersive response to the films and the characters. The stylistic cues that lead to 
mediated realism have been inputted into the memory of the viewer so that when 
events become more extraordinary, the viewer will retrieve these cues that led 
them to read the film as plausible and realistic. 
 
195 
 
However, these films are also clearly products of a commercial industry and can 
be delineated by the conventions that they share with other films in the horror 
genre. As well as the ‘reality mood’, the priming that occurs in the early scenes 
creates an anticipatory mood, even if the horror is not yet present. Diegetic camera 
films deliberately allude to the fate of their protagonists in their opening titles. 
This primes the audience to hypothesise pessimistically about how the films will 
end and also allows the mood to be fearful, even when nothing immediately 
threatening is occurring in the opening scenes. While the opening scenes prime 
the audience for something akin to a genuine non-fiction media product, the 
opening titles before these scenes prime the viewer for the more extraordinary and 
horrific events to take place later.  
 
Finally, the opening scenes of found footage films must prime the spectator for 
the experience of seeing the majority of the film from one character’s point of 
view. This camera-operating character is often central to the story as s/he 
converses with the characters on screen, is affected by the events s/he witnesses, 
and offers the viewer both a privileged insight into his or her own thoughts, while 
also limiting the viewer’s knowledge of events to what the character knows and 
sees. Many of these films make a point to reveal their camera-operating character 
early on in order to aid with character construction and thus they allow the viewer 
to ‘recognise’ that there is a character there to be considered and to empathise 
with. 
 
  7.2.2 Self-consciousness and camera operator interaction 
 
Once the viewer has been primed to imagine a character in off-screen space 
behind the camera, the cinematography takes on increased importance as it can be 
conceived as a vital component of the performance of the camera operator. I have 
shown in the analysis how the cinematography can reflect the feelings, desires and 
distress of the camera operators and I believe that this recognition through 
imagination can lead to greater empathy and therefore engagement with the films 
and the camera-operating characters. One of the most recognisable traits of these 
characters is their compulsion to continue filming even in extreme circumstances. 
196 
 
I believe that diegetic camera films will be more engaging to viewers that share 
this compulsion with the camera-operating characters. Viewers who have 
experience of making their own home videos, for example, will empathise more 
with a character that displays a similar desire to film events around them. 
 
However, diegetic camera films are also engaging because their aesthetics 
encourage the viewer to search the frame quickly and carefully. The hectic 
camerawork and the POV alignment with a curious camera-operating character 
encourages an activation of seeking systems as character and viewer frantically 
search for focal points, clues that are hidden in darkness and threats that might 
attack the camera and operator. The manner in which the diegetic camera is 
utilised can reveal the interests and motivations of the operators and can 
encourage us to empathise more with the emotions of the off-screen operator, than 
with the emotions of the profilmic subjects. The revelation of the motivations of 
the camera operators even extends to when the camera is set up separately from 
the hands of the operator. The viewer is perceptually aligned with the camera and 
not the character, but we can still learn something about the character from their 
positioning of the camera. The diegetic camera often provides epistemological 
alignment between operator and viewer, but in cases where the camera is not at 
the eye of the operator, we learn more than what the character learns (unless the 
character plays the footage back during the course of the narrative, as is the case 
in Paranormal Activity). Therefore, the viewer of diegetic camera films can feel 
like s/he is receiving a privileged insight into a character due to the prolonged 
alignment, but also a view of the diegesis that is lacking in privilege compared to 
if s/he was watching a film with a more traditionally omniscient narrative 
strategy.  
 
The viewer can also imagine who the intended or imagined viewer of the film is 
supposed to be in the minds of the characters. By imagining that there is an 
intended viewer, the actual viewer can feel like s/he is in a privileged position 
because s/he can feel like an interceptor of the footage. This is heightened when 
the footage is clearly not intended to be seen by strangers and when characters 
appear to use the camera as a confidant. Our personal imagining is affected 
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because while we may continue to imagine the camera operator, there will be 
occasions where we are encouraged to imagine the specific future viewer that the 
operator or profilmic subject has in mind for the footage.  
 
I have also analysed the interactions of the camera operator with the profilmic 
subjects because I believe that these moments are crucial in encouraging empathy 
with the operator. Frequently audible (or visible) camera operators continually 
confirm who is behind the camera, and this encourages our clear recognition of 
the character behind the camera and might in some cases heighten empathy and 
even allegiance.  
 
  7.2.3 Allegiance with charismatic killers 
 
The charismatic killer category required separate attention in this thesis as the 
diegetic camera is used less to provoke imaginings of off-screen camera operators 
and more to allow morally negative characters to communicate with the viewer. In 
terms of recognition, alignment and allegiance, the process of recognising the 
killer characters is less demanding because it does not require the viewer to 
imagine off-screen space. This means that the viewer can focus their full attention 
on the killer characters, rather than dividing their attention between imagining off-
screen camera operators and pro-filmic subjects. The pro-filmic subjects in this 
category are amorally fascinating killers and they are particularly captivating due 
to the combination of bizarre and banal facets in their lives, but also the manner in 
which the diegetic camera captures them.  
 
The killer characters speak directly to their imagined viewers, putting the viewer 
in a prolonged and sustained alignment with them. Our access to their thoughts is 
heightened because they often use the diegetic camera to create video diary 
segments. However, even though these scenes share some of the elicitors of what 
could be considered scenes of empathy, they in fact often have an opposite effect 
on the viewer. The narrative context and lack of affective congruency can lead to 
viewers feeling increased antipathy towards these characters as the killers offer 
the viewer a privileged, but disturbing insight into their minds.   
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Overall, despite the importance of the diegetic camera, I am not convinced of its 
ability to affect allegiance. Recognition and alignment does not necessarily lead to 
allegiance and the diegetic camera provides the viewer with opportunities for clear 
recognition and sustained alignment, but their moral orientation is not shifted as a 
result. The diegetic camera fails to offer the viewer a chance to be aligned with 
victims before they actually become victims. This means that the killer characters 
are the moral centres of the films and their morals are not positioned in opposition 
to other characters’ values. The only way that the diegetic camera has a notable 
impact on allegiance is in fact, on the viewer’s evaluation of the diegetic camera 
operators when they engage in morally objectionable actions. We expect the killer 
to kill, whereas we expect the camera operator to be an objective observer. The 
shock experienced when the camera-operating characters move from observers to 
participants is perhaps the most unexpected and upsetting of events. As a result, 
the viewer is likely to morally evaluate these characters in harsher ways than the 
killer characters that are expected to engage in immoral behaviour. 
 
7.3 Further areas of exploration 
 
Despite the repetition that is inherent in any genre or sub-genre, diegetic camera 
films are often criticised for being particularly dependent on what critics such as 
Simon Brew (2011) consider to be predictable conventions. However, there is still 
constant adaptation and innovation of the diegetic camera conceit and these films 
will offer more to consider analysing in the future. Developments in camera 
technology are key to developments in the genre, with filmmakers exploring many 
different types of cameras that can be used. Surveillance cameras, GoPro and 
other ‘action cameras’ and phone cameras are still relatively unexplored media for 
filmmakers. With the ubiquity of these kind of recording devices increasing, it is 
likely that films that use these technologies will continue. For example, V/H/S 2 
(Barrett, Eisener, Evans, Hale, Sanchez, Tjahjanto and Wingard, 2013) contains a 
sequence filmed entirely with a GoPro camera, much of Afflicted (Lee and 
Prowse, 2013) also utilises a similar camera and Blair Witch utilises a camera 
attached to a drone. So-called ‘action cameras’ can go to places inaccessible to 
earlier technology. They can be attached to people’s bodies with special mounting 
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equipment and can free the hands of the operator. This can lead to more subjective 
point of view, where the camera is close to the eyes of the operator but crucially 
the cinematography remains unaffected by the hand movements of the operator. 
 
It will also be interesting to map the impact of the so-called ‘selfie stick’ and other 
devices that are becoming increasingly popular for tourists, festival-goers and 
others to use in order to put themselves in the foreground of the picture they wish 
to take. Not only are cameras getting increasingly smaller, easy to use and 
portable, but the technology used to support and position these cameras is 
changing. The ‘selfie stick’ will become a useful tool for camera-operating 
characters to put themselves back on-screen and to allow filmmakers to ensure 
that the entire film is not simply a point/object shot, without any chances for the 
viewer to see the character holding the camera. Therefore, a more thorough 
consideration of the technology surrounding camera operation could prove useful 
when studying diegetic camera films. The limits to what a character can achieve 
with a camera are being tested by technological advancements and also new 
narrative conceits. For example, drone technology is going to become increasingly 
affordable. As these devices allow domestic camera users and documentary 
makers to create aerial shots on a minimal budget, diegetic camera films have 
begun to adopt these techniques. For instance, in the film Chronicle, a character’s 
telekinetic abilities are used to control the movement of the camera, allowing for a 
more diverse and unique aesthetic experience than in many other diegetic camera 
films. 
 
One of the major areas that still needs to be explored is how diegetic camera 
techniques and aesthetics have started to be used beyond the horror genre. I have 
chosen to focus on what could loosely be described as films in the horror genre as 
this is where the trend for using diegetic cameras began. However, it is debateable 
that some of these films would be categorised as horror; for example Zero Day 
and Exhibit A could both be considered dramas. While a comprehensive genre 
analysis is outside of the scope of this thesis, it would be prudent to consider the 
use of the diegetic camera in relation to the conventions of various genres. The 
purpose of using a diegetic camera in what I have broadly categorised as diegetic 
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camera horror films has been interrogated in the preceding chapters. The question 
of what makes filmmakers turn to diegetic cameras in other genres has only 
recently started to be considered. Films such as Chronicle, End of Watch, Project 
X (Nourizadeh, 2012), Project Almanac and Earth to Echo have all attempted (in 
a manner similar to Cloverfield) to take the found footage aesthetic into more 
mainstream genres such as the superhero movie, the cop thriller, science fiction 
and the teen comedy. Some have experimented in using both diegetic and extra-
diegetic cameras within the same film (End of Watch) and some have 
experimented with using countless amounts of cameras to cut together a range of 
different perspectives from various characters (Project X, Chronicle). The chapter 
on priming in this thesis is still applicable to many of these films as the priming 
strategy is often very similar. However, it would be significant to consider how 
these films differ in terms of concepts such as interaction, cinematography as 
performance, and allegiance and if the purpose is not to scare an audience, then 
what it is that the techniques are being used to achieve. 
 
Another area that this thesis leaves relatively underexplored is what I consider a 
separate category of diegetic camera films - surveillance and communication 
films. In this category, which includes films such as The Collingwood Story, My 
Little Eye, Alone With Her and most recently Unfriended and Ratter (Kramer, 
2015), the diegetic cameras are all either expressly used for surveillance purposes 
(in My Little Eye for a webcast competition and in Alone With Her for discreet 
spying) or for communication across the Internet between individuals (as with the 
webcams in Unfriended). These films raise many distinct issues as the camera is 
not generally held by characters, but it is still diegetic and the characters self-
consciously understand that they are being filmed (in most cases except Alone 
With Her and Ratter where the characters are recorded without their knowledge or 
consent). The implications in terms of allegiance and priming could be explored 
in a further study. For example, priming in a film such as Ratter where the central 
character is not aware of being filmed by the camera on her hacked laptop and 
phone is necessarily different to the priming scenes in my focus films. The notion 
of who controls the cameras is complicated as they may be in the hands of the 
central character, but she does not know that the cameras are recording her and 
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that the footage is being watched. Allegiance is also complicated in many films 
like Ratter and Unfriended where there is an unseen character controlling the 
cameras and taking the place of fake enunciator. 
 
To conclude, despite its many detractors, the diegetic camera does not seem to be 
disappearing as a popular concept for filmmakers. If horror films respond to 
contemporary anxieties, then the diegetic camera trend is a continuation of this. 
These films are quite astute at reflecting how people are increasingly experiencing 
life through a camera lens, or by watching events (filmed by someone else) unfold 
on a screen. With this blurring of what is real and what is a media construction 
occurring everyday in audience’s media consumption, diegetic camera horror can 
capitalise on this. 
 
The diegetic camera is undoubtedly a popular technique with inexperienced 
filmmakers due to the limited budget needed to make a film in this way. The 
reasons for these films occasionally crossing over into the mainstream and 
enjoying overwhelming success (or developing a cult following and some critical 
praise) cannot be wholly attributed to the diegetic camera. Detractors may criticise 
the stories, performances, scripts or aesthetics but these films do on occasion 
attract a large number of viewers. I believe that this is because of their claims to 
mediated realism, and their attempts to force the viewer to imagine off-screen 
space and empathise with an off-screen character to make the films more 
terrifying. The interaction between diegetic camera operators, profilmic subjects 
and the viewer can be more engaging than films that do not break the fourth wall. 
The mediated realism of these films makes imagining that they are real an easy, 
spontaneous process for the viewer and this adds to their immersion and empathy. 
Finally, I argue that the diegetic camera offers the viewer what appears to be a 
convincing insight into amorally fascinating characters and the mediated realism 
created by the diegetic camera encourages us not to ally with these characters, but 
to imagine that they are real in a more spontaneous and forceful way than if the 
diegetic camera was not utilised. Thus the acts of these characters are more 
disturbing. 
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More than any other horror films, those that employ the diegetic camera ‘impress 
upon their spectators the proximity, the immediacy of their terrors, avoiding the 
conventions that mark them out as safely contained entertainments’ (North, p.88, 
2010). By avoiding many traditional cinematic conventions, they have created 
new ones. Unfortunately for viewers that want to imagine that these films are non-
fiction, the more familiar that the conventions of the diegetic camera film become, 
the more difficult that imagining will be. Consequently, the harder it becomes to 
imagine that the events on screen are real, the safer the experience of watching a 
diegetic camera film feels. 
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Quarantine (John Erick Dowdle) 
The Ghosts of Crowley Hall (Daren Marc) 
The Moretti House (Todd Douglas Bailey) 
The Project (Ryan Piotrowicz) 
2009 1013 Briar Lane (Michael Bayouth) 
Cropsey (Barbara Branaccio and Joshua Zeman) 
Evil Things (Domic Perez) 
Hunting Grounds (Matthew Charles Hall) 
In the Dead of Night (Joey Evans) 
Keramat (Monty Tiwa) 
Lunopolis (Matthew Avant) 
Murder Collection V.1 (Jerami Cruise, Fred Vogel and Shelby Lyn 
Vogel) 
Occult (Kôji Shiraishi) 
Paranormal Entity (Shane Van Dyke) 
Rec 2 (Jaume Balagueró and Paco Plaza) 
Russia 88 (Pavel Bardin) 
The Dead... Will Rise! (Brandon Salkil and Jordan Salkil) 
The Lift (Brady Starr) 
The Ritual (Anthony Spadaccini) 
The Turnpike Killer (Evan Makrogiannis and Brian Weaver) 
Timetravel_0 (Scott Norwood) 
Trash Humpers (Harmony Korine) 
Unaired (Tim Buel and Derek Sigmund) 
 
Source: Found Footage Critic 
 
